Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania 2.0

Kingdom of the Netherlands

PRINCIPAL RESEARCHER

Arjan Dyrmishi

RESEARCH GROUP

Elona Dhëmbo

Gjergji Vurmo

Sotiraq Hroni

IDM, Tirana 2016

Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania

Tirana 2016

Second Edition

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"The police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence."

Robert Peel

Former Minister of Internal Affairs and founder of London Metropolitan Police Force in 1829

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASP	Albanian State Police
CMD	Council of Ministers' Decision
CoE	Council of Europe
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSAC	Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption
DP	Democratic Party
EU	European Union
HIDAACI	High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interests
IACS	Internal Affairs and Complaints Service
ICACU	Internal Control and Anti-Corruption Unit
ICITAP	International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICS	Internal Control Service
IDM	Institute for Democracy and Mediation
IDRA	Institute for Development Research and Alternatives
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NCAC	National Coordinator against Corruption
PS	Socialist Party
PSD	Professional Standards Department
SAA	Stabilization-Association Agreement
SELDI	Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity
SMI	Socialist Movement for Integration
SP	State Police
SPS	State Police Strategy
SSA	Supreme State Audit
TI	Transparency International
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WB	World Bank

1. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

Corruption remains endemic in Albania and is one of the leading problems that hinder the country's economic development, progress, and accomplishment of government's objectives, including the foremost goal – membership to European Union (EU).

The police have been highly exposed to the threat of an environment of widespread corruption. Regardless of incessant efforts, Albania has not fared well to curb corruption at significant rate.

The current government has endeavored unreservedly to address police corruption. Some of these efforts relate with amendment of legislation, enhancement of anti-corruption measures, and greater involvement and engagement of public.

Similar anti-corruption measures and reforms have also been undertaken in other sectors and, according to the results of the Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perception Index, Albania has improved its position in the world classification. Yet, the public perception on police corruption in Albania remains high and has slightly increased when compared with year 2014.

In some segments of police, corruption seems to have decreased, such as in the traffic police, or remained unaffected such as in the case of Internal Affairs and Complaints Service (IACS), but has increased in the rest of police services. Anti-corruption strategic framework and measures have been partially implemented. Their enactment has been impeded by lack of adequate resources and capacities, by grassroots tolerance of corruption, low public trust, and politicization of the fight against corruption.

While the number of police officers investigated and punished for corruption has increased over the last two years, most of them are low- and mid-rank officers. On the other hand, public perception on spread of corruption among top police officials has increased.

Bribery is the most widespread form of corruption and remains almost unchanged just like two years ago, as other forms of corruption have increased their presence. Cooperation with criminals, involvement in illegal traffics, manipulation of evidence, and corrupt procurements are among corruption forms with significant rise. Likewise, public perception on corruption and violation of Police rules on recruitment, appointment, and promotion has worsened.

The fight against corruption and the efforts to curb corruption have produced no results in strengthening the culture of integrity as an instrument to resist temptation for abuse with the rights and privileges of the police profession.

The culture of silence for reporting fellow officers' corrupt acts continues to prevail in the State Police and the will to report violations is persistently depleted.

The efforts placed in the last 2-3 years to introduce a culture of integrity and anti-corruption improvement in police education and training curricula have not produced visible results. However, the government's attempt to engage the public in reporting corruption has led to some results and complaints filed with the Internal Affairs and Complaints Service have intensified.

There are an increasing number of citizens who think that political leaders use police for corrupt purposes and that the police use their position for corrupt acts. Similarly, citizens think that police leaders tolerate corruption and there is a culture of tolerance and omission of action to restrain corruption in the State Police.

The perception that police is used for corrupt purposes by the politics and that political influence in the police affects the escalation of corruption is quite common among police officials themselves.

Pervasive and lasting corruption in the State Police and the approach to fight corruption as a problem linked with individual officials' conduct have led to failure in addressing corruption systemically by targeting police organization by means of strengthening integrity and anti-corruption culture.

Claims that the previous governments are to be held accountable for the police corruption have emphatically politicized the anti-corruption measured undertaken by various governments over the last ten something years. This approach resulted in an increasing number of investigations and dismissals of great number of police officers in the first post-electoral years without appropriately addressing the causes and factors that lead to corruption. These factors are linked with the characteristics of police services and their organizational culture.

Another negative consequence of this approach relates with the consideration that the State Police is to be held responsible for police corruption. Its role as the main actor in the fight against corruption in

the police has diminished significantly, while as the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Government of Albania perform control functions and monitor the progress of this process and its results.

Police officers' discretion in exercising their functions, the quasi-military and secrecy nature of the police organization, and the culture of silence and solidarity among fellow officers to not report one another's corrupt acts and practices cannot be changed unless the police organization is vested with the necessary autonomy to reflect on these features of organizational culture, is given the means and resources to change this culture, and is controlled adequately to make sure that these processes are taking place and moving to the right direction.

2. INTRODUCTION

This publication examines corruption in the State Police in Albania and the need to strengthen the police organization's integrity as a means to curb corruption.

Corruption remains one of the major challenges confronting Albania and in this environment with endemic corruption police is one of the most exposed institutions to this phenomenon.

As part of the civil society's efforts to contribute in curbing corruption in the State Police, this study examines police corruption in Albania for 2014-2016. This is the second research dedicated to addressing police corruption in Albania following a study published in November 2014.

The fight against corruption is a constant process and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is substantially affected by the extent of knowledge of corruption dynamics and trends as well as by development of adequate strategies and instruments.

In light of this, the purpose of this second study is to provide an overview of police corruption dynamics for the said timespan, which coincides with the political rotation and the anti-corruption reforms undertaken by the current government. In addition, the study seeks to assess the efficiency of the anti-corruption measures.

Similar to the first one, this study focuses in measuring the spread of corruption in the State Police, in assessing types of corruption and in analysis the causes that drive or control police corruption. It also seeks

to serve as a milestone for subsequent comparative studies in the area of police corruption.

After having described the methodological approach on data collection and processing, the study provides an overview of corruption and its dynamics in Albania during 2014-2016, including an assessment of the anti-corruption framework for the same period.

It then proceeds with an overview of the extent of spread of police corruption, types of corruption, and causes that drive corruption in the State Police drawing on the data obtained from survey conducted with the public.

The next chapter addresses aspects of police integrity and corruption by analyzing the data collected from a survey and interviews conducted with police officers.

The last section draws some conclusions and provides recommendations that seek to enhance effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures and efforts in the State Police.

Annexes included in the final section of the study offer complete data on the poll conducted with the public and police officers in order to render further analysis of collected data feasible.

3. METHODOLOGY

This study employs an approach and research model similar to the one developed and applied by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in year 2014. Police officers' corruption and professional integrity are the core issues under study highlighting the features similar to those that led the process of conceptualization of methodological approach applied in year 2014.

It has been argued earlier that exploring complex issues, such as the one under consideration, requires an approach that combines techniques and strategies that ensure a greater involvement of the targeted population. A combination of methods and techniques on data collection and solicitation of opinions and attitudes on issues under consideration enable a triangulation of data and information sources so as to enrich and add validity and credibility to findings of this study.

3.1 SURVEY WITH THE PUBLIC

A structured interview (questionnaire) was conducted to explore levels and forms that drive corruption and to measure extent of corruption spread as perceived by the public opinion. This survey was employed to solicit opinion and attitudes from a sample of 1,100 citizens selected randomly across the country. In the absence of an accurate sample framework, i.e., detailed data on population for each area, and considering the sizable migratory movement and emigration of the population (even if such framework was available), it was decided to employ quota sampling, where each area is represented on similar terms irrespective of the population size.

	Urban Areas		Rural Areas
	County center	County's Second Urban Center	Largest administrative unit
1	Berat	Kuçova	Kozara
2	Peshkopi	Bulqiza	Maqellara
3	Durres	Fushe-Kruja	Maminas
4	Elbasan	Librazhd	Bradashesh
5	Fier	Lushnja	Mbrostar
6	Gjirokastra	Tepelena	Lazarat
7	Korça	Pogradec	Hudenisht
8	Kukes	Bajram Curri	Shtiqen
9	Lezha	Rreshen	Balldre
10	Shkodra	Koplik	Bushat
11	Tirana	Kavaja	Yzberisht
12	Vlora	Orikum	Vlora Center

Table 1. *Areas included in the study*

Sampling selection underwent several phases. At first, the areas were selected. Each major urban center of every county became part of this study. On the other hand, counties' second largest centers and largest administrative units were also incorporated in the study to ensure a similar representation of citizens from both large and small urban centers. While selection of medium-sized urban and rural areas seems biased, the criterion of area size was conditioned by the need to establish the sample within the budget and time constraints. A list of areas covered by the survey is provided below.

Fourteen experienced field interviewers were employed to administer the public survey questionnaire. They received additional training on the instrument, the process and the strategy on how to select respondents. The entire process –starting from interviewer training to data collection and entry into a database- lasted for about a month (June 2016). A monitoring system was established to ensure quality of field work.

		Gender		Area			Age		Education		
		F	%		F	%		F	%		F	%
Sample =1,081	Male	545	50.42	Urban area	635	59.12	18 – 25	251	23.22	8-year upper primary	566	52.70
	Female	536	49.58	Rural area	439	40.88	26- 35	245	22.66	Upper secondary	324	30.17
							36 – 45	218	20.17	University	59	5.49
							46 – 55	207	19.15	Post-university	125	11.64
							Over 55	160	14.80			

Table 2. *Characteristics of Sample – Public opinion survey, 2016*

By the end of the process, the final sample had the characteristics presented in the following table. (Table 2).

The questionnaire employed to collect data was similar with the one applied in year 2014 in order to ensure continuity of measurement comparisons over time. Regardless of this, some changes were also made to the instrument so as to incorporate lessons learned from the first experience. In principal, these changes included simplification and abridgment of the instrument to make it more manageable and acceptable for the respondents. The final version included a total of 40 questions organized in several sections that address issues of interest to the study. The following list presents the major sections/fields covered by the questionnaire:

- Demographic data
- Information on corruption
- Perception on corruption
- Experiences with corruption
- Types and extent of corruption
- External causes of corruption
- Internal causes of corruption
- Tolerance to corruption
- Trust to fight corruption
- Assessment of anti-corruption framework

3.2   SURVEY WITH THE POLICE OFFICERS

The opinions and attitude of the police officers themselves were examined through an instrument conceptualized to enable solicitation of the most objective opinion possible. While the issue of enhancement of objectivity was of primary importance in the 2014 study, the original instrument underwent several amendments. The final version of the 2016 questionnaire utilized to collect data asked 38 questions organized by the following sections:

- Demographic data
- Information on corruption
- Perception on corruption
- Experiences with corruption
- Types and extent of corruption

⊃ External causes of corruption

⊃ Internal causes of corruption

⊃ Tolerance to corruption

⊃ Trust to fight corruption

⊃ Assessment of anti-corruption framework

As one can note, there is a deliberate consistency with the public opinion instrument to enable comparisons between two populations under study.

A sample of 370 police officers was selected on proportional quotas according to the number of officials in each department, commissariat, and rank in all police units in 12 counties. The complete data collection and processing from this sample produced the following characteristics (Table 3):

Variable		F	%
Gender	M	276	74.59
	F	94	25.41
Age	18 – 25	50	13.51
	26 – 35	95	25.68
	36 – 45	85	22.97
	46 – 55	117	31.62
	Over 55	23	6.22
Level of education	Upper secondary	166	44.86
	University	175	47.30
	Post-university	29	7.84
Rank	Inspector	279	76.66
	Vice-Commissar	69	18.96
	Commissar	16	4.40
	Prime Commissar	-	-
	Krye-Komisar	-	-

	Criminal Police	53	14.32
	Border and Migration Police	53	14.32
Sector of Service	Public Order and Safety	245	66.22
	Support Services	14	3.78
	Police Academy	5	1.35
	Less than 5 years	94	25.47
	5 – 10 years	52	14.09
Experience with the State Police	11 – 20 years	123	33.33
	21 – 30 years	87	23.58
	Over 30 years	13	3.52

Table 3. *Characteristics of the Sample – the police officers' survey, 2016*

The majority of respondents came from field operation sector. Some 259 interviewees or 72% of the police officer sample were law enforcement officers working in the field. This criterion is important for the purpose of this study. The data obtained from this survey were analyzed separately but were also compared with the findings of the public survey.

3.3 INTERVIEWS BY MEANS OF SCENARIOS

It is a challenging task to examine and measure police officers' knowledge and attitudes. The tendencies to be socially acceptable and to meet expectations were noted in the 2014 study. To this end, and in addition to the original drive to include the survey and assessment through real-life scenarios, it was deemed necessary to give more importance to this technique in the 2016 study. This was reflected in an increase of the sample size by 150 police officers selected intentionally for this technique. Distribution by gender, age and year in police service was maintained to resemble the ratios of the sample interviewed in this study – the State Police population. Their main characteristics are summarized in the following table (Table 4).

Distribution in percentage by characteristics of sample								
Total number of respondents	Gender		Age		Years in Police Service		Sector of Service	
n=150	28 F	72 M	Under 25	25.00	Less than 5	59.00	Criminal Police	8.00
			26- 35	50.00	5 – 10	17.00	Border and Migration Police	21.00
			36 – 45	34.00	11 – 20	35.00	Public Order and Safety	114.00
			46 – 55	31.00	21 – 30	24.00	Support Services	1.00
			Over 56	4.00	Over 30	7.00	Police Academy	-

Table 4. *Characteristics of survey sample by scenarios, 2016*

The approach of hypothetical scenarios was employed in order to obtain the most sincere answers and to avoid any possible resistance to give answers to questions on real cases of engagement in corruption by the police officers or their colleagues. Respondents were asked to give their opinion on 11 hypothetical scenarios of police misconduct, including conflict of interest, soliciting/accepting bribes, misuse of authority, and embezzlement. Essentially, 10 scenarios describe situations in which the aim to gain drives the police officer's conduct. One scenario includes the use of force.

Each respondent was asked to assess the scenarios by answering seven questions. Six questions focused on reflecting the policing integrity as a tendency to resist temptation of abuse with the rights and privileges of occupation.

Out of these, two questions related with the fact how severe police officers perceive each scenario for themselves and for other police officers. Two questions dealt with the disciplinary measures that according to police officers would be given and the one they thought should be given for each violation foreseen in the scenario. Two other questions related to the will to report cases of misconduct committed by the officer him/herself and

his opinion on the will to report on other officers' misconduct.

Question no. 3 sought to take answers on whether police officers thought that the conduct described in the scenario constituted a violation of the official policy of the police organization.

The survey was conducted with the support of the State Police leaders during June and July 2016. In each police unit where the survey was conducted, the police officers completed the questionnaires simultaneously at premises made available by the police stations.

The support and collaboration of the Professional Standards Department of the State Police was indispensable to solicit data from the police officers. This department approved and facilitated the survey with 370 police officers across the country as per the specifications and with an additional cohort of 150 police officers for the hypothetical scenarios. The survey and hypothetical scenarios were administered from end of June until late July 2016.

Two IDM specialists with extensive experience in surveys administered both instruments. Local police departments were informed in advance on the development of the survey at the police premises for each specific sample.

The survey with hypothetical scenarios was administered in 10 police units in Tirana using an equal quota of 15 questionnaires. Below is a list of the surveyed police units:

1. Local Directorate of Tirana Police

2. Police Commissariat No. 1, Tirana

3. Police Commissariat No. 2, Tirana

4. Police Commissariat No. 3, Tirana

5. Police Commissariat No. 4, Tirana

5. Police Commissariat No. 5, Tirana

5. Police Commissariat No. 6, Tirana

8. Police Commissariat of Kavaja, Tirana

9. Regional Commissariat of Traffic Police, Tirana

10. Regional Directorate of Border and Migration, Tirana

The approach to conduct the survey only in Tirana relates with the rationale provided by the group of researchers. Firstly, researchers considered the fact that the State Police is a vertically-organized institution with unique

rules applied uniformly across the territory of the country. Therefore, the findings of the survey conducted in Tirana can be considered applicable to the entire State Police. Secondly, Tirana is the largest administrative unit in the country and a place where police officials are most likely to face a variety of situation and opportunities to engage in corrupt acts. Thirdly, an analysis of the data of surveys conducted with the public and police showed that the differences among the regions were insignificant. Thus, conclusions drawn from these data could quite well apply to the entire State Police. This does not, however, rule out the importance of conducting the questionnaire in other town in follow-up studies to see potential differences, if any, and to analyze their causes.

3.4 DATA ANALYSIS

Two specialists entered the data in a database and a statistics expert processed the data. Descriptive statistics have been used in the study, which draws a series of comparisons in time and among categories. Thus, comparisons are drawn between the studies of year 2014 and year 2016. In addition, some characteristics have been used as reference categories to check trends and potential changes. A concrete example is the comparison between two subcategories of officers in the case of scenarios where we hypothesize that the experience with the State Police could potentially be linked with changes in knowledge and/or attitude to corruption.

4. DYNAMICS OF SPREAD OF CORRUPTION DURING 2014-2016

This chapter analyzes trends of spread of corruption and anti-corruption measures for 2014-2016. An exploration of a broader context serve the very purpose of this study – explore police corruption, because external factors, such as extent of corruption in society, level of tolerance to corruption, anti-corruption measures or the trust in them and in institutions are some of the factors that positively affect police corruption.

Corruption has been determined as one of Albania's most serious problems that hinders economic and social development and progress since the fall of communist regime and during the entire transition period. Periodic measurements of public perceptions and studies on corruption have constantly revealed that corruption is widely spread in almost all levels and sectors of the state activity.

Upon a broad recognition of corruption problem and its consequences, the government that took power after the parliamentary elections of 2013 made the fight against corruption a top priority.

Some reforms undertaken by the government and the improvement of several and economic and political indicators produces results that encouraged the European Union to grant Albania the status of candidate country in 2014. The EU Albania Progress Report of 2014 pointed out that "the new government undertook a number of reforms to bring the country closer to meeting the key priorities for progress towards the EU and deliver further tangible results, notably in the area of rule of law."

Yet, these reforms have not produced considerable impact to change the situation of corruption. The EU Progress Report of 2015 indicated that "corruption is widespread and more efforts are needed to make progress with a view to establishing a solid track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions at all levels".[1]

According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, corruption in Albania has remained high and rampant during 2014-2016 ranking the country among most corrupt countries in Europe for the said period.[2]

In year 2015, Albania fared better in classification galloping ahead 22 places and ranking at the 88th place, but without a considerable increase of points (from 33 points in 2014 to 36 points in 2015, out of 100 possible points). Thus, in 2005, Albania left behind only Kosovo and Moldova among Central and Southeastern European countries.[3]

Without ignoring this result, maintaining this trend and stability remain a challenge. An analysis of the trends of spread of corruption in Albania from year 2002 reveals that there is a close correlation between political power rotations and spread of corruption (as shown in Graph 1).

---

1   Albania EU Progress report 2014, p. 8
2   Albania EU Progress report 2015, p. 4
3   Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (2014) and Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (2015)

Graph 1: *Corruption perception in Albania during 2002-2015*

Hence, after the political power rotation of 2005, the then Government's reforms led to a gradual reduction of corruption in the first three years, attaining the Albania's best historical classification in 2008 since the establishment of the Corruption Perception Index. After that year, corruption regained its momentum.

On the other hand, Corruption Perception Index measurements reveal that during electoral years, corruption in Albania tends to increase (24 points in year 2005 from 25 in year 2004, 32 points in year 2009 from 34 in year 2008, and 31 points in year 2013 from 33 in year 2012).

Because 2016 is an electoral year, it is very likely that corruption will increase in the current year and in the next one.

Freedom House considers corruption in Albania as the main problem to the country's democratization and EU integration. According to this organization, corruption has remained unchanged during 2014-2016, even though with an insignificant decrease when compared with the previous years (as shown in Graph 2).[4]

---

4   Freedom House uses a scale to rate corruption index from 1 (low corruption) to 7 (high corruption).

Graph 2: Corruption in Albania according to Freedom House
Source: Freedom House reports, 'Nations in Transit', 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Albania continues to rank as the country with the highest pressure of corruption in the region and during 2014-2016 this pressure has increased (Graph 3).[5]

Graph 3: Pressure of corruption in Southeast European countries and the trends for 2014 – 2016

In terms of spread, corruption continues to remain unrestrained in almost all branches of governance and country's major sectors, even though the phenomenon has somewhat dwindled in several sectors over the last few years (Graph 4). The most problematic areas include customs and

5   Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov, 'Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe'. SEDLI 2016 http://seldi.net/publications/publications/shadow-power-assessment-of-corruption-and-hidden-economy-in-southeast-europe/

taxes, judiciary, healthcare, education, mortgage, and local governance.[6] Corruption has remained rampant among political parties, ministers, and members of Parliament.

Graph 4. *Trends of spread of corruption by sector, institution, and profession for years 2014-2015*
Source: *IDRA, 'Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences 2015-2016'*

5. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

The fight against corruption and the fight against organized crime are among 5 key priorities that Albania has to fulfill in order to proceed with the process of opening negotiations to EU membership.

To this end, upon taking power in 2013, the new government embarked on a series of reforms and measures to curb overall corruption. In this context, the strategic national anti-corruption framework and the State Police strategy were also revisited.

This chapter assesses the strategic and institutional framework and anticorruption measures by analyzing them as per the relevance, efficacy,

6   IDRA, 'Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences 2015-2016' http://www.idrainstitute.org/files/reports/Corruption%202016/Gjetjet%20Kryesore%20Studimi%20i%20Korrupsionit%20IDRA%20_Grafike.pdf

efficiency and sustainability.[7] In this framework, relevance refers to the extent to which the anticorruption measures are consistent and relevant to achieve the objectives in the institutional and political context of the country. Efficacy refers to the extent to which the established objectives are achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Efficiency refers to the considerable reduction of corruption at the lowest cost, and sustainability refers the extent to which anticorruption measures have created resistance to corruption in the long term and have brought changes to how public officials perceive accountability.[8]

An analysis shows that relevance, efficacy, and efficiency are partial, whereas sustainability remains a challenge irrespective of the positive result attained in Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 2015.[9]

5.1 CROSSCUTTING STRATEGY AGAINST CORRUPTION 2015-2020

The "Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020" (CSAC) is the fundamental anti-corruption policy document adopted by the Council of Ministers.[10]

CSAC is a continuation of the previous 'Crosscutting Strategy for Prevention and the Fight against Corruption and for a Transparent Governance 2008-2013". Because of the power rotation, the strategy was adopted after a void period of two years.

The vision enshrined in this strategy is: "Transparent and high-integrity Albanian institutions that enjoy citizens' trust and ensure a qualitative and incorruptible service."

Similar to the previous strategy, CSAC constitutes a multiyear policy instrument that seeks to address corruption in all sectors based on: (1) prevention, (2) punishment, and, (3) awareness. Each approach is further elaborated into specific objectives presented in Table 1.

---

7   Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, "Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: A framework for Evaluation", Policy Research Working Paper 2501, World Bank, Washington, 2000, p. 8
8   Ibid. p. 10-11
9   Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (2015)
10   Council of Ministers' Decision No. 247, dated 20.3.2015, "On Adoption of Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020"

Approach	Goals
Prevention	1. Increase transparency in state activity and improve access to information for the citizens 2. Increase transparency in planning, elaboration, management and control of budget funds 3. Strengthen electronic infrastructure of public institutions 4. Improve handling of reports on corruption 5. Strengthen the regime of disclosure and control of public officials' assets and cases of conflict of interest 6. Strengthen the control regime for political party financing 7. Enhance efficiency of internal audit and inspection and systematic use of risk analysis 8. Systematic use of the mechanism for identifying vulnerabilities to corruption 9. Strengthen public officials' integrity 10. Systematic analysis of inclinations to corruption and improvement of statistics on the activity of law enforcement agencies in the fight against corruption 11. Development and adoption of policies against corruption at local government level
Repression	1. Improve efficiency and effectiveness of criminal investigations against corruption 2. Improve cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the criminal prosecution and conviction of corruption 3. Improve legislation on criminal prosecution of corruption 4. Improving international legal and police cooperation in the fight against corruption
Awareness	1. Raise awareness of and educate the public on the consequences of corruption 2. Encourage the general public to actively use the complaints mechanisms to report and prevent corruption 3. Encourage cooperation with civil society

Table 5: Approaches and objectives of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020

In addition to the anti-corruption strategy, the Government adopted an action plan on CSAC for 2015-2017. This action plan specifies activities, outputs, performance indicators, implementation sectors, responsible institutions, partners, deadlines, and cost of outputs for each objective. A budget of 12 million Euros is projected for the implementation of this action plan.

SCAC foresees to spend 30% of the budget to achieve the "Improve efficiency and effectiveness of criminal investigations against corruption" objective, which takes up the largest specific share of the budget. Budget-wise, it is followed by "Increase transparency in state activity and improve access to information for the citizens" and "Encourage the general public to actively use the complaints mechanisms to report and prevent corruption" with 16% and "Strengthen the electronic infrastructure of public institutions" with 14%.

Other objectives of considerable specific budget spending include "Improve handling of reports on corruption" and "Raise awareness of and educate the public on the consequences of corruption" with 9% of the projected budget, and "Systematic analysis of inclinations to corruption and improvement of statistics on the activity of law enforcement agencies in the fight against corruption" with 10%.

CSAC is foreseen to be implemented through the coordinated efforts of the Minister of State for Local Issues and its monitoring and implementation mechanisms for the anti-corruption strategy. The following have been determined as specific indicator on implementation of the strategy: (1) Achieve the specific indicators established for each measure according to the Action Plan attached to the Strategy; (2) The number of investigations and proactive operations, as well the number of special technique investigations; (3) The number of criminal filings for corruption offences according to the methodology of consolidated statistics; (4) The number of convictions of corruption-related offences.

CSAC and its action plan foresee that by 2017 Albania will achieve the level 37.5 points in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International and by 2020 the country will earn 40.5 points.

While the improved result in the Corruption Perception Index of 2015 is an important achievement, maintaining the trend of curbing corruption to earn 40.5 points by year 2020 remains a challenge to be overcome.

Indeed, CSAC has suffered from a slothful implementation. During year 2015, out of 191 measures foreseen in the action plan, 38 have been fully implemented, 95 have been partially implemented, and 52 have not

been implemented at all.[11] Divided by approach, 28 measures have been fully implemented, 69 measures have been partly implemented, and 43 measures have not been implemented under the preventive approach.[12] The repressive approach features the following situation: 3 measures have been fully implemented, 18 measures have been partially implemented, and 4 measures have not been implemented at all.[13] Under the awareness approach, 7 measures have been fully implemented, 8 measures have been partially implemented, and 5 measures have not been implemented.[14]

The main challenges affecting implementation of CSAC include: (1) scarce human and financial resources in both implementation of measures pursuant to its Action Plan and in reporting implementation progress; (2) confusion created between the strategy objectives and performance of functions and routine legal obligations of the institutions; (3) deficient commitment on the part of several institutions involved in the implementation of the action plan.[15]

Subsequently, during 2014-2016, the reforms have failed in addressing a series of key problems that directly affect their legitimacy and effectiveness, such as political independence of institutions, institutional integrity in management of conflict of interests, deficiencies of standards and norms of public administration, and lack of transparency in political party financing.[16] Also, the track record of investigations, prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases remains limited.[17]

On the other hand, an analysis of the trends of spread of corruption in Albania from year 2002 reveals that there is a close correlation between political power rotations and spread of corruption (as shown in Graph 1 above). Hence, after the political power rotation of 2005, the Democratic Party-led Government's reforms led to a gradual reduction of corruption in the first three years, attaining the Albania's best historical classification in 2008 since the birth of Corruption Perception Index. After that year, corruption regained its momentum. Likewise, the Index measurements

---

11   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016, p. 7
12   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016, p. 16. http://www.ceshtjetvendore. gov.al/files/pages_files/Raport_Vjetor_mbi_Monitorimin_dhe_Zbatimin_e_Strategjis%C3%AB_ Nd%C3%ABrsektoriale_kunder_Korrupsionit_20015-_2020_.pdf
13   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016, p. 30
14   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016, p. 35
15   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016, pp. 137-138
16   Transparency International. Albania National Integrity System Assessment 2016. http://files.transparency.org/content/download/2031/13136/file/2016_NISAlbania_SQ.pdf
17   EU Albania Progress Report 2015. p. 55

reveal that during electoral years, corruption in Albania tends to increase (24 points in year 2005 from 25 in year 2004, 32 points in year 2009 from 34 in year 2008, and 31 points in year 2013 from 33 in year 2012 as shown in Graph 1 above).

5.2 PUBLIC ORDER STRATEGY FOR 2015−2020

The CSAC Action Plan defines State Police as the responsible institution for a series of outputs under the following objectives: "Systematic analysis of inclinations to corruption and improvement of statistics on the activity of law enforcement agencies in the fight against corruption", "Improve efficiency and effectiveness of criminal investigations against corruption", and "Improve cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the criminal prosecution and conviction of corruption".

The major State Police document for the fight against corruption is the Public Order Strategy 2015-2020 (POS) and its Action Plan 2015-2017 constitutes the fundamental strategic document of the State Police.[18]

Adopted by the Council of Ministers, the Public Order Strategy constitutes the second document of this type following the State Police Strategy 2007-2013. POS was adopted two years after the first strategy had already expired. The goal of this strategy is to assess law enforcement in the country and determine priorities and objectives to improve safety standards and harmonize them with European parameters.

At first, POS provides an overall assessment of the State Police and the environmental it operates in, highlighting several factors, such as geographic position, economy, demography, extent of Euro-Atlantic integration, and crime trends.

In addition to trafficking of narcotics, firearm and explosive crimes, and human being trafficking, corruption is considered by POS as one of the top priority threats.[19] The Strategy ranks corruption as one of the major future challenges of the State Police.[20]

State Police priorities for 2015-2020 determined in the POS include: (1) development and harmonization of State Police standards with those of EU; (2) strengthening law enforcement to enhance security level; (3) fight against organized crime and corruption; (4) integrated management of border and migration; and, (5) strengthening interinstitutional and international cooperation.

18   Council of Ministers' Decision No. 702, dated 26.8.2015, "On Adoption of Public Order Strategy 2015-2020 and its Action Plan for 2015-2017". Official Journal of the Republic of Albania, No. 155, 2015
19   POS, p. 11147
20   POS, p. 11151

Strategic objectives specified in the POS include: (1) harmonization of legislation on and organization of State Police with that of EU; (2) education and qualification of police officers; (3) improvement of work conditions and technology; and, (4) improvement of internal management in State Police.

The fourth objective, "improvement of internal management in State Police", has a specific target: "to change the level of management and leadership within police organization by establishing and enforcing internal regulation and other normative acts as well as by developing the process of planning, organization, direction, and control."[21] Under this objective, POS points out the necessity to enhance integrity and highlights the need to assess a complexity of factors and causes that drive or control police corruption.

The measures foreseen by POS to strengthen integrity and reduce level of police corruption include:

1. Enforce organizational changes that will establish adequate legal and organizational procedures and instruments and will created the appropriate institutional environment to curb corruption;

2. Reform the management system, which will change the organizational culture, will strengthen leadership of all ranks in the police, will develop accountability mechanisms; will strengthen integrity, and will further boost public trust and support for the police;

3. Change management of human resources in the recruitment and promotion of officials by instilling transparency in the performance evaluation and merit-based career growth;

4. Promote leaders with high professional and personal qualities and police leadership style that engages and motivates all officials to develop their integrity and to fight corruption;

5. Institutionalize and develop transparency within the police organization and with the public on all activity and performance indicators;

6. Establish an effective complaint system to encourage citizens to report unethical conduct and corruption in the police service. [22]

In addition to State Police's POS objectives and priorities, the Action Plan provides for measures and concrete actions and evaluation instruments for 2015-2017. The measures foreseen in the Action Plan to improve internal management in the police include: improvement

---

21   POS, p. 11155
22   POS, p. 11156

of performance evaluation system; improvement of promotion and career advancement system; and promotion of female officers and improvement of gender representation.[23]

The State Police Directorate is responsible for implementing POS. implementation will be monitored by means of annual reports submitted to the State Police Director and Minister of Interior.[24]

The CSAC Action Plan specifies a series of duties, whose implementation is a responsibility of the State Police. These duties have been implemented partially (as presented in Table 2).[25]

Duty	Implemented
Conduct integrity test in the police	Partially
Establish a police case management system in all police commissariats	Partially
Equip traffic police officers and mobile patrol officers with surveillance camera in the course of duty	Partially
Increase the number of operations using special investigation techniques by 5% on annual basis; increase the number of proactive investigation on corruption by 5% on annual basis	Partially

Table 6. Implementation of measures foreseen in the action plan of the CSAC under the responsibility of the State Police

5.3 LEGISLATION

5.3.1 LAW ON STATE POLICE

The Law on State Police[26] is the key piece of legislation that regulates the organization and activity of the police. The law was adopted in July 2014 and repealed the law approved in 2007.[27] The law was changed with the principal goal of establishing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), whose main

---

23   POS, p. 11185
24   POS, p. 11166
25   Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016
26   Law No. 108/2014, dated 31.7.2014, "On State Police"
27   Law No. 9749, dated 4.6.2007, "On State Police"

activity was to trace and investigate activities corruption-related criminal offenses and other criminal activities linked with it.[28] The Constitutional Court, however, overturned the establishment of NBI on grounds that this bureau was in conflict with the Constitution.[29]

The rationale behind the changes made to the law related with the need to address a series of deficiencies identified in this piece of legislation, including vulnerabilities of misinterpretation and failure to meet responsibilities on the part of the State Police; possibility of misinterpretation of Minister of Interior's reports on State Police; bureaucratization because of existence of too many level of leadership; deficiencies in defining responsibilities of the General Police Director, regional police directors, and police commissariats; problems with the career advancement system through professional grades; deficient criteria of admission to State Police, etc.[30]

To address these deficiencies, the new law restructures police organization in four levels (State Police Directorate, local police directorates, police commissariats, and police stations);[31] redefines the role of the Minister of Interior as developer and overseer of policy implementation and limits the minister's intervention in the independence and operational leadership of State Police;[32] redefines career growth through a system of grades where police ranks are stipulated as a right earned by an official through a competitive and evaluating process.[33] In terms of State Police opening up to public, the law obligates the State Police to inform and cooperate with the civil society.[34]

5.3.2 Law on Internal Affairs and Complaints Service

The law with a direct link to the fight against corruption in the police is the Law on Internal Affairs and Complaints Service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs".[35] Adopted in year 2014, this law repealed the previous law.[36] The former Internal Control Service became the Internal Affairs and Complaints Service (IACS).

According to the Internal Control Service, some of the factors that necessitated the development of a new law include: the need to undertake investigative activity based on elements and methods of proactive

---

28 Law on State Police, 2014, Article 27
29 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania, Decision No. dated 26.06.2015
30 Rationale on Draft Law on State Police https://www.parlament.al/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/11/relacioni_per_policine_e_shtetit_17890_1.pdf
31 Law on State Police, 2014, Articles 20-24
32 Law on State Police, 2014, Articles 7-8
33 Law on State Police, 2014, Articles 50-60
34 Law on State Police, 2014, Article 79
35 Law No. 70/2014, dated 10.7.2014, 'On Internal Affairs and Complaints Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs'
36 Law No. 10 002, dated 6.10.2008, 'On Internal Control Service of the Ministry of Interior'

investigation and not only on reports; subsequent lack of anti-corruption outputs; inaccuracies and deficiencies of the law that provided room and opportunities for various interpretations.[37] Because of the previous law, performance indicators of the IACS showed "excessive lack of efficiency, insufficient impact on the police accountability, police integrity, prevention of and the fight against corruption and failure to involve external civil control on the police.[38]

The new law endeavored to address these deficiencies in several aspects. Firstly, the law expanded the mission of the IACS to include guaranteeing of law enforcement and public interest as well as protection from criminal and illegal activities.[39] Secondly, the law expanded the scope of activity to include, in addition to those specified by the previous law, other areas of activity, such as review of public complaints; maintaining officers' integrity; audit of unjustified wealth; fight against corrupt and criminal activities; analysis, research, and general recommendations on the basis of inspections and investigations.[40] Other improvements of the law include redefinition of scope of information and investigation activity, expansion of inspection competencies; obligation of State Police structures to consider recommendations made by IACS.

In pursuance of the new law on IACS, the entire sublegal framework was revised, including 4 decisions of the Council of Ministers and 12 orders and instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs.[41]

5.3.3 State Police Regulation

The State Police Regulation is one of the key documents of the State Police.[42] It was reviewed in 2015 following the legal amendments made to the law in the last three years. The scope of the regulation is to define "rules on organization and functioning of relations within and outside State Police structures; principles, standards, and norms that regulate professional and ethical conduct of police officers during and outside service; career advancement and management of human resources; performance evaluation of State Police structures and rules on discipline and procedures to be followed in case of disciplinary violations."[43]

---

37 Rationale on Draft Law 'On Internal Affairs and Complaints Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs', http://shcba.gov.al/images/RELACION.pdf
38 Rationale on Draft Law 'On Internal Affairs and Complaints Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs', http://shcba.gov.al/images/RELACION.pdf
39 Law on IACS, 2014, Article 4
40 Law on IACS, 2014, Article 5
41 Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report for 2014, http://shcba.gov.al/images/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf
42 Council of Ministers' Decision No. 750, dated 16.9.2015, Regulation of the State Police
43 Regulation of the State Police, Article 1

Unlike previous regulatory acts that were adopted as separate documents,[44] the new regulation incorporates in one single document (1) State Police internal rules; (2) State Police ethics; (3) career advancement; and, (4) disciplinary rules.[45]

Incorporation of all regulations into one single document is a good opportunity for communication and familiarization with these rules on the part of police officers, because knowing an organization's rules is one key element to strengthen integrity, as are enforcement of these rules, trust in the fairness of disciplinary system, and readiness to report cases of misconduct.[46]

The section on internal rules of the State Police regulation provides details on organization and responsibilities of police structures, rules and conduct in work environment, rules on use of firearms, rules on communication, and rules on performance evaluation. Some chapters of this regulation are intended to rules on drafting administrative acts, planning and analysis, and community policing.

The section on ethics sets out the principles on police activity, standards, norms and conduct of police officers, as well as control and accountability on enforcement of ethics.

One shortcoming of this section of the regulation is that it defines ethics as a binding norm for police officers rather than as a framework for enforcement of ethics as a practical police guideline to all levels.

The section on career advancement, which is a rewritten version of the "Regulation on Personnel of the State Police"[47], is one of the most important sections of the Regulation, because the processes of police recruitment, career advancement, and expulsion from police have always been controversial and affected by corruption and politicization. Therefore, they have had a negative impact on the public perception on police as well as on the police officers' trust in the fairness of these processes. (IDM 2014: p. 79-81)

This regulation has improved the procedures of admission in State Police instilling clarity and details into these procedures. In addition, the procedures of promotion, transfer, and termination of work relationship have improved. This section of the regulation includes procedures and criteria on granting incentives to police officials and structures.

44 Law No. 8291, dated 25.2.1998, Code of Ethics of State Police;
   Decision No. 786, Dated 4.6.2008, 'On Adoption of Disciplinary Regulation of the State Police';
   Decision No. 804, Dated 21.11.2007 'On Adoption of Regulation of Personnel of the State Police'.
45 Regulation of the State Police, Article 2
46 Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Maria R. Haberfeld. 'Enhancing police integrity'. Springer 2006. f.13
47 Council of Ministers' Decision No. 804, dated 21.11.2007, "On Adoption of Regulation of Personnel of the State Police"

The section on disciplinary rules, a reformulated version of the "Regulation on Discipline of the State Police",[48] defines categories of disciplinary violations, procedures on reporting and investigation, disciplinary measures, procedures on complaints and their administration.

This section has introduced some improvements to specifications of disciplinary violations by including definition on corruption committed by police officers [49], as it was not incorporated in the previous regulation.

All in all, the regulation is a good start for strengthening integrity and for curbing corruption in the State Police.

5.3.4 ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

In addition to legal and sublegal amendments over the period analyzed in this study, a series of measures have been initiated, which aimed to address the problem of corruption in the State Police. One important measure related with the establishment of one-stop-shops at the police commissariats to reduce bureaucracy and facilitate citizens' interaction with police so as to contribute to curbing corruption, basically petty corruption.

Police officials' salary has increased two times[50] and several investments have been made to improve work conditions in the framework of measures to strengthen integrity.

One effective measure to prevent corruption and to increase transparency is installation of cameras to mobile police patrols and body cameras for the sector of traffic control.

The State Police publishes an informative bulletin periodically to increase public transparency.

The IACS has reinstated a toll-free number (08009090) since 2014 for reports on corruption-related cases and has installed recording devices of phone calls to facilitate follow-up of public complaints. Also, the IACS has developed and published a transparency program and has assigned a Coordinator for the Right to Information.[51]

---

48 Council of Ministers' Decision No. 786, dated 4.6.2008, "On Adoption of Regulation on Discipline of the State Police"
49 Regulation of State Police, Article 208.
50 Interior Minister Tahiri: A salary increase of 17% for the State Police in January 2017, http://www. punetebrendshme.gov.al/al/te-rejat/lajme/ministri-tahiri-per-policine-e-shtetit-rritje-pagash-me-17-prej-janarit-2017&page=1
51 IACS, Transparency Program http://shcba.gov.al/index.php/programi-i-transparences

6. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

While there is general agreement among the public and national and international institutions that corruption remains one of Albania's hard nuts to crack, there has been no response to strengthen the institutional framework to address this challenge as adequately as possible.

Albania does not have a specialized anti-corruption agency, which would be independent from the executive branch and would report to Parliament only. Similar to most Balkan countries that have been successful in this direction, this agency would have authority to process anti-corruption measures, follow-up their enforcement, and, above all, conduct independent investigation of all corruption-related cases at all levels.[52]

The Government of Albania has since 2013 assigned the Minister of State for Local Issues the duty of the National Coordinator against Corruption (NCAC). Yet, this Coordinator finds it difficult to coordinate work with institutions that are independent of the central government, such as General Prosecutor's Office, High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest (HIDAACI), or the Supreme State Audit (SSA). An Internal Control and Anti-corruption Unit is established at the Prime Minister's Office vested with the authority to conduct administrative investigations and propose administrative and disciplinary measures in ministries and other institutions under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office. The role of this unit is, however, ambiguous and does not include prevention of corruption.[53] Hence, the NCAC activity consisted basically in developing a crosscutting strategy for the fight against corruption 2015-2020 and monitoring the implementation of its action plan 2015-2017.

Moreover, regardless of the fragmented institutional framework, the Parliament has not established a specialized anti-corruption committee that would help to reduce the excessive fragmentation and converge the anti-corruption of relevant institutions.

The anti-corruption institutional framework of the State Police is composed of the MoI Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, which is independent of the State Police and reports to the Minister of Interior, and of the Department of Professional Standards (DPS), which reports to the SP Director.

The IACS is the main anti-corruption institution in the State Police.[54]

---

52 Such agencies include: Anti-Corruption Agency in Serbia, State Attorney's Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), National Anticorruption Directorate in Romania, etc.
53 EU Progress Report 2015, p. 15
54 IACS structure, http://shcba.gov.al/images/banners/Struktura.pdf

This service is organized at central and regional level (12 counties) and exercises two functions: 1) investigation of criminal offenses (Department of Inquest and Investigation); and, 2) Inspection (Department of Inspection and Complaints). The IACS staff has expanded in the last two years reaching a number of 167 out of 104 that it had three years ago (IDM 2014, p. 65). Irrespective of this, the number of investigations conducted by IACS is very small[55] and the results are hindered by disputes on authorities, inadequacy of human and technical resources, and deficient cooperation with the prosecutor's office.

DPS is the responsible structure to regularly assess the performance of central and local structures of the State Police.[56] In the course of accomplishing its mission, DPS conducts regular assessments and proposes recommendations to relevant structure of the State Police.[57] In pursuance of the State Police Regulation, DPS verifies and investigates disciplinary violations committed by State Police officials and proposes related measures.

DPS and IACS coordinate their activity and exchange information regularly on investigation of complaints against police officers.[58]

7. RESULTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Overall, the results of investigation and conviction of corruption-related cases in Albania have been partial and deficient. A number of high-profile cases, including some where evidence of alleged wrongdoing by high-level state officials, judges, mayors and former ministers was leaked to the media, have never been seriously investigated.[59]

A number of government agencies investigated corruption cases, but limited resources, investigative leaks, real and perceived political pressure, and a haphazard reassignment system hampered the investigations.[60]

Financial investigations are not yet systematically launched in cases of corruption. Infiltration of the public and private sectors by organized crime –facilitated by corruption– continues to be a major cause for concern and needs to be urgently addressed.[61]

---

55   EU Progress Report 2015 p. 54-55, 16-17
56   State Police Regulation, Article 96
57   State Police Regulation, Article 97, 102
58   State Police Regulation, Article 218
59   EU Progress Report 2015, p. 15
60   US Department of State, Albania Human Rights Report, 2015, p. 17: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253027.pdf
61   EU Progress Report 2015, p. 15-16

The scarce results of the fight against corruption are also reflected in the low public trust that corruption can be curbed. Albania is the country with the lowest confidence in the effectiveness of the fight against corruption as compared with other countries of the region (Graph 5).[62]

Bar chart data:

Country	Corruption cannot be substantially reduced	Corruption can be substantially reduced or eredicated	Don't know, no answer
Albania	70	22	2
Bulgaria	67	30	3
Macedonia	63	35	2
Kosovo	63	35	2
Serbia	62	38	0
Croatia	55	44	1
BiH	50	45	4
Montenegro	42	52	6
Turkey	37	54	8

■ Corruption cannot be substantially reduced

■ Corruption can be substantially reduced or eredicated

■ Don't know, no answer

Graph 5: *Corruption pressure and trends in Southeast European countries for 2014 – 2016*

A number of studies on police corruption point out that a broader social, economic, and political environment directly affects police corruption.[63]

Police services are structured in social environment and their institutional role provides opportunities to police officers and structures to engage in corruption.[64] Expensive lifestyle, low pays, and vulnerabilities to corruption push police officers to seek financial and material gains from profession.

The high rate of organized crime adds to the risk of police corruption, because criminal organizations will find ways to engage the police in order to accomplish their objectives.[65]

62   Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov, 'Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe'. SEDLI 2016, f. 19, http://seldi.net/publications/publications/shadow-power-assessment-of-corruption-and-hidden-economy-in-southeast-europe/

63   Maurice Punch, 'Rotten Orchards: "Pestilence", Police Misconduct and System Failure', Policing and Society 13, no. 2 (2003); Pierre Aepli, (Ed) 'Package of Instruments on Police Integrity', DCAF 2012; Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 'Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption', Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005; Tim Prenzler, Police corruption: Preventing misconduct and maintaining integrity. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group 2009; Tim Newburn and Barry Webb. Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature. No. 110. Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 1999.

64   Package 2012, p. 21

65   Newburn 1999, p. 21

Corruption in the justice system has a particular impact on police corruption, because injustice and lack of effectiveness of this system pushes police officers to contempt law and engage in corruption.

The impact of all these factors may, however, be low if corruption control and anti-corruption mechanisms work efficiently in the police.[66] Hence, weakness of anti-corruption institutions, inadequate resources and capacities, and lack of necessary support increase the chances for corruption among police officers.

Graph 6, provided below, presents the trends of ICS/IACS results of the fight against and illegal activity in State Police during 2006-2015

It can be noted that in the two years examined in this study (2014-2015), the anti-corruption activity has increased considerably, because the number of corruption-related reports and of police officers reported to have committed corrupt and illegal activities has also increased.

In addition, prevention of corruption was a priority of IACS during 2016.[67] This explains the decreased number of reports and reported police officers, while the number of arrested police officers increased.

Graph 6: Trend of ICS/IACS results against corruption and illegal activity in State Police during 2006-2015
Source: Annual reports of IACS, IDM 2014.

In addition to assisting State Police in its anti-corruption activity, IACS

---

66   Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 'Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption', Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005, p. 64-94
67   Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Service Progress during 2015, http://shcba.gov.al/images/RVP2015.pdf

initiated disciplinary proceedings and issued disciplinary measures for 50 officials of the Internal Control Service (about 50% of the staff) and expelled 13 police officers during year 2014.[68]

Yet, an analysis of the trends of ICS/IACS anti-corruption activity over a time span of 10 years reveals that there is a correlation between results of anti-corruption activity and political power rotations.

The number of reports and police officers reported for corruption-related offenses in 2014-2015 was as high as two years after the new government took power. This similarity and the claims of both major political parties that have ruled the country during these two periods (2005-2015, and from 2013 and on) indicate the highly political attire of the fight against corruption in the police.

Investigation of corruption-related cases focused mostly in low-rank police officers. Reports on mid-rank officers have progressively dropped since 2006, whereas 4 top police officials have been investigated for corruption in 2013 and 214 (as shown in Graph 7).

Graph 7: *Distribution of criminal filings by ICS by rank during 2006-2015.*
Source: *ICS/IACS annual reports 2010-2015.*

The data from public and police officer surveys show that corruption is widespread among top level of the State Police and the lack of investigation in these levels reveal that enforcement of anti-corruption measures in these levels is coping with restrictions and impediments.

---

68   Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Service Progress during 2014. http://shcba.gov.al/images/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf

Besides disciplinary measures initiated by the IACS, the Department of Professional Standards has examines a considerable number of disciplinary violations committed by police officers and has issued disciplinary measures (Graph 8).[69]

The following graph clearly shows a trend of an increasing use of disciplinary proceedings pursued in the last three years and the number of police officers expelled or fired from State Police.[70]

Graph 8. *Progress of disciplinary proceedings initiated by DPS during 2010-2016*[71]

Besides expulsion from State Police, other disciplinary measures instigated by DPS include demotion in rank and position, suspension without pay, deferral of promotion, written admonishment, etc.

Unlike IACS, DPS has a fairer ratio of disciplinary measures instigated by rank of punished police officers (as shown in Graph 9).

A positive trend on public interaction with IACS is noticed the two years under consideration, as the number of public complaints and phone calls to IACS has increased significantly (Graph 10). Once the toll free line was installed, IACS received thousands of phone calls, in addition to complaints submitted in written form.

---

69   The data for year 2016 cover January-September.
70   According to the data obtained from the Department of Professional Standards of the State Police, October 2016
71   Annual reports 'On Activity of the Internal Control Service': 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Disciplinary measures by rank

Graph 9. *Distribution of measures taken by DPS by rank in year 2016*
Source: *According to data obtained from Department of Professional Standards, October 2016.*

Complaints ■ Phone calls

Graph 10. *Number of complaints and phone calls to IACS during 2010-2015.*
Source: *ICS/IACS annual reports 2010-2015*

A vast number of complaints have served to initiate inspections, which have found numerous violations. As a result of these inspections triggered by public complaints, IACS has suggested initiation of disciplinary procedures for 41 police officers. Also, IACS has recommended disciplinary measures for 112 police officers pursuant to violations identified from inspections. [72] This Service has recommended disciplinary measures for 172 police officers during year 2015.[73]

The increasing number of public complaints filed with IACS was associated with a gradual drop of the number of complaints submitted to the Ombudsman (Graph 11).

---

72 Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report for 2014, http://shcba.gov.al/im-ages/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf
73 Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report for 2015, http://shcba.gov.al/im-ages/RVP2015.pdf

Graph 11: *Complaints on State Police officials submitted to Ombudsman during 2012-2015*
Source: *Annual reports of Ombudsman, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015*

Notwithstanding, Ombudsman reports show that the culture of use of physical force or psychological violence on the part of police officers is still predominant.[74]

Use of excessive force, police beating and otherwise mistreating suspects during detention and interrogation, and occasionally prolonged police detention without charge were also reported by the US State Department in its annual reports on human rights.[75]

Unjustified use of force is considered as one form of corruption, because it is carried out by police officers in their official position. Indeed, this problem does not occupy a prominent place and is neither reported in IACS documents.

8. POLICE CORRUPTION

The US State Department's Albania 2015 Human Rights Report provides a summarized description of law enforcement and police corruption in Albania as follows:

"Police did not always enforce the law equally. Personal associations, political or criminal connections, poor infrastructure, lack of equipment,

---

74 Annual Report on the Activity of Ombudsman 1 January – 31 December 2014, http://www.avokatipop-ullit.gov.al/sites/default/files/ctools/RAPORTI%202014.pdf

75 US State Department Albania 2014 Human Rights Report, http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-tion/236704.pdf; US State Department Albania 2015 Human Rights Report, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253027.pdf

or inadequate supervision often influenced enforcement of laws. Low salaries, poor motivation and leadership, and a lack of diversity in the workforce contributed to continued corruption and unprofessional behavior." [76]

A study on police corruption, "Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania",[77] conducted by IDM two years ago, emphasized the need to associate causes of corruption and actual corruption pointing out police corruption is organization-based and application of measures on investigation and conviction of corruption must be accompanied with the strengthening of culture of integrity. Studies show that building anti-corruption mechanisms on the assumption that individual police officers are the cause of police corruption does not lead to strengthening police integrity and that weak integrity of police organization helps corruption to thrive.

As already pointed out by the US State Department's Albania Human Rights Report, corruption and unprofessional conduct of police officers have continued during these years regardless of efforts to control them.

This chapter examines (1) extent of spread of police corruption in Albania, in general, by type of corruption, by management level, by structure and position; (2) causes of corruption; (3) trust in anti-corruption measures.

This analysis is based on the data collected from surveys conducted with the public and police officers during June and July 2016. It includes other data from surveys conducted during January-March 2014 used, which are basically used for examining trends and drawing comparisons between two groups of surveys.

8.1 DYNAMICS OF SPREAD OF POLICE CORRUPTION

One of the difficulties in addressing police corruption in Albania is the lack of studies on this phenomenon and social problem. For over two decades, the data on police corruption have been generated from public surveys and are based on comparisons with other vocations and on bribe.

The surveys conducted in 2014 and 2016 using identical questions generate a picture of the trends of the spread of police corruption in Albania for a certain time frame (Graph 12). Annex 1 provides complete data on the questions and results of the public survey for 2016.

---

76   US State Department Albania 2015 Human Rights Report, http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-tion/253027.pdf

77   Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania, IDM, Tirana 2014

Graph 12. *Spread of corruption in the State Police in 2014 and 2016*

The above graphic shows that police corruption continues to be widespread in the State Police and has slightly increased when compared with 2014.

In consideration of fluctuations and irrespective of methodological approaches for measuring it in the last 15 years, the recent data indicate that police corruption in Albania continues to be a persistent problem (Graph 13). This persistence in the spread of corruption in State Police shows that the phenomenon is now a prominent feature of police culture in Albania and that persistent tackling of this problem calls for time and unrelenting concentration of efforts and resources

Graph 13.[78] *Extent of spread of police corruption in Albania based on the SELDI survey data (2001, 2002),*[79] *IDRA-s (2005, 2008, 2009,*

---

78 The values of 51% and 55% produced by IDM surveys are aggregate values of 'Widespread at a con-siderable extent' and 'Very widespread and serious'

79 Vitosha Research, 'Corruption Indexes, Regional Corruption Monitoring in Albania, Bosnia and Her-zegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia'. Vitosha Research - International Research. April 2002. http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/Corruption_Indexes_2002.PDF

2015)[80], Transparency International (2013)[81] and IDM (2014, 2016).

8.2 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY LEVEL OF POLICE MANAGEMENT

To examine the extent of corruption by level of police management, the public was asked to state its opinion on five levels: top-line leaders of the Directorate of State Police, top-line leaders of regional police, chief of commissariats, mid-rank level in commissariats, and police officers at commissariats.

The 2016 survey asked the same questions made to the public in 2014. The survey results show a trend of increasing corruption in all levels during 2016, with the escalation of the phenomenon among top-line leaders of the State Police (Graph 14).

Graph 14. *Spread of corruption by level of police management*

The data reveal an increase in the spread of corruption among top-line leaders of the State Police. This increase becomes gradually moderate as management level lowers to baseline level. The results of the above graphic call for attention to the disproportion between the public perception on the spread of corruption mostly at top-line management levels rather than at mid/low management level and the investigation of corruption by IACS and DPS, in which investigated and convicted officers on corruption-related cases are mostly enforcement and low and mid rank police officers (Graph 7 and 9).

80   Institute for Development Research and Alternative, IDRA. 'Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences" 2005 Survey; Institute for Development Research and Alternative, IDRA. 'Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences" 2008 Survey; Institute for Development Research and Alternative, IDRA. 'Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences" 2015-2016 Survey;

81   Global Corruption Barometer, 2013. https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=albania

In terms of spread of corruption by various police structure/services, the general trend seems to have increased when compared with year 2015 (Graph 15). Corruption in the Traffic Police has dropped by 21%, while a substantial rise can be noticed in the services of Financial Crime and Anti-Narcotics.

Graph 15. *Spread of corruption by police structure/service*

It should be pointed out that public perception of corruption in the Traffic Police has decreased, because this State Police sector was the core of the anti-corruption measures to curb corruption. Obviously, the measures have produced visible results.

The public perception on spread of corruption in IACS has remained un-changed, even though an additional 4% of the public think that corruption in this service is very widespread (Graph 16)..

Graph 16. *Corruption at IACS*

8.3 EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

Regarding personal experiences with police corruption, only 32% of the respondents reported to have had contacts with police officers in the last year, whereas 15% admitted to have had previous contacts. Some 18% of the interviewees declared that they were asked to pay a bribe by the traffic police and 17% of them admitted to having bribed a traffic police officer. A small number of respondents, 7% and 8%, stated to have been asked and to have given bribes and other favors to traffic police officers. On the other hand, the cases of solicitation of and taking bribes or favors on the part of other police services are fewer. One percent or two percent of respondents admitted to have had similar experiences with the services of Anti-Narcotics, Border Police, and Public Order Police.

Some 89% of those that have reported to have had such experiences declared that police officers have accepted the bribe or favor and only 11% stated that the police officer did not accept the bribe or favor.

As already shown from data, the State Police resistance to pressure of corruption is still low indicating that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures continues to be minimal.

Likewise, citizens' commitment and will to report corruption are dwindling. While 65% of the respondents, 10% more than in 2014, said they knew where to report on a corruption-related act or attempt, 95% of them stated that they did not report (Graph 17).

In addition to those who stated to have had no contact with the police (52%), 12% of those who report to have been in contact with the police admitted that it was easier for them to solve the issue through bribing, 19% responded that they did not report the case because they did not trust the institution where they would report the case to, whereas 5% did not report the case because of lack of time to deal with the reporting procedure.

Graph 17. *Experiences with corruption*

A positive indicator is the increasing number of citizens who are informed on where to report corruption-related cases thanks to the awareness campaigns and improvement of reporting infrastructure on the part of IACS and State Police itself as well as the establishment of the stopkorrupsionit.al portal.

More than from personal experiences, citizens seem to shape their own opinion on police corruption from public information means. In both surveys, over 70% of the respondents stated to have been informed on police corruption by the media, relatives and friends, and only 8% of those interviewed in 2016 and 5% of those asked in 2014 have reported to have formed their opinion on their personal experiences.

The overall media predominance in public soliciting information on corruption illustrates the media's important role in communicating the positive results of the police as well as in shaping public opinion on police corruption through the reverberation of corruption-related cases.

8.4 SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY TYPE

According to IACS reports, the most common types of corruption, for which investigations and criminal proceedings have been initiated, include passive corruption, trafficking and cultivation of narcotics, falsification of official documents, theft, trafficking of motor vehicles, involvement in prostitution pimping, etc.

These types of corruption and spread of corruption by type have been

emphasized in this study to assist anti-corruption institutions to assess vulnerabilities of corruption and to embark upon adequate anti-corruption measures.

To this end, the questions asked to citizens sought to generate a picture of the spread of corruption by forms and types considering the typologies of police corruption as well. Thus, the questions were intended to solicit public perception on forms of corrupt transactions, which could be money, gifts or favors, other forms of corruption through involvement in criminal activities, embezzlement of public resources and funds or violation of internal police rules or laws, or involvement in political corruption. In addition, the survey questions aimed to gain an understanding of the response to external or proactive corruption, when police officers create conditions for personal gains from corruption by themselves.

These data seek to generate a view of the corruption problem by types from the public perception viewpoint and to shed light on preventive measures that may be undertaken.

Bribery (giving money in exchange of a service) is one of the most pervasive forms of corrupt transactions and has remained almost unaffected over the last two years under study (Graph 18).[82] It is the most widespread form of corrupt transaction in Albania as compared with other countries of the region (except for Kosovo) where gifts are commonly used all over the country.[83]

Over the years under this study, there are a considerably increasing number of respondents think that police officers offer favors to third parties, i.e., people outside police, indicating that there is a trend in Albania to use favors as a form of corrupt transaction. Misuse of police funds has also increased substantially.

---

82   The graph shows sum of percentage of respondents who "agree" and "fully agree" with the question.
83   Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov, 'Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe'. SEDLI 2016. p. 18 http://seldi.net/publications/publications/shadow-power-assessment-of-corruption-and-hidden-economy-in-southeast-europe/

Graph 18. *Spread of corruption by form of transaction and types*

The spread of other more serious forms of corruption is most concerning. The number of citizens who declare that police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations has increased by 27% compared with year 2014. Some 24% of the respondents state that police officers are involved in illegitimate activities, such as trafficking, smuggling, etc. Also, the percentage of respondents thinking that police officers manipulate evidence has boosted by 20% and of those who say that procurement in the police are corrupt has increased by 23% compared with year 2014 (Graph 19).

There is a slight decrease (by 1%) of the cohort of respondents stating that police officers working in the field are more corrupt than those working in the office. This reveals the inconsistency between the great number of low-rank police officials convicted for corruption and public perception that corruption is more widespread in those positions with more discretion and authority, i.e., in top positions.

Similar to the findings above, there are an increasing number of respondents who think that the administrative and political corruption has become commonplace. Indeed, an additional 23% of citizens think that political leaders use police for corrupt purposes and an extra 19% of respondents stating that political leaders and police officers collaborate on corruption (Graph 20).

2014 **2016**

Graph 19. *Spread of corruption by type*

2014 **2016**

Graph 20. *Spread of administrative and political corruption*

Likewise, the percentage of citizens who think that recruitment, appointment and promotion in the police are corrupt has increased. Under

this category, the highest number belongs to citizens (17%) who say that appointments and promotion to top-line positions in the State Police are corrupt.

8.5 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

The survey questions asked to the public were divided in two categories in order to gain an understanding on causes of corruption. These two categories were: questions that sought to solicit answers on external causes, i.e., those causes that are not directly linked with the police organization; and, questions intended to solicit input on internal causes, which stem from or are to be found within the police organization.

External causes were revealed through questions on spread of corruption in the main institutions of the state, trust in these institutions and their fight against corruption, and the influence of external factors, such as political pressure, society tolerance to corruption, and public engagement in the fight against corruption.

The following graph shows that the corruption in major state institutions is widely spread and has increased as compared with year 2014. The High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets is the only institution with no change when compared with the 2014 survey data (Graph 21).

Graph 21. Spread of Corruption in major state institutions

There is a substantial increase among citizens who think that corruption has intensified in the Parliament, Council of Ministers, Ministry of Interior, and the President's Office, even though they perceive the courts and the Prosecutor's Office as the most corrupt institutions.

The increase of the public perception on corruption is associated with a sizeable decline of the public trust. Indeed, the percentage of respondents who believe in the efforts of the major state institutions to combat corruption has dropped significantly since 2014. The only exception to this finding is IACS, whose percentage of respondents to the question about their trust in the institutions to combat corruption in the police has not changed (Graph 22).

Institutions with a substantial drop in the public trust include the Ministry of Interior by 19%, General Director of State Police by 17%, Prime Minister by 10%, even though they enjoy comparatively high trust among other state institutions.

The trust in the Supreme State Audit and General Prosecutor has also dropped by 6% and 7% respectively.

Graph 22. Trust in the fight against corruption by major state institutions

Citizens think that "excessive political influence on police" is a factor that impacts the high police corruption. Some 48% of them declare that politics has "a lot of" influence on police corruption. Likewise, 46% of the respondents think that public tolerance to corruption and deficient public engagement against corruption have also "a lot of" influence.

The public perception was also examined on internal causes of corruption by making questions that sought to obtain answers about various aspects, such as attitude of management levels to corruption, police officers' pay and working conditions, quality of training or police management. Furthermore, citizens were asked about adequacy of this framework and its enforcement.

The data generated form responses show that State Police organizational culture is tolerance to and inaction to combat corruption. This culture derives from top-line management levels of the police organization. A comparison with year 2014 data reveals an increasing number of citizens that think police top management tolerates corruption because they are corrupt. Similarly, an additional cohort of citizens state that police management's apathy to corruption contributes in disheartening anti-corruption efforts and in inducing police officers to use their position for corrupt purposes. The number of public survey participants who think that most police officers are motivated to enforce the law is low albeit with a slight increase (Graph 23).

Graph 23. *Anti-corruption culture in State Police management*

The presence of corruption culture as an organizational characteristic is also pointed out from the citizens' response to the question "Police officers are corrupt before joining the State Police". Some 43% of the respondents do not agree with this statement and 32% think that this statement is true, indicating that many citizens think new police officers get corrupted when joining the State Police. This finding is compliant with the answer to the other question "Older (by age) police officers in the State Police are more corrupt than young officers": 55% of respondents "agree" or "fully agree" with this statement, whereas 29% of public survey participants do not agree with the statement.

One other feature of corruption culture is the correlation between corruption and gender. About 67% of the respondents think that "male police officers in the State Police are more corrupt than female police officers", while 14% do not agree with this statement.

Other survey data emphasizing the culture of integrity as an anti-corruption means include the dynamics of responses given on working conditions and salaries. When compared with year 2014, one can notice that fewer survey respondents think spread of police corruption is affected by low pay, bad working conditions or deficient training. A whooping increase of respondents of public survey, 14% more than in 2014, think that spread of corruption is relative to the work culture in the police organization (Graph 24).

Graph 24. *Impact of pay, working conditions, and training on police corruption.*

Also, 52 % of the respondents think that poor police management is an

influential factor on police corruption.[84]

In terms of enforcement of the framework on prevention of corruption, only 4% of interviewees think this framework is being fully implemented, and the same percentage of respondents think that the legal framework on investigation of corruption is being fully enforced. About 36% think that the framework on prevention of corruption is implemented 'to a certain extent' and 41% state that the legislation on investigation of corruption is enforced 'to a certain extent'.

All these factors seem to have affected overall belief that police corruption may be reduced. Hence, the number of citizens who stated that it is impossible to reduce police corruption has increased by 12% and the number of those who say that it is completely possible to reduce police corruption increased by 15% (Graph 25).

Graph 25. *Trust that police corruption may be reduced*

Similarly, the number of citizens who think that the State Police is capable of fighting corruption within its ranks has increased by 12%. In this respect, as fewer as 12% of citizens think that this is 'completely possible', and we have a higher percentage of those who say that it is impossible for the police to fight against police corruption. On the other

---

84   The question "to what extent poor police management affect level of corruption" was added in the 2016 questionnaire. Therefore, no comparisons with 2014 data can be drawn.

hand, it looks like citizens' expectations have shifted to more moderate requirements, because the number of those checking 'police can reduce police corruption to a certain extent' has increased by 15% (Graph 26).

Graph 26. Trust that police is capable of fighting corruption within its ranks

Among measures for which a higher number of citizens think are "very effective" to address corruption are improvement of education and training (55%), increase of salaries (52%), more severe punishment (51%), and improvement of working conditions (48%).

9. POLICE INTEGRITY AND CORRUPTION

9.1 SURVEY WITH THE POLICE

A more profound and broader examination of the problem under study required a survey with police officers in addition to one conducted with the public. In general, police officers are more reticent, which is reflected in the answers they provided in the survey. Thus, when asked how much they had heard about police corruption, 66% of citizens said that they heard "almost always" or "very often", but 22% of interviewed police officers provided these answers, whereas 52% stated that they have "rarely" heard about this phenomenon. (See Annex 2 for complete data of the police officers' survey.)

When considered from the viewpoint of inspiration of a culture of

integrity, these data show that irrespective of anti-corruption activity and intense debates, police officers are more likely to avoid rather than face the problem of corruption in their institution. However, 46% of police officers admit that there are corrupt officers in the State Police and 12% of police respondents say corruption in the State Police is spread at a considerable extent. This trend is also noticed in the responses given by police officers when asked about the spread of corruption by type (Graph 27).

Graph 27. Spread of corruption by forms and types according to police officers and the public, 2016.

Regardless of the inclination to avoid facing corruption, when asked about spread of corruption by police management level, the data of police officers' survey exposed a higher presence of this negative phenomenon in the top management levels of the State Police (Graph 28).

Graph 28. *Spread of corruption by State Police management level according to the public and police officers*

The trend of division by ranks is also observed in responses to the question on corruption within the police. Thus, 14% of respondents say that they "agree" and "fully agree" that appointments and promotion to top levels are corrupt, but only 10% agree that this is the case for low and mid rank levels. Also, 14% of police officers state that they "agree" and "fully agree" that political leaders use police for corrupt purposes and 7% admit that police officers create opportunities for corruption.

It should be pointed out that a great number of police officers think that corruption is "widespread" and "very widespread" in the Prosecutor's Office (39%) and in the Judiciary (41%). Some 29% of interviewed police officers declare that the excessive influence of politics on the police constitutes one of the causes of corruption in this organization.

Other internal factors, such as low pay (52%), deficient training (28%), and work culture (28%) are deemed to affect corruption. On the other hand, only 31% of interviewees declare that the working conditions are good or very good. Most respondents (43%) think that these conditions are acceptable or bad (25%). The responses on working conditions in both surveys are almost similar and there is significant coherence in the answers from the public and police officers for both years (Graph 29) indicating that the investments made to improve police infrastructure have not produced

the desired effect and that there is much to be done in this direction.

One problem raised from the answers relates with the low level of police officers' commitment to combat corruption within their organization. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 95% of interviewed police officers stated that they did not report on a fellow officer and the same percentage declared that they had not reported on their superior for corruption. Only 4% admitted to have done this at least once.

There are several factors that affect this finding. The culture of occupational solidarity and silence over misconduct of fellow officers continues to prevail undisturbed in the State Police making it a major factor that helps corruption to thrive. The following graph shows that police officers have less trust in institutions and this is accompanied with an increasing distrust (Graph 30).

Graph 29. *Evaluation of working conditions in the Police according to police officers and the public*

Graph 30. *Police officers' trust that institutions will combat police corruption*

The data indicate deficient knowledge on anti-corruption legislation and practices on the part of the police officers. Knowing rules is one of the four pillars that shape the integrity framework in a police organization. The problem of lack of knowledge was identified in the survey of 2014 and data of the 2016 survey point out that this problem has not been addressed at all (as shown in Graph 31). Regardless of deficient assimilation of anti-corruption legislation, 44% of the interviewed police officers stated that the anticorruption framework is implemented "little" or "not at all".

Police officers think that the anti-corruption measures are "very effective": some of these measures include: increase salaries (74%); improve working conditions (65%), improve education and training (60%), and better control of conflict of interest (41%). However, there is little support for the punitive measures. Thus, only 36% of interviewed police officers

think that most severe punishments are "very effective" and only 20% feel that replacement of top-line police leaders is "very effective" as an anti-corruption measure.

Graph 31. Knowledge of anti-corruption legislation and policies by police officers

9.2 INTERVIEWS WITH HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS

A survey instrument of scenarios with hypothetical offenses of occupational corruption was employed with police officers to explore and examine the issue of corruption and its perceptions. The main purpose of this instrument was to scan not only individual attitudes on these scenarios but to also identify any potential inconsistency between individual perceptions and attitudes and those perceived to be prevalent among fellow officers. This comparison would help to improve the instrument's objectivity in measuring and validating these attitudes. In addition, the application of the same instrument of year 2014 would enable comparisons between the two periods, even though the study samples do not allow for generalizations of findings for the entire population.

The collected data analysis is organized by four major issues:

Firstly, comparisons are drawn on respondents' assessments of personal attitudes and their fellow officers' perceived attitudes to the severity of violation (offense) presented in each scenario.

Secondly, we compared and analyzed the disciplinary measures that respondents think should be taken versus those they practically expect to occur in ratio to the severity of the offense examined in the previous section.

Thirdly, this instrument analyzes the trends of individual willingness and fellow officers' perceived willingness to report on offenses they have witnessed.

Lastly, an assessment of the respondents' knowledge is also reported on the compliance of scenario-based conducts with the official policies and rules.

9.3 ASSESSMENT OF SEVERITY OF CONDUCT

Interviewed police officers seem to have prioritizing assessment in terms of severity of conduct presented in each of the 11 scenarios. The ranking by personal beliefs and attitudes varies from the one reported for fellow officers or from the projected disciplinary measures that should or are likely to be taken (to be further explored in the following section).

Dual employment (or Scenario 1 for easy reference) continues to be less problematic in both personal and fellow officers' attitude even in this round of interviews. This scenario scored the lowest average, at 1.88 points, in a scale of 1 (not severe at all) to 5 (very severe). The most common checkmark to this scenario was 1 – an attitude that in most cases was deemed to be "Not severe at all". This is a commonly perceived assessment of the police officers.

When comparing the answers obtained on the questions about the personal attitude versus the one reported for fellow officers, one can see that Scenario 1 is the only case where the balance of severity leans on fellow officers' attitude. Indeed, fellow officers are more inclined to assess dual employment as "very severe" than the respondents themselves. All other scenarios feature an opposite direction of the fellow officers' perceived attitude. (See Graph 32 for a visual presentation).

Individual assessment on severity of conduct continues to follow a similar trend with the one reported in the first (2014) study. The only difference is the change of place between Scenario 6 (Taking a commission for recommendation) and Scenario 7 (Misuse of occupational competencies). The scenarios scoring highest in terms of problem they present include Scenario 3 (Taking bribe) and Scenario 5 (Opportunistic theft). The complete ranking of scenarios by reported severity is presented in Table 2.

SEVERITY OF VIOLATION				
SCENARIO	My attitude How severe do YOU think this conduct is?		My fellow officers' attitude, according to me How severe do MOST POLICE OFFICERS OF YOUR UNIT/DE-PARTMENT think this conduct is?	
	Average	Mode	Average	Mode
Scenario 1 Dual employment	1.88	Not severe at all	2.16↑	Not severe at all
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	2.87↑	Not severe at all	2.86	Not severe at all
Scenario 8 Cover-up of a violation of a fellow officer	3.44↑	Very severe	3.37	Very severe
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	3.45↑	Very severe	3.34	Very severe
Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	3.78↑	Very severe	3.55	Very severe
Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	3.97↑	Very severe	3.82	Very severe
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	4.13↑	Very severe	3.95	Very severe
Scenario 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	4.37↑	Very severe	4.12	Very severe
Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	4.63↑	Very severe	4.52	Very severe
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.81↑	Very severe	4.46	Very severe
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	4.87↑	Very severe	4.73	Very severe

Table 7. *Scenarios ranked by individual assessment versus fellow officers' reported assessment*

Regardless of the variety of scenarios and diversity of assessments, none of them is considered as "very severe" by all respondents. With the exception of Scenario 1, elaborated above, in all other cases, the assessment of severity of conduct dwindles from personal attitude to fellow officers' perceived attitude. The biggest difference is seen in one of the two scenarios deemed to be most severe, Scenario 3. Taking bribes, an offense commonly identified with corruption, is reportedly deemed most severe by interviewed police officers than by their fellow officers (Graph 32).

Graph 32. Assessment of severity of conduct (in average value, 1 = Not severe at all, to 5 = Very severe).

Identification of bribery as the most severe corrupt conduct reveals the deficiency of information and training of police officers on corruption and its forms in the State Police. The same rationale may be employed for the attitude to theft, under Scenario 5, which is considered as the most severe offense, given the fact that it is considered socially punishable.

It is interesting to draw attention to the polarization of assessment on severity of offenses, when comparing them reported for scenarios 3 and 4. While taking bribes is judged to be one of the most serious violations (with an average of 4.81 and mode 5), Scenario 4 (Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty) is positioned at the other pole, as one of the least problematic conducts (with an average of 2.9 and mode 1 "not severe at all"). Further analysis will, however, be necessary to provide a more thorough interpretation of these references.

9.4 DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND THEIR APPLICATION

Overall, the ranking of scenarios by disciplinary measures that respondents report that should be taken in the case of intended conducts matches with that of assessment of their severity. An exception to this finding are scenarios 2 and 8, which change places but without affecting the general standing. When comparing assessments on disciplinary measures that should be taken with those reported likely to be taken in reality a contradictory trend is observed, in which scenarios with high severity the disciplinary measures likely to be reported are harsher than those deemed to be taken.

The contrary occurs with those scenarios that by severity of offense ranked as most serious – Scenario 3 (taking bribes) and Scenario 5 (opportunistic theft). The disciplinary measures likely to be instigated for these two offenses and for Scenario 7 (misuse of occupational competencies) are softer than the measures respondents believe that should be taken. (Table 3 provides more information.) All in all, the reported attitudes indicate harsher disciplinary measures for "lighter" offenses and the likely lack of punishment for those offenses considered to be "more severe".

DISCIPLINE	Disciplinary measure that SHOULD be taken (p. 4)[83]		Disciplinary measure LIKELY to be taken (p. 5)	
	Average	Mode	Average	Mode
Scenario 1 Dual employment	1.98	None	1.99↑	None
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	2.48	None	2.57↑	None
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	2.87	Written admonishment	3.00↑	Written admonishment
Scenario 8 Cover-up of a violation of a fellow officer	3.14	Written admonishment	3.17↑	Written admonishment
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	3.28	Written admonishment	3.41↑	Written admonishment
Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	3.34↑	Written admonishment	3.27	Written admonishment
Skenari 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	3.36	Written admonishment	3.44↑	Written admonishment
Scenario 6 Theft of lost-and-found items	3.49	Vërejtje me shkrim	3.51	Vërejtje me shkrim
Scenario 11 Vjedhje e sendeve të gjetura	4.18	Shkarkim nga puna	4.21	Shkarkim nga puna
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.60	Shkarkim nga puna	4.57	Shkarkim nga puna
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	5.22	Shkarkim nga puna	5.18	Shkarkim nga puna

Table 8. *Scenarios ranked by average of disciplinary measure that should be taken versus those likely to be taken.*

---

84   See Table of Questions provided in Annex 5 for a complete list of the survey questions.

A comparison of the findings of this survey with those of the 2014 instrument reveals an increase of the "awareness" on disciplinary measures. While lighter disciplinary measures –oral admonishment prevailing (IDM, 2014, p. 95) –were chosen by respondents for a majority of violations, the answers given in this survey are much different.

As already illustrated in a summarized form in the following graph, the options "written admonishment" and "dismissal from work" prevailed in the remaining scenarios, with the exception of scenarios 1 and 4, which are thought to be less severe and for which the option "none" was stated as a punitive measure.

Irrespective of the trend to support harsher disciplinary measures than in 2014, inaccuracies and inconsistencies with the official regulations are still persistent. For example, the most reported disciplinary measure for the offense of "Use of excessive force" is now stated to be "written admonishment", unlike "oral admonishment" reported in 2014, but this does not comply with the regulation, which states that the use of excessive force is punished with "expulsion from State Police", i.e., dismissal from work.[85] It is, however, interesting to note this change toward supporting harsher disciplinary measures.

Additional data are required to analyze and understand whether this is a result of increased information and awareness activities, harshened punitive measures taken for these offenses in the State Police or a combination of both factors.

SCENARIO 1

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
82	26	22	8	2	9

---

85   See Regulation on Police Discipline Article 11, paragraph 14, and Article 10, paragraph 2

SCENARIO 2

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
22	42	54	8	10	13

SCENARIO 3

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
1	5	33	39	7	65

SCENARIO 4

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
51	33	40	7	2	16

SCENARIO 5

1	3	13	23	13	96

1. None | 2. Oral admonishment | 3. Written admonishment | 4. Suspension from duty | 5. Reduction in rank | 6. Dismissal from work

SCENARIO 6

14	23	54	19	11	28

1. None | 2. Oral admonishment | 3. Written admonishment | 4. Suspension from duty | 5. Reduction in rank | 6. Dismissal from work

SCENARIO 7

12	35	44	22	19	17

1. None | 2. Oral admonishment | 3. Written admonishment | 4. Suspension from duty | 5. Reduction in rank | 6. Dismissal from work

SCENARIO 8

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
23	28	50	20	8	20

SCENARIO 9

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
3	32	58	30	7	16

SCENARIO 10

1. None	2. Oral admonishment	3. Written admonishment	4. Suspension from duty	5. Reduction in rank	6. Dismissal from work
13	31	48	29	6	19

SCENARIO 11

Graph 33. *Disciplinary measures that should be taken: distribution by scenarios*

9.5 REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS: PERCEPTIONS ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE WILLINGNESS

A reference to findings on willingness to report on these offenses reveals no significant increase of awareness and information on violations and related disciplinary measures. Findings in this direction confirm that the culture of silence, which conflicts with the culture of police integrity, remains unaffected. The willingness to report on violations continues to be low. Indeed, the lack of willingness is now shown in values. Only in the case of willingness to report the average values on individual stances are lower than those of the perceptions on fellow officers' willingness, as shown in the following table and graph.

WILLINGNESS TO REPORT	By MYSELF (p. 6)		By MOST fellow officers (p. 7)	
	Average	Mode	Average	Mode
Scenario 1 Dual employment	2.40	Absolutely not	2.69	Absolutely not
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	2.80	Absolutely not	2.94	Yes, of course
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	3.17	Yes, of course	3.40	Yes, of course
Scenario 8 Cover-up of a violation of a fellow officer	3.17	Yes, of course	3.29	Yes, of course
Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	3.53	Yes, of course	3.54	Yes, of course
Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	3.57	Yes, of course	3.51	Yes, of course
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	3.61	Yes, of course	3.68	Yes, of course
Scenario 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	3.71	Yes, of course	3.77	Yes, of course
Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	4.00	Yes, of course	4.02	Yes, of course
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.06	Yes, of course	4.00	Yes, of course
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	4.45	Yes, of course	4.32	Yes, of course

Table 9. Willingness to report violations

An exception to this general trend are those scenarios deemed by

respondents as most severe. Scenarios 3, 5, and 7 are considered to earn more individual willingness for reporting than among fellow officers. It seems that higher sensitivity persists to relate to a certain typology of violations that include taking bribes, opportunistic theft, and misuse of occupational competencies. The situation is completely inverted for violations considered "not severe at all" or "little severe", such as those presented in scenarios 1 and 2 (dual employment, and accepting reward when off duty).

■ By most fellow officers ■ By Myself

Scenario	By Myself	By most fellow officers
SCENARIO 5	4.45	4.32
SCENARIO 3	4.06	4
SCENARIO 11	4	4.02
SCENARIO 9	3.71	3.77
SCENARIO 10	3.61	3.68
SCENARIO 7	3.57	3.51
SCENARIO 6	3.53	3.54
SCENARIO 8	3.17	3.29
SCENARIO 2	3.17	3.4
SCENARIO 4	2.8	2.94
SCENARIO 1	2.4	2.69

Graph 33. *Differences in willingness to report on violations*

9.6 OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE ON VIOLATIONS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL POLICY

In addition to questions that explored opinions and attitudes, interviewed State Police officers were asked questions to check their knowledge on official policy and level of support for this policy. They were asked to assess compliance/compatibility of conducts described in each scenario in consideration of knowledge of official policies and line of the State Police. The results according to a scale of 1 = "Absolutely not" to 5 = "Definitely yes" are presented in Table 10.

The 'Average' column indicates an average assessment of each scenario,

whereas the mode shows the most commonly reported value. As can be seen from the above table, while the most repetitive value in almost all scenarios (with the exception of Scenario 1) is 5, or 'Definitely yes', i.e., in sheer conflict with the official policies and regulations, none of the offenses receives all respondents' unanimous vote. The most severe scenario is classified as the most non-compliant with the official policies; yet, its mean value is barely 4.8.

COMPLIANCE WITH OFFICIAL POLICY		
	Average	**Mode**
Scenario 1 Dual employment	2.49	Absolutely not
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	3.14	Definitely yes
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	3.72	Definitely yes
Scenario 8 Cover-up of a violation of a fellow officer	3.94	Definitely yes
Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	4.02	Definitely yes
Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	4.15	Definitely yes
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	4.23	Definitely yes
Scenario 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	4.51	Definitely yes
Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	4.67	Definitely yes
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.74	Definitely yes
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	4.81	Definitely yes

Table 10. *Is described conduct considered a violation of the official line and policies of the police?*

9.7 EXPERIENCE IN STATE POLICE AND ATTITUDE TO VIOLATIONS

Education and training of State Police staff have undergone a process of reformation in the last few years. So have the strategies of training on corrupt or unethical conduct. For this reason, an interesting exploration of findings related with the observation whether these reformations would have led to changes that might not be identified otherwise. Thus, a subgroup (30% of interviewed) police officers of less than 5 years of experience in the State Police was targeted with the assumption that young police officers have been more exposed to numerous training programs. To this end, the sample included a similar percentage of both groups (less and over 5 years of experience) to draw comparisons for data analysis.

Unlike expectations for a lower tolerance to corruption on the part of young police officers interviewed in this study, the cohort of police officers with more years of experience in the State Police showed a stricter attitude to both the severity of the offence and its elements of punishment and reporting. The contrary has been validated in only few cases, as reported below. The less experienced cohort confirmed higher values only for scenarios that are generally deemed as most problematic: scenarios 3, 5, 7, and 9.

Hence, less experienced police officers think that taking bribes and opportunistic theft are most severe (albeit with a small difference from more experienced interviewed respondents). This finding applies to scenarios 7 and 9 as well. Misuse of occupational competencies and accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law are reported as severe offenses and most non-compliant with the official policies by the less experienced police officers. The differences are, however, smaller in this respect. The issues of willingness to report and domination of code of silence call for particular attention in this analysis and in additional studies on police corruption.

Graph 34. *Willingness to report violations (in average value in a scale of 1, Absolutely not – 5, Definitely yes).*

The above graph shows a clear distinction between police officers with less than 5 years of experience in the State Police and those with more experience in the police regarding their willingness to report. In none of the above scenarios did the cohort of respondents of less than 5 years in the police show a higher readiness to report. A broader context of analysis and comparison with the above findings may help to argue that the code of silence is reinforced as attitudes to and punishment for violations get harsher.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examines police corruption in Albania in order to assess trends of police corruption and anti-corruption measures during 2014-2016.

An analysis of public perception and data generated from surveys and interviews with police officers show that corruption continues to be endemic and that achievements to date are simply partial and have addressed certain aspects of policing or segments of the State Police.

An examination of the anti-corruption framework and measures reveal that, irrespective of the ambitious objectives stipulated in the strategic framework and review of the legislation, the main factors affecting police

corruption include insufficient resources, politicization of fight against corruption, deficient motivation of police officers, low trust in institutions, and substandard division of responsibilities and authorities.

This study is an additional contribution to the civil society efforts in enhancing and improving anti-corruption framework and in supplementing empirical studies on police corruption in Albania.

The fight against police corruption is a long and continuous process and should, first of all, be considered as a responsibility of the State Police. While it is indispensable in ensuring adequate conditions for the State Police to successfully and effectively carry on its anti-corruption process, the political will is not sufficient.

Police organizations have specific organizational characteristics and culture that comprise the main factor why this type of corruption exists. Indeed, they survive political power rotations.

Politicization of fight against police corruption has affected the public and police officers' perception that political institutions use this organization for corrupt purposes. In addition to shrinking the trust in these institutions, politicization creates conditions for the next political power rotation – whenever it occurs – to put the Police under political reformation pressure, which will simply recycle the problem but will not help to solve it. To this end, it is crucial to have a clear segregation of authorities, responsibilities, and roles in the public communication between the Minister of Interior and the State Police.

Citizens' perceptions and their incorporation into anti-corruption policies and measures contribute to strengthening the police organization integrity and increase the trust in the State Police.

The Parliament should acquire a greater role in monitoring the anti-corruption processes as well as in holding institutions accountable on lack of progress and failure to achieve established goals.

The State Police itself must do more in terms of effective and efficient use of its available resources and means to prevent and curb corruption.

Improvement of training capacities in the Police Academy should be accompanied by a more efficient use of these capacities to enhance the role of education and training as instruments in strengthening police integrity.

Police officers' deficient knowledge of anti-corruption rules, low level of their support for enforcing these rules, and the sturdy culture of silence to misconduct should be the focus of the education and training programs

delivered to police officers. To this end, particular attention should be paid to training on ethics and incorporation of ethics as an integral part of police culture.

While monetary and material gains and favors occupy the first place when analyzing the drives to corruption, the use of excessive force continues to be one of the most negative and almost unaddressed facets of the State Police.

Psychological verification of police officers' personality, avoidance of those vulnerable by positions in which use of force is required to perform the duty, and provision of adequate training are cost-effective and feasible measures on the part of the State Police, but that produce great impact on public perception.

ANNEX 1 - DETAILED REPORT OF FINDINGS AND QUESTIONNAIRE OF PUBLIC SURVEY

1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. GENDER			%
Male	☐1	**545**	50
Female	☐2	**536**	50

2. Resident in which district?	_____

3. Live in urban area (town) or in rural area (village)			
Urban area	☐1	**635**	59
Rural area	☐2	**439**	41

4. Which age group do you belong to?			
18 – 25 years	☐1	**251**	23
26- 35 years	☐2	**245**	23
36 – 45 years	☐3	**218**	20
46 – 55 years	☐4	**207**	19
Over 55 years	☐5	**160**	15

5. What is your highest education level completed?			
Elementary school	☐1	**566**	53
High school	☐2	**324**	30
University degree	☐3	**59**	5
Post-university degree	☐4	**125**	12

1.2 INFORMATION ON CORRUPTION

6. What are your main means of information on the general developments in country? You may check more than one answer.			
TV	☐1	**590**	55
Newspapers	☐2	**164**	15
Internet	☐3	**174**	16
Radio	☐4	**21**	2
Friends /acquaintances / family	☐5	**130**	12

7. Have you ever heard of corruption in Police?				
Almost always	☐ 1	**257**		24
Often	☐ 2	**526**		49
Rarely	☐ 3	**264**		25
Never	☐ 4	**21**		2
Refuse to answer (go to question 9)	☐ 99	**4**		0

8. Personal experience				
Media (TV, newspapers, Radio etc.)	☐ 1	**737**		70
Personal experience	☐ 2	**84**		8
Friends/Family	☐ 3	**232**		22
Other. Specify _____	☐ 4	**3**		0
Refuse to answer	☐ 99	**1**		0

9. How often do you hear or are exposed to information about corrupt police officers?				
Almost always	☐ 1	**194**		18
Often	☐ 2	**511**		48
Rarely	☐ 3	**335**		31
Never	☐ 4	**26**		2
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**1**		0

1.3 PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION

10. Do you think there are corrupt officers in the State Police?				
Yes	☐ 1	**984**		92
No	☐ 2	**47**		4
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**37**		4

11. To what extent do you think corruption is spread in the State Police?				
Few, isolated cases	☐ 1	**22**		2
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 2	**165**		16
Is spread considerably	☐ 3	**262**		25
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 4	**412**		39
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**183**		18

12. Evaluate spread of corruption at different levels of the State Police. Please evaluate in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means "Does not exist" and 5 means "Very widespread and serious".

A. *Leadership rank*
High rank leadership of "General Directorate of the State Police

Does not exist	1	**42**		4
Few, isolated cases	2	**161**		15
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**268**		25
Is spread considerably	4	**331**		31
Is very widespread and serious	5	**276**		26

B. *Leadership rank*
High rank leadership of "Directorates of the State Police in the Regions"

Does not exist	1	**38**		4
Few, isolated cases	2	**155**		14
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**327**		30
Is spread considerably	4	**322**		30
Is very widespread and serious	5	**234**		22

C. *Leadership rank*
Commissariat Leaders of the State Police

Does not exist	1	**45**		4
Few, isolated cases	2	**165**		15
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**326**		30
Is spread considerably	4	**300**		28
Is very widespread and serious	5	**237**		22

D. *Leadership rank*
Mid rank leadership in commissariats

Does not exist	1	**46**		4
Few, isolated cases	2	**207**		19
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**348**		32
Is spread considerably	4	**282**		26
Is very widespread and serious	5	**191**		18

E. *Leadership rank*				
Low rank officers of the State Police in commissariats				
Does not exist	1	**61**		6
Few, isolated cases	2	**186**		17
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**322**		30
Is spread considerably	4	**285**		27
Is very widespread and serious	5	**221**		21

13. Evaluate spread of corruption at different structures within the State Police. Please evaluate in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means "Does not exist" and 5 means "Very widespread and serious

A. *State Police Structures*				
Traffic Police				
Does not exist	1	**69**		6
Few, isolated cases	2	**183**		17
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**246**		23
Is spread considerably	4	**268**		25
Is very widespread and serious	5	**313**		29

B. *State Police Structures*				
Sector against Narcotics and Trafficking (Anti-Drugs)				
Does not exist	1	**82**		8
Few, isolated cases	2	**140**		13
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**210**		19
Is spread considerably	4	**262**		24
Is very widespread and serious	5	**384**		36

C. *State Police Structures*				
Border and Migration Police				
Does not exist	1	**493**		9
Few, isolated cases	2	**191**		18
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**320**		30
Is spread considerably	4	**238**		22
Is very widespread and serious	5	**231**		22

D. *State Police Structures*
Sector for Crime Investigation and Prevention

Does not exist	1	**89**		8
Few, isolated cases	2	**219**		20
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**328**		30
Is spread considerably	4	**230**		21
Is very widespread and serious	5	**212**		20

E. *State Police Structures*
Sector for Public Order and Safety

Does not exist	1	**91**		8
Few, isolated cases	2	**250**		23
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**270**		25
Is spread considerably	4	**270**		25
Is very widespread and serious	5	**197**		18

F. *State Police Structures*
Sector against Financial Crime

Does not exist	1	**65**		6
Few, isolated cases	2	**147**		14
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**290**		27
Is spread considerably	4	**264**		24
Is very widespread and serious	5	**313**		29

G. *State Police Structures*
Sector against Serious Crimes

Does not exist	1	**99**		9
Few, isolated cases	2	**186**		17
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**342**		32
Is spread considerably	4	**234**		22
Is very widespread and serious	5	**217**		20

H. *State Police Structures*
Administration of Directorates in Regional Police and Commissariats

Does not exist	1	**67**		6
Few, isolated cases	2	**221**		21
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**365**		34
Is spread considerably	4	**256**		24
Is very widespread and serious	5	**168**		16

I.	State Police Structures				
	Internal Control Inspection				
Does not exist	1	**91**			8
Few, isolated cases	2	**213**			20
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	3	**352**			30
Is spread considerably	4	**231**			21
Is very widespread and serious	5	**217**			20

14. How much do you agree with following statements? Please rank in an SPSS scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree at all and 5-Fully agree.

A. **Police officers are corrupt before joining the State Police force**

Do not agree at all	**242**		22
Do not agree to a certain extent	**228**		21
Neither agree nor disagree	**262**		24
Agree to a certain extent	**172**		16
Fully agree	**175**		16

B. **Old (by age) officers of the State Police are more corrupt that young officers**

Do not agree at all	**140**		13
Do not agree to a certain extent	**172**		16
Neither agree nor disagree	**172**		16
Agree to a certain extent	**253**		24
Fully agree	**337**		31

C. **Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt that female officers**

Do not agree at all	**69**		6
Do not agree to a certain extent	**85**		8
Neither agree nor disagree	**196**		18
Agree to a certain extent	**206**		19
Fully agree	**521**		48

D. The State Police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt.

Do not agree at all	71	7
Do not agree to a certain extent	111	10
Neither agree nor disagree	203	19
Agree to a certain extent	270	25
Fully agree	421	39

E. Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices.

Do not agree at all	149	14
Do not agree to a certain extent	151	14
Neither agree nor disagree	261	24
Agree to a certain extent	299	28
Fully agree	218	20

F. Senior officers in the State Police tolerate corruption of their juniors, because they are corrupt themselves.

Do not agree at all	22	2
Do not agree to a certain extent	94	9
Neither agree nor disagree	246	23
Agree to a certain extent	340	32
Fully agree	376	35

G. Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers.

Do not agree at all	26	2
Do not agree to a certain extent	99	9
Neither agree nor disagree	213	20
Agree to a certain extent	387	36
Fully agree	350	33

H. *Majority of the State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement.*		
Do not agree at all	**91**	8
Do not agree to a certain extent	**134**	12
Neither agree nor disagree	**308**	29
Agree to a certain extent	**309**	29
Fully agree	**235**	22

I. *Majority of the State Police officers often use the law as a pressure on citizens for personal benefits.*		
Do not agree at all	**45**	4
Do not agree to a certain extent	**139**	13
Neither agree nor disagree	**242**	22
Agree to a certain extent	**363**	34
Fully agree	**287**	27

1.4 EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

15. *Last time you had contact/interacted with a police officer has been:*			
In the last 6 months	☐ 1	**223**	21
In the last 6-12 months	☐ 2	**122**	12
One year ago or earlier	☐ 3	**160**	15
Never had any (go to question 17)	☐ 4	**541**	52
Don't know/refuse to answer (go to quest.17)	☐ 99	**0**	0

16. *If you had contact/interaction with, which Police/Police organization? (You may choose more than one option)*			
State Police	☐ 1	**321**	52
Municipal Police	☐ 2	**164**	27
Other (Specify): _____	☐ 3	**40**	7
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**89**	14

17. Has it ever happened to YOU to have been explicitly asked for a bribe in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

NO, never happened	**806**	69
YES, with Traffic Police	**204**	18
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	**15**	1
YES, with Border and Migration Police	**19**	2
YES, with public Order Police	**23**	2
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against Serious Crimes)	**5**	0
YES, from Internal Control Service	**3**	0
YES, with Regional Police administration	**20**	2
YES, with Police commissariat administration	**10**	1
YES, with Municipal Police	**55**	5

18. Has it happened to You in person, to have offered a bribe in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

NO, never happened	**846**	75
YES, with Traffic Police	**188**	17
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	**12**	1
YES, with Border and Migration Police	**16**	1
YES, with public Order Police	**15**	1
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against Serious Crimes)	**2**	0
YES, from Internal Control Service	**6**	1
YES, with Regional Police administration	**36**	3
YES, with Police commissariat administration	**0**	0
YES, with Municipal Police	**0**	0

19. Has it happened to YOU in person to have been explicitly asked for a favor in the last year from: (You may choose more than one option)

NO, never happened	**953**	87
YES, with Traffic Police	**86**	8
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	**11**	1
YES, with Border and Migration Police	**9**	1
YES, with public Order Police	**16**	1
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against Serious Crimes)	**1**	0
YES, from Internal Control Service	**3**	0
YES, with Regional Police administration	**21**	2
YES, with Police commissariat administration	**0**	0
YES, with Municipal Police	**0**	0

20. Have YOU in person offered any favors in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

NO, never happened	**972**	90
YES, with Traffic Police	**71**	7
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	**8**	1
YES, with Border and Migration Police	**9**	1
YES, with public Order Police	**8**	1
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against Serious Crimes)	**0**	0
YES, from Internal Control Service	**1**	0
YES, with Regional Police administration	**15**	1
YES, with Police commissariat administration	**0**	0
YES, with Municipal Police	**0**	0

21. If you have paid a bribe or offered a favor in the last year to the officers of any of the above mentioned structures, which has been their reaction?

Has accepted the bribe / favor	☐1	**206**	89
Has not accepted the bribe / favor	☐2	**25**	11
I don't know / Refuse to answer	☐99	**0**	0

22. Do you know where to report an act (or attempt) of corruption by a State Police officer?

YES	☐1	**698**		65
NO	☐2	**377**		35

23. Have you ever reported an act (or attempt) of corruption by a State Police officer?

YES	☐1	**55**		5
NO	☐2	**985**		95
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐99	**1**		0

24. If NO, what was the reason (for not reporting):

I have never been exposed to a corruptive act of the State Police officers	☐1	**587**		57
I had no time, I was in a rush	☐2	**48**		5
I had no information about where to report the case	☐3	**69**		7
It has been easier to solve the problem with a bribe/favor	☐4	**122**		12
I had no trust in institutions where such acts are should be reported to	☐99	**195**		19

1.5 TYPES AND DEGREE OF CORRUPTION

25. In your opinion, how often do following acts happen in the State Police? Please rank in a scale _of 1 to 5 where 1-almost never and 5-very often._

A. *Bribe*		
Almost never	**36**	3
Rarely	**100**	9
Sometimes	**242**	23
Often	**337**	31
Very often	**360**	33

B. *Courtesies / favors by third parties (outside police)*		
Almost never	**21**	2
Rarely	**149**	14
Sometimes	**302**	28
Often	**340**	32
Very often	**257**	24

C.   *Courtesies / favors to third parties (by the police)*

Almost never	**28**	3
Rarely	**139**	13
Sometimes	**266**	25
Often	**358**	33
Very often	**279**	26

D.   *Courtesies / favors to third parties (within the police)*

Almost never	**31**	3
Rarely	**116**	11
Sometimes	**281**	26
Often	**297**	28
Very often	**346**	32

E.   *Misuse of police funds*

Almost never	**93**	9
Rarely	**172**	16
Sometimes	**268**	25
Often	**226**	21
Very often	**306**	29

F.   *Misuse of police resources*

Almost never	**115**	11
Rarely	**205**	19
Sometimes	**253**	24
Often	**255**	24
Very often	**243**	23

G.   *Manipulation of evidence*

Almost never	**75**	7
Rarely	**148**	14
Sometimes	**241**	22
Often	**322**	30
Very often	**288**	27

H. *Use of excessive force by the police*		
Almost never	**76**	7
Rarely	**180**	17
Sometimes	**345**	32
Often	**212**	20
Very often	**259**	24

26. Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree at all and 5-Fully agree.

A. *Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations*		
Do not agree at all	**65**	6
Do not agree to a certain extent	**162**	15
Neither agree nor disagree	**201**	19
Agree to a certain extent	**306**	28
Fully agree	**343**	32

B. *Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)*		
Do not agree at all	**83**	8
Do not agree to a certain extent	**160**	15
Neither agree nor disagree	**218**	20
Agree to a certain extent	**278**	26
Fully agree	**339**	31

C. *Recruitment of police officers takes place on corrupt basis*		
Do not agree at all	**75**	7
Do not agree to a certain extent	**156**	14
Neither agree nor disagree	**273**	25
Agree to a certain extent	**276**	26
Fully agree	**298**	28

D. *Appointments and promotion in high rank police are corrupt*

Do not agree at all	**40**	4
Do not agree to a certain extent	**151**	14
Neither agree nor disagree	**257**	24
Agree to a certain extent	**287**	27
Fully agree	**337**	31

E. *Appointments and promotion in middle and lower ranks of police are corrupt*

Do not agree at all	**52**	5
Do not agree to a certain extent	**156**	14
Neither agree nor disagree	**283**	26
Agree to a certain extent	**287**	27
Fully agree	**300**	28

F. *Police leaders use police for corrupt purposes*

Do not agree at all	**51**	5
Do not agree to a certain extent	**115**	11
Neither agree nor disagree	**196**	18
Agree to a certain extent	**325**	30
Fully agree	**389**	36

G. *Political leaders and police officers collude for corrupt purposes*

Do not agree at all	**47**	4
Do not agree to a certain extent	**113**	10
Neither agree nor disagree	**168**	16
Agree to a certain extent	**327**	30
Fully agree	**423**	39

H. *Police officers collude for corrupt purposes*

Do not agree at all	**55**	5
Do not agree to a certain extent	**133**	12
Neither agree nor disagree	**178**	16
Agree to a certain extent	**314**	29
Fully agree	**399**	37

I. Procurement in police is performed on corrupt basis		
Do not agree at all	49	5
Do not agree to a certain extent	145	13
Neither agree nor disagree	262	24
Agree to a certain extent	296	28
Fully agree	324	30

J. Police officers create themselves opportunities for profit through corruption		
Do not agree at all	33	3
Do not agree to a certain extent	156	14
Neither agree nor disagree	246	23
Agree to a certain extent	343	32
Fully agree	300	28

1.6 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

27. In your opinion, how much is corruption spread in the following institutions? Please rank in a scale of _1 to 5_ where _1- Not at all and 5 - Very widespread._

A. President's Office		
Does not exist at all	255	24
Few, isolated cases	261	24
Exists, but is not in serious levels	273	25
Is spread to a considerable extent	168	16
Is very widespread and serious	118	11

B. Parliament		
Does not exist at all	66	6
Few, isolated cases	137	13
Exists, but is not in serious levels	237	22
Is spread to a considerable extent	242	22
Is very widespread and serious	396	37

C.   Council of Ministers

Does not exist at all	69	6
Few, isolated cases	174	16
Exists, but is not in serious levels	228	21
Is spread to a considerable extent	288	27
Is very widespread and serious	319	30

D.   Ministry of Interior

Does not exist at all	72	7
Few, isolated cases	190	18
Exists, but is not in serious levels	241	22
Is spread to a considerable extent	249	23
Is very widespread and serious	325	30

E.   Prosecutor's Office

Does not exist at all	41	4
Few, isolated cases	74	7
Exists, but is not in serious levels	195	18
Is spread to a considerable extent	269	25
Is very widespread and serious	499	46

F.   Courts

Does not exist at all	31	3
Few, isolated cases	51	5
Exists, but is not in serious levels	157	15
Is spread to a considerable extent	243	23
Is very widespread and serious	595	55

G.   Supreme State Audit

Does not exist at all	73	7
Few, isolated cases	177	16
Exists, but is not in serious levels	252	23
Is spread to a considerable extent	307	28
Is very widespread and serious	269	25

H. *High Inspectorate of Declarations and Audit of Assets*		
Does not exist at all	75	7
Few, isolated cases	138	13
Exists, but is not in serious levels	340	32
Is spread to a considerable extent	252	23
Is very widespread and serious	272	25

I. *Media*		
Does not exist at all	179	17
Few, isolated cases	235	22
Exists, but is not in serious levels	306	28
Is spread to a considerable extent	192	18
Is very widespread and serious	166	15

J. *Civil society*		
Does not exist at all	258	24
Few, isolated cases	278	26
Exists, but is not in serious levels	300	28
Is spread to a considerable extent	156	14
Is very widespread and serious	86	8

K. *Ombudsman*		
Does not exist at all	298	28
Few, isolated cases	262	24
Exists, but is not in serious levels	257	24
Is spread to a considerable extent	157	15
Is very widespread and serious	104	10

28. How much do following factors influence the level of corruption in the Police? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- No influence at all and 5- A lot of influence.

A. *Corruption culture in Albanian society in general*		
No influence at all	27	3
A little	58	5
Neutral	192	18
Some influence	395	37
A lot of influence	403	37

B. *Too much political control over police*		
No influence at all	**8**	1
A little	**58**	5
Neutral	**180**	17
Some influence	**358**	33
A lot of influence	**465**	43

C. *Deficient/poor oversight of Parliament over police*		
No influence at all	**29**	3
A little	**103**	10
Neutral	**180**	17
Some influence	**356**	33
A lot of influence	**406**	38

D. *Public tolerance to corruption/Deficient public involvement against corruption*		
No influence at all	**28**	3
A little	**95**	9
Neutral	**184**	17
Some influence	**270**	25
A lot of influence	**498**	46

1.7 INTERNAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

29. How much do following factors influence the level of corruption in the Police? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- No influence at all and 5- A lot of influence.

A. *Low salaries*		
No influence at all	**31**	3
A little	**88**	8
Neutral	**122**	11
Some influence	**327**	30
A lot of influence	**505**	47

B. *Deficient training*		
No influence at all	130	12
A little	174	16
Neutral	332	31
Some influence	394	37
A lot of influence	43	4

C. *Working culture in the State Police organization*		
No influence at all	24	2
A little	53	5
Neutral	174	16
Some influence	283	26
A lot of influence	537	50

D. *Poor police management*		
No influence at all	30	3
A little	71	7
Neutral	137	13
Some influence	276	26
A lot of influence	560	52

30. How do you consider working conditions of the State Police officers?

Bad	?	207	20
Acceptable	?	494	48
Good	?	270	26
Very good	4	41	4
I don't know/refuse to answer	?9	18	2

1.8 TOLERANCE TO CORRUPTION

31. In your opinion, are the following situations qualified as corrupt acts?

A. A police officer outside service (working hours) violates traffic police rules and is not punished

Yes	889	85
No	153	15
Don't know/Refuse to answer	5	0

B. A police officer helps someone else to benefit a service disregarding the queue		
Yes	**828**	79
No	**198**	19
Don't know/Refuse to answer	**23**	2

C. A police officer accepts free of charge services from private subjects (coffee shops, restaurants, petrol stations, etc.)		
Yes	**761**	73
No	**226**	22
Don't know/Refuse to answer	**56**	5

D. A police officer manipulates the evidence aiming at a quicker arrest of a suspected incriminated person		
Yes	**790**	78
No	**146**	14
Don't know/Refuse to answer	**74**	7

32. If a police officer is involved in illegal activities or he/she collaborates with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations, he/she should:

Be given notice / warning for dismissal	⬜	**128**	12
Be transferred to another position	⬜	**122**	11
Leave the Police	⬜	**800**	75
Other: _____	⬜	**5**	0
I don't know/refuse to answer	⬜9	**16**	1

33. Do you agree with the following Statements? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where "1 – Do not agree" and "5 – fully agree".

A. It is fair that State Police officers perform another job outside working hours		
Do not agree at all	**234**	22
Do not agree to a certain extent	**100**	9
Neither agree nor disagree	**265**	25
Agree to a certain extent	**210**	19
Fully agree	**270**	25

B. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers that are involved in a bribery affair*

Do not agree at all	27	3
Do not agree to a certain extent	46	4
Neither agree nor disagree	97	9
Agree to a certain extent	230	21
Fully agree	674	63

C. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers involved in the provision of police information to criminal people/organizations*

Do not agree at all	21	2
Do not agree to a certain extent	65	6
Neither agree nor disagree	64	6
Agree to a certain extent	160	15
Fully agree	769	71

D. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers involved in a criminal organization*

Do not agree at all	27	3
Do not agree to a certain extent	41	4
Neither agree nor disagree	111	10
Agree to a certain extent	153	14
Fully agree	747	69

E. *Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the job*

Do not agree at all	242	22
Do not agree to a certain extent	178	17
Neither agree nor disagree	261	24
Agree to a certain extent	218	20
Fully agree	179	17

F. *Performing a second job outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfillment of the police duties*

Do not agree at all	**219**	20
Do not agree to a certain extent	**205**	19
Neither agree nor disagree	**263**	24
Agree to a certain extent	**205**	19
Fully agree	**168**	17

1.9 TRUST IN FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

34. *Do you believe that police corruption can be reduced?*

Yes, totally possible	☐ 1	**248**	23
Yes, but to a certain extent	☐ 2	**552**	51
Almost impossible	☐ 3	**201**	19
No, impossible	☐ 4	**71**	7
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐ 99	**4**	0

35. *Do you believe that Police is capable of fighting corruption internally?*

Yes	☐ 1	**258**	24
To a certain extent	☐ 2	**597**	56
No	☐ 3	**195**	18
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐ 99	**13**	1

36. *How much do you trust the following institutions for the fight against police corruption? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- Not trust at all and 5- A lot of trust. (1 = no trust at all, 2 = little trust, 3 = neutral, 4 = some trust, 5 = a lot of trust).*

A. *Prime Minister*

No trust at all	**259**	24
A little trust	**205**	19
Neutral	**210**	19
Some trust	**224**	21
A lot of trust	**181**	17

B. *Minister of Interior*		
No trust at all	267	25
A little trust	231	21
Neutral	174	16
Some trust	200	19
A lot of trust	207	19

C. *General Director of the State Police*		
No trust at all	262	25
A little trust	246	23
Neutral	207	19
Some trust	219	20
A lot of trust	145	13

D. *Internal Control Service*		
No trust at all	214	20
A little trust	227	21
Neutral	282	26
Some trust	225	21
A lot of trust	131	12

E. *General Prosecutor's Office*		
No trust at all	331	31
A little trust	235	22
Neutral	249	23
Some trust	145	13
A lot of trust	119	11

F. *Ombudsman*		
No trust at all	261	24
A little trust	213	20
Neutral	264	24
Some trust	179	17
A lot of trust	162	15

G. *High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest*

No trust at all	278	26
A little trust	278	26
Neutral	282	26
Some trust	155	14
A lot of trust	84	8

H. *Parliament*

No trust at all	480	44
A little trust	206	19
Neutral	164	15
Some trust	158	15
A lot of trust	71	7

I. *Judiciary*

No trust at all	532	49
A little trust	227	21
Neutral	136	13
Some trust	101	9
A lot of trust	83	8

J. *Prosecutor's Office*

No trust at all	471	44
A little trust	222	21
Neutral	179	17
Some trust	119	11
A lot of trust	87	8

K. *Supreme State Audit*

No trust at all	286	27
A little trust	247	23
Neutral	256	24
Some trust	187	17
A lot of trust	100	9

L. *Political parties*		
No trust at all	**509**	47
A little trust	**190**	18
Neutral	**206**	19
Some trust	**99**	9
A lot of trust	**74**	7

M. *Civil society*		
No trust at all	**134**	12
A little trust	**214**	20
Neutral	**343**	32
Some trust	**245**	23
A lot of trust	**141**	13

N. *Media*		
No trust at all	**110**	10
A little trust	**150**	14
Neutral	**334**	31
Some trust	**277**	26
A lot of trust	**206**	19

1.10 EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

37. According to you, to what extent are the legal framework and policies in force implemented to prevent police corruption?		
Not at all	**188**	18
Very little	**441**	41
Somewhat	**387**	36
Totally implemented	**46**	4
I don't know/refuse to answer	**1**	0

38. According to you, to what extent are the legal framework and policies in force implemented to investigate into police corruption?

Not at all	**164**		16
Very little	**414**		39
Somewhat	**430**		41
Totally implemented	**43**		4
I don't know / refuse to answer	**4**		0

39. In your opinion, how effective are the following institutions in investigating police corruption? Please rank in a scale of _1 to 5_ where _1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective_.

A. *Internal Audit*			
Not effective at all	**85**		8
Little effective	**167**		16
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	**351**		33
Somewhat effective	**307**		29
Very effective	**161**		15

B. *Inspection*			
Not effective at all	**81**		8
Little effective	**176**		16
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	**330**		31
Somewhat effective	**286**		27
Very effective	**199**		19

C. *Internal Control Service*			
Not effective at all	**97**		9
Little effective	**146**		14
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	**357**		33
Somewhat effective	**238**		22
Very effective	**236**		22

40. How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in the State Police? Please rank in a scale of _1 to 5_ where _1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective_.

A. *Strengthening legal and institutional framework*

Not effective at all	26	2
Little effective	83	8
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	178	17
Somewhat effective	367	34
Very effective	420	39

B. *Improvement of anticorruption policies*

Not effective at all	26	2
Little effective	48	4
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	183	17
Somewhat effective	358	33
Very effective	457	43

C. *Replacement of the State Police leadership*

Not effective at all	65	6
Little effective	142	13
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	248	23
Somewhat effective	295	27
Very effective	324	30

D. *Severe punishment*

Not effective at all	39	4
Little effective	63	6
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	155	14
Somewhat effective	268	25
Very effective	544	51

E. *Improvement of working conditions*

Not effective at all	42	4
Little effective	71	7
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	139	13
Somewhat effective	306	29
Very effective	515	48

F. *Increase of salaries*		
Not effective at all	34	3
Little effective	63	6
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	125	12
Somewhat effective	291	27
Very effective	561	52

G. *Improvement of education and training*		
Not effective at all	13	1
Little effective	69	6
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	147	14
Somewhat effective	256	24
Very effective	589	55

H. *Better oversight from Parliament*		
Not effective at all	42	4
Little effective	138	13
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	271	25
Somewhat effective	279	26
Very effective	342	32

I. *Better audit of conflict of interest*		
Not effective at all	18	2
Little effective	88	8
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	241	23
Somewhat effective	303	28
Very effective	418	39

ANNEX 2 – DETAILED REPORT OF FINDINGS AND QUESTIONNAIRE OF POLICE OFFICERS

2.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. *Gender*			%
Male	☐ 1	276	75
Female	☐ 2	94	25

2. Which age group do you belong to?			
18 – 25 years	**50**		14
26- 35 years	**95**		26
36 – 45 years	**85**		23
46 – 55 years	**117**		32
Over 55 years	**23**		6

3. What is your highest education level completed?				
High school	☐1	**166**		45
University degree	☐2	**175**		47
Post-university degree	☐3	**29**		8

4. What is your actual rank?				
Enforcement Police Officer				
Vice-Inspector	☐1	**10**		3
Inspector	☐2	**251**		69
Prime Inspector	☐3	**18**		5
Vice-Commissar	☐4	**69**		19
Commissar	☐5	**16**		4
Prime Commissar	☐6	**0**		-

5. Which service of the State Police do you work for?				
Criminal Police				
Border and Migration Police	☐2	**53**		14
Public Order and Safety	☐3	**245**		66
Support Services	☐4	**14**		4
Police Academy	☐5	**5**		1

6. Are you a field officer in your actual position in the State Police?				
Yes	☐1	**259**		72
No	☐2	**103**		28

7. Since when are you part of the State Police service?				
Less than 5 years	☐1	**94**		25
5 – 10 years	☐2	**52**		14
11 – 20 years	☐3	**123**		33
21 – 30 years	☐4	**87**		24
Over 30 years	☐5	**13**		4

2.2 INFORMATION ON CORRUPTION

8. What are your main means of information on the general developments in country? You may check more than one answer.

TV	☐ 1	**115**	31
Newspapers	☐ 2	**22**	6
Internet	☐ 3	**146**	40
Radio	☐ 4	**30**	8
Friends /acquaintances / family	☐ 5	**56**	15

9. Have you ever heard of corruption in Police?

Almost always	☐ 1	**33**	9
Often	☐ 2	**125**	34
Rarely	☐ 3	**191**	52
Never	☐ 4	**10**	3
Refuse to answer (go to question 9)	☐ 99	**10**	3

10. From which source do you hear more about corruption in Police?

Media (TV, newspapers, Radio etc.)	☐ 1	**273**	74
Personal experience	☐ 2	**24**	7
Friends/Family	☐ 3	**52**	14
Refuse to answer	☐ 99	**1**	5

2.3 PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION

11. How often do you hear or are exposed to information about corrupt police officers?

Almost always	☐ 1	**13**	4
Often	☐ 2	**66**	18
Rarely	☐ 3	**229**	62
Never	☐ 4	**28**	8
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**34**	9

12. Do you think there are corrupt officers in the State Police?

Yes	☐ 1	**169**	46
No	☐ 2	**73**	20
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**126**	34

13. To what extent do you think corruption is spread in the State Police?

Does not exist	☐ 1	**31**		8
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**132**		36
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**104**		28
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**43**		12
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**1**		-
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**58**		16

14. Evaluate spread of corruption at different levels of the State Police. Please evaluate in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means "Does not exist" and 5 means "Very widespread and serious".

A.   Leadership rank

High rank leadership of "General Directorate of the State Police

Does not exist	☐ 1	**172**		47
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**115**		31
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**41**		11
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**15**		4
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**26**		7

B.   Leadership rank

High rank leadership of "Directorates of the State Police in the Regions"

Does not exist	☐ 1	**174**		47
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**109**		30
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**46**		12
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**22**		6
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**18**		5

C.   Leadership rank

Commissariat Leaders of the State Police

Does not exist	☐ 1	**161**		44
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**114**		31
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**59**		16
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**19**		5
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**16**		4

D. *Leadership rank*			
Mid rank leadership in commissariats			
Does not exist	☐1	**146**	39
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**148**	40
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**56**	15
Is spread considerably	☐4	**11**	3
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**9**	2

E. *Leadership rank*			
Low rank officers of the State Police in commissariats			
Does not exist	☐1	**170**	46
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**135**	36
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**44**	12
Is spread considerably	☐4	**8**	2
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**13**	4

15. Evaluate spread of corruption at different structures within the State Police. Please evaluate in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means "Does not exist" and 5 means "Very widespread and serious

A. *State Police Structures*			
Traffic Police			
Does not exist	☐1	**92**	25
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**125**	34
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**75**	20
Is spread considerably	☐4	**45**	12
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**33**	9

B. *State Police Structures*			
Sector against Narcotics and Trafficking (Anti-Drugs)			
Does not exist	☐1	**122**	33
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**127**	34
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**61**	16
Is spread considerably	☐4	**40**	11
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**20**	5

C. *State Police Structures*
Border and Migration Police

Does not exist	☐1	**122**		33
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**118**		32
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**81**		22
Is spread considerably	☐4	**28**		8
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**21**		6

D. *State Police Structures*
Sector for Crime Investigation and Prevention

Does not exist	☐1	**160**		43
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**130**		35
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**59**		16
Is spread considerably	☐4	**9**		2
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**12**		3

E. *State Police Structures*
Sector for Public Order and Safety

Does not exist	☐1	**207**		56
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**107**		29
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**37**		10
Is spread considerably	☐4	**5**		1
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**14**		4

F. *State Police Structures*
Sector against Financial Crime

Does not exist	☐1	**118**		32
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**119**		32
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**86**		23
Is spread considerably	☐4	**30**		8
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**17**		5

G. *State Police Structures*
Sector against Serious Crimes

Does not exist	☐1	**178**		48
Few, isolated cases	☐2	**113**		31
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐3	**52**		14
Is spread considerably	☐4	**15**		4
Is very widespread and serious	☐5	**12**		3

H. *State Police Structures*				
Administration of Directorates in Regional Police and Commissariats				
Does not exist	☐ 1	**193**		52
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**113**		31
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**42**		11
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**13**		4
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**9**		2

I. *State Police Structures*				
Internal Control Inspection				
Does not exist	☐ 1	**177**		48
Few, isolated cases	☐ 2	**99**		27
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	☐ 3	**48**		13
Is spread considerably	☐ 4	**20**		5
Is very widespread and serious	☐ 5	**26**		7

16. How much do you agree with following statements? Please rank in an SPSS scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree at all and 5-Fully agree.

A. *There are many uncorrupt police officers in the State Police.*

Do not agree at all	**86**	23
Do not agree to a certain extent	**67**	18
Neither agree nor disagree	**29**	8
Agree to a certain extent	**26**	7
Fully agree	**162**	44

B. *Police officers are corrupt before joining the State Police force*

Do not agree at all	**202**	55
Do not agree to a certain extent	**73**	20
Neither agree nor disagree	**42**	11
Agree to a certain extent	**15**	4
Fully agree	**37**	10

C. *Old (by age) officers of the State Police are more corrupt that young officers*

Do not agree at all	176	48
Do not agree to a certain extent	78	21
Neither agree nor disagree	42	11
Agree to a certain extent	18	5
Fully agree	56	15

D. *Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt that female officers*

Do not agree at all	164	44
Do not agree to a certain extent	78	21
Neither agree nor disagree	38	10
Agree to a certain extent	31	8
Fully agree	58	16

E. *The State Police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt.*

Do not agree at all	81	22
Do not agree to a certain extent	71	19
Neither agree nor disagree	41	11
Agree to a certain extent	29	8
Fully agree	148	40

F. *Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices.*

Do not agree at all	168	45
Do not agree to a certain extent	73	20
Neither agree nor disagree	56	15
Agree to a certain extent	28	8
Fully agree	45	12

G. *Senior officers in the State Police tolerate corruption of their juniors, because they are corrupt themselves.*

Do not agree at all	**167**	45
Do not agree to a certain extent	**70**	19
Neither agree nor disagree	**56**	15
Agree to a certain extent	**27**	7
Fully agree	**49**	13

H. *Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers.*

Do not agree at all	**112**	30
Do not agree to a certain extent	**57**	15
Neither agree nor disagree	**53**	14
Agree to a certain extent	**30**	8
Fully agree	**115**	32

I. *Majority of the State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement.*

Do not agree at all	**54**	15
Do not agree to a certain extent	**39**	11
Neither agree nor disagree	**31**	8
Agree to a certain extent	**40**	11
Fully agree	**206**	56

2.4 EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

17. *In the last 12 months, has it happened to YOU in person any of the following situations?*

A. *A citizen offered a bribe*

Never	**266**	72
At least once	**72**	17
Several times	**29**	8
Often	**5**	1
Very often	**5**	1

B. *A citizen asked for a favor*		
Never	183	49
At least once	113	31
Several times	62	17
Often	7	2
Very often	5	1

C. *A fellow officer asked for a favor*		
Never	233	63
At least once	84	23
Several times	42	11
Often	5	1
Very often	5	1

D. *Your supervisor asked to tolerate someone (citizen, colleague, official, etc.)*		
Never	276	75
At least once	58	16
Several times	25	7
Often	7	2
Very often	4	1

E. *You have reported on a fellow police officer for corruption*		
Never	350	95
At least once	14	4
Several times	4	1
Often	1	-
Very often	1	-

F. *You have reported on your supervisor for corruption*		
Never	351	95
At least once	13	4
Several times	4	1
Often	0	-
Very often	2	1

G. *You have reported on a citizen for an attempted corrupt behavior*

Never	**329**		89
At least once	**25**		7
Several times	**10**		3
Often	**2**		1
Very often	**4**		1

18. *In the last 12 months, have YOU in person ever encounter any of the following situations:*

A. *A police officer getting a bribe*

Never	**330**		89
At least once	**27**		7
Several times	**9**		2
Often	**4**		1
Very often	**0**		-

B. *A police officer offering a favor to a citizen*

Never	**264**		71
At least once	**74**		20
Several times	**28**		8
Often	**4**		1
Very often	**0**		-

C. *A police officer asking a bribe/favor to any citizen in return for no punishment*

Never	**316**		85
At least once	**35**		9
Several times	**15**		4
Often	**4**		1
Very often	**0**		-

D. *A police officer reporting on his fellow officer/supervisor for corruption*

Never	336	91
At least once	26	7
Several times	5	1
Often	3	1
Very often	0	-

E. *A police officer reporting on a citizen for an attempted corrupt behavior*

Never	255	69
At least once	69	19
Several times	39	11
Often	6	2
Very often	1	-

2.5 TYPES AND DEGREE OF CORRUPTION

19. In your opinion, how often do following act happen in the State Police? Please rank in a degree of _1 to 5 where 1-almost never and 5-very often._

A. *Bribe*

Almost never	174	47
Rarely	131	35
Sometimes	48	13
Often	10	3
Very often	7	2

B. *Courtesies / favors by third parties (outside police)*

Almost never	140	38
Rarely	144	39
Sometimes	60	16
Often	17	5
Very often	8	2

C. *Courtesies / favors to third parties (by the police)*

Almost never	**168**	46
Rarely	**131**	36
Sometimes	**53**	14
Often	**6**	2
Very often	**11**	3

D. *Courtesies / favors to fellow officers (within the police)*

Almost never	**162**	44
Rarely	**129**	35
Sometimes	**57**	15
Often	**14**	4
Very often	**7**	2

E. *Misuse of police funds*

Almost never	**208**	56
Rarely	**77**	21
Sometimes	**48**	13
Often	**23**	6
Very often	**14**	4

F. *Misuse of police resources*

Almost never	**203**	55
Rarely	**87**	24
Sometimes	**44**	12
Often	**20**	5
Very often	**16**	4

G. *Manipulation of evidence*

Almost never	**278**	75
Rarely	**59**	16
Sometimes	**19**	5
Often	**8**	2
Very often	**5**	1

H. *Use of excessive force by the police*		
Almost never	**263**	71
Rarely	**83**	22
Sometimes	**21**	6
Often	**2**	1
Very often	**1**	-

20. *How much do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree at all and 5-Fully agree*.

A. *Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations*		
Do not agree at all	**227**	61
Do not agree to a certain extent	**105**	28
Neither agree nor disagree	**28**	5
Agree to a certain extent	**7**	2
Fully agree	**3**	1

B. *Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)*		
Do not agree at all	**203**	55
Do not agree to a certain extent	**123**	33
Neither agree nor disagree	**25**	7
Agree to a certain extent	**10**	3
Fully agree	**9**	2

C. *Recruitment of police officers takes place on corrupt basis*		
Do not agree at all	**233**	63
Do not agree to a certain extent	**92**	25
Neither agree nor disagree	**25**	7
Agree to a certain extent	**6**	2
Fully agree	**13**	4

D. *Appointments and promotion in high rank police are corrupt*

Do not agree at all	**180**	49
Do not agree to a certain extent	**95**	26
Neither agree nor disagree	**42**	11
Agree to a certain extent	**21**	6
Fully agree	**32**	9

E. *Appointments and promotion in middle and lower ranks of police are corrupt*

Do not agree at all	**199**	54
Do not agree to a certain extent	**90**	24
Neither agree nor disagree	**41**	11
Agree to a certain extent	**20**	5
Fully agree	**20**	5

F. *Police leaders use police for corrupt purposes*

Do not agree at all	**210**	57
Do not agree to a certain extent	**70**	19
Neither agree nor disagree	**41**	11
Agree to a certain extent	**21**	6
Fully agree	**28**	8

G. *Political leaders and police officers collude for corrupt purposes*

Do not agree at all	**219**	59
Do not agree to a certain extent	**77**	21
Neither agree nor disagree	**33**	9
Agree to a certain extent	**21**	6
Fully agree	**20**	5

H. *Procurement in police is performed on corrupt basis*

Do not agree at all	**237**	64
Do not agree to a certain extent	**85**	23
Neither agree nor disagree	**31**	8
Agree to a certain extent	**9**	2
Fully agree	**8**	2

I. *Police officers create themselves opportunities for profit through corruption*		
Do not agree at all	**221**	60
Do not agree to a certain extent	**88**	24
Neither agree nor disagree	**34**	9
Agree to a certain extent	**11**	3
Fully agree	**16**	4

2.6 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

21. *In your opinion, how much is corruption spread in the following institutions? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- Not at all and 5 - Very widespread.*		
A. ***President's Office***		
Does not exist at all	**199**	54
Few, isolated cases	**83**	22
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**48**	13
Is spread to a considerable extent	**13**	4
Is very widespread and serious	**27**	7

B. ***Parliament***		
Does not exist at all	**155**	42
Few, isolated cases	**63**	17
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**58**	16
Is spread to a considerable extent	**32**	9
Is very widespread and serious	**62**	17

C. ***Council of Ministers***		
Does not exist at all	**178**	48
Few, isolated cases	**70**	19
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**52**	14
Is spread to a considerable extent	**31**	8
Is very widespread and serious	**39**	11

D. *Ministry of Interior*

Does not exist at all	**199**	54
Few, isolated cases	**78**	21
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**38**	10
Is spread to a considerable extent	**28**	8
Is very widespread and serious	**27**	7

E. *Prosecutor's Office*

Does not exist at all	**93**	25
Few, isolated cases	**76**	21
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**58**	16
Is spread to a considerable extent	**48**	13
Is very widespread and serious	**95**	26

F. *Courts*

Does not exist at all	**67**	18
Few, isolated cases	**54**	15
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**63**	17
Is spread to a considerable extent	**39**	11
Is very widespread and serious	**147**	40

G. *Supreme State Audit*

Does not exist at all	**137**	37
Few, isolated cases	**73**	20
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**70**	19
Is spread to a considerable extent	**39**	11
Is very widespread and serious	**51**	14

H. *High Inspectorate of Declarations and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests*

Does not exist at all	**122**	33
Few, isolated cases	**79**	21
Exists, but is not in serious levels	**73**	20
Is spread to a considerable extent	**41**	11
Is very widespread and serious	**55**	15

I. *Media*		
Does not exist at all	110	30
Few, isolated cases	82	22
Exists, but is not in serious levels	79	21
Is spread to a considerable extent	57	15
Is very widespread and serious	42	11

J. *Civil society*		
Does not exist at all	167	45
Few, isolated cases	92	25
Exists, but is not in serious levels	59	16
Is spread to a considerable extent	22	6
Is very widespread and serious	30	8

K. *Ombudsman*		
Does not exist at all	198	54
Few, isolated cases	80	22
Exists, but is not in serious levels	45	12
Is spread to a considerable extent	21	6
Is very widespread and serious	24	7

22. How much do following factors influence the level of corruption in the Police? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- No influence at all and 5- A lot of influence.

A. *Corruption culture in Albanian society in general*		
No influence at all	72	19
A little	112	30
Neutral	100	27
Some influence	37	10
A lot of influence	49	13

B. *Too much political control over police*		
No influence at all	84	23
A little	96	26
Neutral	83	22
Some influence	53	14
A lot of influence	54	15

C. *Deficient/poor oversight of Parliament over police*

No influence at all	149	40
A little	102	28
Neutral	72	19
Some influence	24	6
A lot of influence	23	6

D. *Public tolerance to corruption/Deficient public involvement against corruption*

No influence at all	82	22
A little	96	26
Neutral	83	22
Some influence	41	11
A lot of influence	68	18

2.7 INTERNAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

23. How much do following factors influence the level of corruption in the Police? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1- No influence at all and 5- A lot of influence.

A. *Low salaries*

No influence at all	44	12
A little	41	11
Neutral	55	15
Some influence	60	16
A lot of influence	170	46

B. *Deficient training*

No influence at all	70	19
A little	87	24
Neutral	71	19
Some influence	49	13
A lot of influence	93	25

C. *Working culture in the State Police organization*

No influence at all	92	25
A little	82	22
Neutral	74	20
Some influence	45	12
A lot of influence	77	21

D. *Poor police management*

No influence at all	60	16
A little	68	18
Neutral	89	24
Some influence	60	16
A lot of influence	92	25

24. How do you consider working conditions of the State Police officers?

Bad	☐ 1	91	25
Acceptable	☐ 2	153	43
Good	☐ 3	98	27
Very good	☐ 4	16	4
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐ 99	12	3

25. How much do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = do not agree at all and 5 = fully agree.

A. *Salaries of low and mid rank officials in the State Police are sufficient for a normal living.*

Do not agree at all	167	45
Do not agree to a certain extent	76	21
Neither agree nor disagree	51	14
Agree to a certain extent	18	5
Fully agree	58	16

B. *Salaries of top line officials in the State Police are sufficient for a normal living.*

Do not agree at all	65		18
Do not agree to a certain extent	87		24
Neither agree nor disagree	78		21
Agree to a certain extent	57		15
Fully agree	83		22

C. *The Code of Ethics has not helped at all to prevent corruption in the State Police*

Do not agree at all	130		35
Do not agree to a certain extent	74		20
Neither agree nor disagree	66		18
Agree to a certain extent	45		12
Fully agree	55		15

D. *The Internal Regulation of the State Police allow vulnerabilities for corruption*

Do not agree at all	198		54
Do not agree to a certain extent	81		22
Neither agree nor disagree	36		10
Agree to a certain extent	20		5
Fully agree	33		9

2.8 TOLERANCE TO CORRUPTION

26. *In your opinion, can the following situations be considered corrupt acts/practices?*

A. *A police officer outside service (working hours) violates traffic police rules and is not punished*

YES	196		53
NO	111		30
I don't know / Refuse	63		17

B. *A police officer helps someone else to benefit a service disregarding the queue*

YES	**190**	52
NO	**129**	35
I don't know / Refuse	**49**	13

C. *A police officer accepts free of charge services from private subjects (coffee shops, restaurants, petrol stations, etc.)*

YES	**230**	62
NO	**97**	26
I don't know / Refuse	**42**	11

D. *A police officer manipulates the evidence aiming at a quicker arrest of a suspected incriminated person*

YES	**217**	59
NO	**107**	29
I don't know / Refuse	**45**	12

27. *If a police officer is involved in illegal activities and collaborates with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations, he/she should:*

Be given notice / warning for dismissal from work	☐ 1	**44**	12
Be transferred to another position	☐ 2	**18**	5
Be expelled from the police	☐ 3	**286**	77
Other: _____	☐ 4	**4**	1
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐ 99	**18**	5

28. *Do you agree with the following Statements? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where "1 – Do not agree" and "5 – fully agree".*

A. *It is fair that State Police officers perform another job outside working hours in case the second job does not conflict with his police work*

Do not agree at all	**63**	17
Do not agree to a certain extent	**41**	11
Neither agree nor disagree	**30**	8
Agree to a certain extent	**17**	5
Fully agree	**219**	59

B. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers that are involved in a bribery affair*

Do not agree at all	23	6
Do not agree to a certain extent	31	8
Neither agree nor disagree	44	12
Agree to a certain extent	31	8
Fully agree	241	65

C. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers involved in the provision of police information to criminal people/organizations*

Do not agree at all	23	6
Do not agree to a certain extent	16	4
Neither agree nor disagree	24	6
Agree to a certain extent	23	6
Fully agree	284	77

D. *A police officer should report on his fellow officers involved in a criminal organization*

Do not agree at all	19	5
Do not agree to a certain extent	14	4
Neither agree nor disagree	19	5
Agree to a certain extent	16	4
Fully agree	302	82

E. *Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the job*

Do not agree at all	119	32
Do not agree to a certain extent	54	15
Neither agree nor disagree	80	22
Agree to a certain extent	35	9
Fully agree	81	22

F. *Performing a second job outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfillment of the police duties*

Do not agree at all	**171**		**46**
Do not agree to a certain extent	**54**		**15**
Neither agree nor disagree	**44**		**12**
Agree to a certain extent	**26**		**7**
Fully agree	**74**		**20**

1.8 TRUST IN FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

29. *Do you believe that police corruption can be reduced?*

Yes, totally possible	☐1	**211**		**57**
Yes, but to a certain extent	☐2	**114**		**31**
Almost impossible	☐3	**6**		**2**
No, impossible	☐4	**15**		**4**
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐99	**24**		**6**

30. *Do you believe that Police is capable of fighting corruption internally?*

Yes	☐1	**232**		**63**
To a certain extent	☐2	**115**		**31**
No	☐3	**7**		**2**
I don't know/refuse to answer	☐99	**15**		**4**

31. *How much do you trust the following institutions for the fight against police corruption? Please rank in a scale of <u>1 to 5 where 1- Not trust at all and 5- A lot of trust. (1 = no trust at all, 2 = little trust, 3 = neutral, 4 = some trust, 5 = a lot of trust).</u>*

A. *Prime Minister*			
No trust at all	**54**		**15**
A little trust	**42**		**11**
Neutral	**56**		**15**
Some trust	**49**		**13**
A lot of trust	**166**		**45**

B. *Minister of Interior*

No trust at all	47	13
A little trust	31	8
Neutral	47	13
Some trust	52	14
A lot of trust	192	52

C. *General Director of the State Police*

No trust at all	39	11
A little trust	26	7
Neutral	48	13
Some trust	50	14
A lot of trust	206	56

D. *Internal Control Service*

No trust at all	56	15
A little trust	35	9
Neutral	71	19
Some trust	57	15
A lot of trust	150	41

E. *General Prosecutor's Office*

No trust at all	61	17
A little trust	62	17
Neutral	65	18
Some trust	57	15
A lot of trust	124	34

F. *Ombudsman*

No trust at all	85	23
A little trust	47	13
Neutral	61	16
Some trust	55	15
A lot of trust	122	33

G. *High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest*

No trust at all	74	20
A little trust	67	18
Neutral	57	15
Some trust	61	17
A lot of trust	110	30

H. *Parliament*

No trust at all	103	28
A little trust	56	15
Neutral	73	20
Some trust	39	11
A lot of trust	99	27

I. *Judiciary*

No trust at all	123	33
A little trust	60	16
Neutral	52	14
Some trust	46	12
A lot of trust	88	24

J. *Prosecutor's Office*

No trust at all	102	28
A little trust	65	18
Neutral	60	16
Some trust	56	15
A lot of trust	87	24

K. *Supreme State Audit*

No trust at all	81	22
A little trust	52	14
Neutral	94	25
Some trust	48	13
A lot of trust	94	25

L. *Political parties*		
No trust at all	**184**	50
A little trust	**49**	13
Neutral	**51**	14
Some trust	**35**	9
A lot of trust	**53**	14

M. *Civil society*		
No trust at all	**75**	20
A little trust	**52**	14
Neutral	**77**	21
Some trust	**60**	16
A lot of trust	**106**	29

N. *Media*		
No trust at all	**75**	20
A little trust	**60**	16
Neutral	**78**	21
Some trust	**61**	16
A lot of trust	**96**	26

2.10 EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

32. *Do you know of the legal framework and policies in force about ant-corruption in the State Police?*

Have no information	☐ 1	**27**	7
Have little information	☐ 2	**111**	30
Have relatively good information	☐ 3	**182**	50
Have very good information	☐ 4	**47**	13

33. *Is the applicable legal and policy framework adequate to prevent*

Not at all	☐ 1	**16**	4
Very little	☐ 2	**44**	12
Somewhat	☐ 3	**141**	38
Totally adequate	☐ 4	**137**	37
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐ 99	**31**	8

34. According to you, to what extent are the legal framework and policies in force implemented to prevent into police corruption?

Not at all	**25**	7
Very little	**136**	37
Somewhat	**105**	28
Totally implemented	**85**	23
I don't know / refuse to answer	**19**	5

35. Is the applicable legal and policy framework adequate to investigate into police corruption?

Not at all	☐1	**12**	3
Very little	☐2	**31**	8
Somewhat	☐3	**154**	42
Totally adequate	☐4	**139**	38
I don't know / refuse to answer	☐99	**33**	9

36. According to you, to what extent are the legal framework and policies in force implemented to investigate into police corruption?

Not at all	**9**	2
Very little	**69**	19
Somewhat	**159**	43
Totally implemented	**109**	30
I don't know / refuse to answer	**23**	6

37. In your opinion, how effective are the following institutions in investigating police corruption? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective.

A. *Internal Audit*		
Not effective at all	**35**	10
Little effective	**66**	18
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	**88**	24
Somewhat effective	**58**	16
Very effective	**109**	30

B. *Inspection*		
Not effective at all	24	7
Little effective	68	18
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	95	26
Somewhat effective	92	25
Very effective	90	24

C. *Internal Control Service*		
Not effective at all	36	10
Little effective	43	12
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	70	19
Somewhat effective	76	21
Very effective	143	39

38. How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in the State Police? Please rank in a scale of 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective.

A. *Strengthening legal and institutional framework*		
Not effective at all	26	7
Little effective	41	11
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	63	17
Somewhat effective	64	17
Very effective	175	47

B. *Improvement of anticorruption policies*		
Not effective at all	29	8
Little effective	33	9
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	64	17
Somewhat effective	79	21
Very effective	164	44

C. *Replacement of the State Police leadership*		
Not effective at all	87	24
Little effective	73	20
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	88	24
Somewhat effective	45	12
Very effective	75	20

D. *Severe punishment*

Not effective at all	59	16
Little effective	52	14
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	79	21
Somewhat effective	47	13
Very effective	132	36

E. *Improvement of working conditions*

Not effective at all	21	6
Little effective	21	6
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	33	9
Somewhat effective	53	14
Very effective	240	65

F. *Increase of salaries*

Not effective at all	20	5
Little effective	19	5
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	19	5
Somewhat effective	37	10
Very effective	275	74

G. *Improvement of education and training*

Not effective at all	20	5
Little effective	21	6
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	35	9
Somewhat effective	71	19
Very effective	222	60

H. *Better oversight from Parliament*

Not effective at all	74	20
Little effective	60	16
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	68	18
Somewhat effective	58	16
Very effective	109	30

I. *Better audit of conflict of interest*			
Not effective at all	**46**		12
Little effective	**46**		12
Neutral (neither effective nor ineffective)	**61**		17
Somewhat effective	**65**		18
Very effective	**151**		41

ANNEX 3 – INTERVIEWS WITH STATE POLICE OFFICIALS USING HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS

3.1 TABLE OF SCENARIOS

Scenario 1	A police officer runs his own private business, in which he sells and installs security equipment, such as alarm systems, safety and anti-ligature locks, etc. He runs this business after office hours.
Scenario 2	A police officer regularly accepts free meals, cigarettes and other goods at a rate from the dealers in THE AREA OF HIS PATROL. He does not ask for these and is careful not to abuse with the generosity of the people that make these gifts.
Scenario 3	A police officer pulls over a speedy motorist. The police officer agrees to accept a bribe in exchange for skipping the ticket; the bribe is half the amount of the ticket he was supposed to write.
Scenario 4	A police officer is much esteemed in his community. Business-people of the area, restaurant and bar owners try to show their appreciation of his service by giving him free food and drinks WHEN HE IS OFF DUTY.
Scenario 5	A police officer finds out that a burglary has occurred at a jeweler's. The shop display window glass was broken and many items were stolen from it. When examining the location, the police officer steals a watch, which is equal to half of his monthly salary. He reports that the watch is among other items stolen during the burglary.

Scenario 6	A police officer has a private deal with a car service and spare part shop to recommend owners of cars crashed in accidents to have their car serviced in that particular shop. In exchange of recommendations, he takes a commission of 5% of the value of the car repair from the car service shop owner for every car recommended to and serviced by this business.
Scenario 7	A police officer, who is a very good car mechanic, is assigned to work during vacation period. One of his supervisors offers him the opportunity to take some days off if the police officer repairs the personal car of the supervisor. HOW WOULD YOU CONSIDER THE CONDUCT OF THIS SUPERVISOR?
Scenario 8	It is 2 o'clock in the morning. A police officer on patrol is driving the police car in a road where there are no people. He spots a car off the road, stuck in a ditch. He approaches the car and sees that the driver is not harmed but he is drunk. He finds out that the drunk driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and recording the traffic code violation, he helps the driver out and drives him home.
Scenario 9	A police officer, who is patrolling on foot in the area assigned to him, sees that a bar owner is serving drinks one hour beyond business closing hours and there is much noise coming from the loud music and its clients. Rather than reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to have two free drinks from the bar owner.
Scenario 10	Two patrolling police officers see a young man trying to break into a car. The suspect takes to his heels upon spotting the approaching police officers, who run after him for a while. They catch him, take him down, and handcuff the suspect. After that, the police officers punch him in the belly as a punishment for his runaway and resistance to handcuffs.
Scenario 11	A police officer finds a wallet in a shopping mall where he was patrolling. In the wallet, there is some money worth his five days of work. He hands in the wallet to the lost-and-found unit, but decides to keep the money for himself.

3.2 TABLE OF QUESTIONS

1. How severe do you think this conduct is?

1 Not severe at all	2	3	4	5 Very severe

2. How severe do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR UNIT/DEPARTMENT think this conduct is?

1 Not severe at all	2	3	4	5 Very severe

3. Is this conduct considered a violation of the official line and policies of the police?

1 Absolutely not	2	3	4	5 Definitely yes

4. If a police officer is involved in such conduct and is caught acting like this, what disciplinary measures, if such measure must be taken, do YOU think that SHOULD be taken against HIM?

1. None   2. Oral admonishment   3. Written admonishment
4. Suspension without pay   5. Demotion   6. Dismissal

5. If a police officer in your unit/department is involved in an activity like that and is caught acting like this, what disciplinary measures do YOU think SHOULD be taken against HIM?

1. None   2. Oral admonishment   3. Written admonishment
4. Suspension without pay   5. Demotion   6. Dismissal

6. Do you think you WOULD YOU REPORT ON a fellow officer who is involved in such conduct?

1 Absolutely not	2	3	4	5 Definitely yes

7. According to your opinion, WOULD MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR UNIT/DEPARTMENT REPORT ON a fellow officer who is involved in such conduct?

1 Absolutely not	2	3	4	5 Definitely yes

11. REFERENCES

11.1 BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS

Arjan Dyrmishi, Elona Dhëmbi, Gjergji Vurmo, Besiana Kuçi, Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania, IDM Tirana 2014

Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Maria R. Haberfeld. 'Enhancing police integrity'. Springer 2006. p. 13

European Commission, Albania Progress Report, Brussels October 2014

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2005;

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2008;

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2009;

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2015-2016' http://www.idrainstitute.org/files/reports/Corruption%202016/Gjetjet%20Kryesore%20Studimi%20i%20Korrupsionit%20IDRA%20_Grafike.pdf

Interior Minister Tahiri: A salary increase of 17% for the State Police in January 2017, http://www.punetebrendshme.gov.al/al/te-rejat/lajme/ministri-tahiri-per-policine-e-shtetit-rritje-pagash-me-17-prej-janarit-2017&page=1

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report for 2014, http://shcba.gov.al/images/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report 2014, http://shcba.gov.al/images/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Annual Performance Report 2014, http://shcba.gov.al/images/Raporte/RPV2014.pdf

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Service Progress during 2015, http://shcba.gov.al/images/RVP2015.pdf

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Service Progress during 2015, http://shcba.gov.al/images/RVP2015.pdf

Internal Affairs and Complaints Service, Transparency Program http://shcba.gov.al/index.php/programi-i-transparences

Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, "Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: A framework for Evaluation", Policy Research Working Paper 2501, World Bank, Washington, 2000

Maurice Punch, 'Rotten Orchards: "Pestilence", Police Misconduct and System Failure', Policing and Society 13, no. 2 (2003)

Minister of State for Local Issues. Annual Report on Monitoring and Implementation of the Crosscutting Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020. March 2016. http://www.ceshtjetvendore.gov.al/files/pages_files/Raport_Vjetor_mbi_Monitorimin_dhe_Zbatimin_e_Strategjis%C3%AB_Nd%C3%ABrsektoriale_kunder_Korrupsionit_20015-_2020_.pdf

Ognian Shentov, Ruslan Stefanov, Boyko Todorov, 'Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe'. SEDLI 2016 http://seldi.net/publications/publications/shadow-power-assessment-of-corruption-and-hidden-economy-in-southeast-europe/

Pierre Aepli, (Ed) 'Package of Instruments on Police Integrity', DCAF 2012

Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 'Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption', Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005

Tim Newburn and Barry Webb. Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature. No. 110. Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 1999.

Tim Prenzler, Police corruption: Preventing misconduct and maintaining integrity. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group 2009

Transparency International. Albania National Integrity System Assessment 2016. http://files.transparency.org/content/download/2031/13136/file/2016_NISAlbania_SQ.pdf

Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (2014)

Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (2015)

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer, Albania 2013. https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=albania

United States Department of State, Albania 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253027.pdf

Vitosha Research, 'Corruption Indexes, Regional Corruption Monitoring in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia'. Vitosha Research - International Research. April 2002. http://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/Corruption_Indexes_2002.PDF

11.2 LEGAL AND SUBLEGAL ACTS

Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania, Decision No. dated 26.06.2015

Council of Ministers' Decision No. 702, dated 26.8.2015, "On Adoption of Public Order Strategy 2015-2020 and its Action Plan for 2015-2017" Official Journal of the Republic of Albania, No. 155, 2015

Council of Ministers' Decision No. 750, dated 16.9.2015, 'State Police Regulation'

Council of Ministers' Decision No. 786, dated 4.6.2008 'On Adoption of Disciplinary Regulation of the State Police'

Council of Ministers' Decision No. 804, dated 21.11.2007, 'On Adoption of Regulation of Personnel of the State Police'

Decision No. 786, dated 4.6.2008, 'On Adoption of Disciplinary Regulation of the State Police';

Decision No. 804, dated 21.11.2007 'On Adoption of Regulation of Personnel of the State Police'

Law No. 108/2014, dated 31.7.2014, 'On State Police'

Law No. 70/2014, dated 10.7.2014, 'On Internal Affairs and Complaints Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs'

Law No. 8291, dated 25.2.1998, Police Code of Ethics;

Law No. 9749, dated 4.6.2007, "On State Police"

Parliament of Albania, Rationale on Draft Law 'On Internal Affairs and Complaints Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs', http://shcba.gov.al/images/RELACION.pdf

Parliament of Albania, Rationale on Draft Law on State Police https://www.parlament.al/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/11/relacioni_per_policine_e_shtetit_17890_1.pdf

Police Integrity and Corruption in Albania 2.0
Tirana, 2016