Hence, a question arises: If none of these three strategic and legitimate “sources” of the country “supplies” 31% of the draft acts for year 2024, what is the other “agenda” which is distinctly and significantly served to by one of the most important processes in place – the drafting of legislation by the Executive body? Are we actually dealing with another source or can this simply be attributed to the need to better reconceptualize the GAPDA law-making process, the institutions’ responsibilities, and their accountability in the implementation of the analytical program?
The Need for More Predictability, Transparency, and Consultation in Law-Making
A study conducted by the Institute for Mediation and Democracy (IDM) and Transparency International in 2021 revealed a sizeable gap between the Executive body and the Parliament with regard to the application of the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, and consultation of interest groups in the process of developing and approving draft laws. Specifically, the Government of Albania has not been transparent in the law-making process and has not involved interest groups for the vast majority of laws argued by this study as tailor-made during 2008-2020. On the other hand, while the parliamentary review of these draft laws has been transparent, the Parliament of Albania has failed to hold consultations with interest groups regarding these draft laws. Another common element of the draft laws, which the study has reasoned to be tailor-made for this period, is the fact that a considerable number of these tailor-made laws were not foreseen in the General Analytical Program of Draft Acts approved by the Government for the respective year.
Rigorous enforcement and application of the principles, such as predictability (meticulous implementation of GAPDA), transparency, and consultation at the onset of law-making process, by the Executive would significantly reduce not only the integrity risks pertaining to law-making, but would also enhance the quality and impact of their enforcement. The Council of Ministers’ regulation should elaborate the law-making procedure in more details, highlighting the need to enforce these three principles, more than the principle of confidentiality, which is unrestrained in this document and has obviously affected the integrity of this process and the public trust in it.
The current phase of the European integration process, the processes related to the country’s development reforms, the challenges of the parliamentary review of the draft laws as well as those of post-legislative oversight by the Assembly would be extremely positively affected if the Council of Ministers’ regulation would address these law-making concerns.
 See “Deconstructing State Capture in Albania: An Examination of Grand Corruption Cases and Tailor-Made Laws from 2008 to 2020” (Gjergji Vurmo, Rovena Sulstarova, Alban Dafa 2021), Appendix 2, page 41. https://idmalbania.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2021_Report_DeconstructingStateCaptureAlbania_English.pdf