

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND MEDIATION

Police

Integrity
and
Corruption

in Albania



Kingdom of the Netherlands



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LEAD RESEARCHER

Arjan Dyrmishi

RESEARCH TEAM

Elona Dhëmbo

Gjergji Vurmo

Besjana Kuci

PROJECT ADVISOR

Sotiraq Hroni - IDM

Berti Koxha – General Directorate of the State Police

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Foreword

Police organizations present a unique paradox in modern democracies: they are guarantors of security and protectors of fundamental freedoms; and, at the same time, they are a potent threat to those same liberties. Perhaps no other servants of the state carry so much responsibility and require so much public trust. The police must be able to exercise a wide range of lawful powers - including the use of deadly force - in order to protect citizens and ensure law and order; and, at the same time, they must act in a manner that fully respects the law, civil liberties and basic human rights. The extent to which the police get the balance right is a recognized indicator of true democracy in a society. That indicator of true democracy is often measured by the level of public trust in the police.

The publication of this IDM research report is both welcome and timely, as a means of measuring public trust in the Albanian State Police (ASP) and indicating the strength of democracy in this country. A wealth of data has been provided that will assist in understanding public perceptions of the police in greater depth and detail than in any previous period of Albania's history. This data will provide a much-needed factual basis for debate about integrity within the ranks of the ASP, and inform the process of police reform and restructuring. The IDM information will also provide added impetus to the revised Code of Ethics and the growing desire within the Government to eradicate police corruption through an uncompromising adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Dr. Frank Harris, D.Crim.J.

Police Accountability Advisor, Ministry of Internal Affairs

ICITAP, Albania

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASP	Albanian State Police
CMD	Council of Ministers' Decision
CoE	Council of Europe
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
EU	European Union
ICS	Internal Control Service
ICITAP	International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDM	Institute for Democracy and Mediation
IDRA	Institute for Development Research and Alternatives
PESTL	Political, economic, social, technological, and legal (factors)
PSD	Professional Standards Department
SAA	Stabilization-Association Agreement
SAA	Stabilization-Association Agreement
SELDI	Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity
SP	State Police
TI	Transparency International
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

1. Executive Summary

This publication treats corruption in the State Police in Albania and the need to strengthen integrity of the institution of the Police as a means to reduce corruption. During the years of transition, corruption has surfaced as one of the major problems of governance in Albania. The data show that corruption is still high and prevalent.

The measures undertaken over the last decade to address this problem through constant reforms and by adopting or reviewing the legislation on conflict of interests, by limiting the immunity of politicians and judiciary, or to better address the financing of political parties have produced no steady effects, indicating that corruption has been resistant to these measures.

The police have been quite exposed to the threat in this environment of widespread corruption, due to the fact that the police are one of the major law enforcement institutions to investigate corruption. In this context, police corruption has also constituted one of the causes of the prevailing corruption in other sectors.

Similar to other sectors, corruption of police in Albania has been widespread and the police are perceived by the public as one of the institutions with the highest level of corruption in the country. Irrespective of efforts made to address this phenomenon among the police, principally through amendments to the legislation and enhancement of institutional capacities, results indicate that police corruption is still persistent.

In light of this context, this publication seeks to bring to the attention of policymakers, senior police leaders and officers, other stakeholders, and public at large the problem of police corruption and the particular importance of the fight against this phenomenon among the police. Its main goal is to contribute to the improvement of the anticorruption measures by acquiring a better knowledge of the police corruption and the factors that

drive or control it.

At first, the study elaborates police corruption as a specific phenomenon by highlighting the need to develop anticorruption measures in conformity with the specifics that characterize it. To this end, the study focuses on an evaluation of (i) the level and forms of police corruption, (ii) the factors that drive police corruption, and, (iii) the relevance, efficacy, efficiency, and sustainability of anticorruption measures.

To date, police corruption has been identified mainly with bribery, even though the forms of police corruption are diverse. In this aspect, this study seeks to address the problem of police corruption beyond its comprehension as bribery by identifying other forms of corruption and by differentiating between police corruption and police misconduct. Additionally, some attention has been paid to factors that encourage corruption to determine whether police corruption is considered as deviation of certain police officers or it is simply shaped by the legislation vacuum. This study sheds light on a range of political, economic, social and cultural organization causes.

The study has paid special attention to evaluate the anticorruption framework and measures that have been and are being implemented in the police. It has not, however, considered the most recent amendments to the legislation on police.

Particular emphasis is given to the strengthening of police integrity, which is conceptualized as the drive to resist temptation of abusing with the rights and privileges of the occupation. Introduction of this concept aims to encourage the change of approach to police corruption, which is mostly treated as a phenomenon caused by the individual conduct of a limited number of police officers that are untrained or inclined to break rules rather than as a problem of the police organization.

Taking into account the difficulties of measuring the spread and the causes of corruption, the study has endeavored to minimize these strains by using a series of methodological instruments. In addition to reviewing the literature on police corruption, the legal and sublegal framework, and various national and international reports, the study relies on the data obtained

from surveys with the public and police officers as well as from deepened interviews with police officers and other institutional and social actors. Anticorruption measures and policies have been assessed for their relevance, efficacy, efficiency, and sustainability. This approach was chosen in view of the assumption that the effectiveness of anticorruption policies and measures in Albania has been low and corruption has not been put under control; rather, it has increased, even though the fight against corruption has been declared as a major priority of the Government of Albania (GoA) for over a decade. This is also confirmed by the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 of the Transparency International (TI), according to which 66% of Albania citizens believe that corruption has increased (40% believe that it has increased a lot and 26% believe it has increased a little), whereas only 24% of respondents think that government's actions in the fight against corruption has been effective.

Findings show that police corruption is endemic. While partial and without specific focus on the police, various surveys and studies on corruption and integrity of institutions conducted mainly in the early 2000s reveal high levels of corruption in this sector. In several segments of the police, such as traffic, border and migration, and criminal unit, corruption results to be more pervasive than in other services.

Police corruption is not limited to financial gains only. It includes other forms, such as soliciting or giving favors, gains from the police means and resources, manipulation of evidence, use of excessive force, etc. The extent of spread of corruption among police forces does not seem to consider ranks and levels within the police service, and this seems to affect the diverse forms of corruption.

Regarding the causes, police corruption relates, first of all, to the political and social context and then to the transition from the communist regime. During the transitional years, a combination of political, economic and social problems coupled with the institutional and legal vacuum made it possible for corruption to develop soaringly at all levels. Moral vacuity and human insecurities contributed to the identification of corruption as a normal phenomenon of the capitalist society and oftentimes accepted as legitimate.

Failure to address corruption effectively over the years made it possible for this phenomenon to acquire systemic dimensions leading to the capture of the very state institutions. This has produced serious consequences to the police, which have been oftentimes used to support illegal activities, such as breaking of UN embargo on former Yugoslavia, participation in the manipulation of the electoral process, playing the role of facilitators in various drug dealings and trafficking of human beings as well as in smuggling of legitimate good to circumvent customs duties.

Secondly, police corruption is linked with the legal and institutional vacuum inherited from the communist regime, which did not recognize corruption as a social phenomenon, but, rather, addressed it with ideological instruments. Weakening of the communist regime and its system's ideological power by the 1980s disclosed the vacuum created from the lack of institutional approach. The immediate reforms of the early 1990s to complete the legal and institutional framework were not implemented and the police corruption remained almost unaddressed until early 2000s, thus substantially affecting the approach to corruption in the subsequent years.

Thirdly, police corruption is also linked with the features and the organizational culture of the police services. The discretion of police officers in the exercise of their functions, the quasi-military organization and secrecy, and the code of silence and culture of solidarity among peers to refuse to report the conduct and deeds of one another constitute some of these factors. Combined with the abovementioned factors as well as with a relatively high degree of tolerance to corruption at societal level, these organizational features are the main factors that drive corruption in the current phase.

Overall, the anticorruption reforms in the police have been ineffective. In the first instance, the reforms have been fractional and have focused on apparent issues of the moment without producing long-term and sustainable solutions. They have aimed at legal amendments, but have fallen short of reflecting the dimension of social and political environment.

The anticorruption system and mechanisms have been built on the assumption that the causes of corruption are certain police officers rather

than the threats stemming from the organizational and the larger societal environments. Consequently, the anticorruption system is predominantly reactive, based on investigation and penalization of individuals engaged in corruption, while the measures to enhance police integrity are weak. Due to the inefficiency of the anticorruption measures, the police integrity has declined creating vulnerability to more corruption.

On the other hand, while the focus on investigation and punishment has increased, results indicate that they have been deficiently effective. The number of investigated and punished police officers is very low; the number of senior officials investigated and punished for corruption is almost insignificant. Likewise, the number of officials admonished with disciplinary measures for misconduct or other administratively condemnable wrongdoings is quite low.

The high corruption and impunity have brought about a decline in the trust of the public and police officers in the anticorruption system. The number of complaints filed by the public against police officers engaged in corruption or violating the rules is very low. Similarly, the number of instances of reporting by police officers, who are legally bound to report violations of their peers, is inconsiderable.

In this context, the establishment of an anticorruption system with a good balance between preventive and reactive measures marks the central challenge of the reforms. This system calls for a broader involvement of institutional and social stakeholders and for the harmonization of the efforts of many institutions and actors, such as the Parliament, independent institutions, civil society and academia, media, and the public at large.

In particular, the reforms must aspire for a greater involvement of the public and a better management of its expectations in order to ensure a greater role for the public in the fight against police corruption by refusing to tolerate corruption and by constantly reporting corrupt practices and acts. In addition, while the high level of politicization of police is one of the major threats of corruption, the reforms should endeavor to enhance the managerial independence of the police.

This is the first publication intended entirely to police corruption in Alba-

nia. Therefore, it represents a good foundation to better understand and address this complex challenge. Yet, the study has its own limitations stemming from the prior vacuum of the research in this area and in the difficulties in studying police corruption. These difficulties are, however, minimized when enquiries are conducted systematically paving the way to subsequent research in this field.

2. Introduction

Corruption in Albania has emerged as one of the major social and institutional challenges. In an environment with prevailing corruption, the police are one of the most exposed institutions. As already validated by various public opinion surveys and studies on corruption conducted in Albania in the last 15 years, the police are among three or four most corrupt institutions in the country.

The anticorruption measures have produced no effect at all making the corruption level stay almost constant or with minor fluctuations. According to the Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International for year 2013, police corruption in Albania has stayed constant at the rate of 3.7, the same as in year 2007.

Regardless, comprehensive studies on police corruption in Albania have been lacking. This lack has negatively contributed to the fight against corruption, because institutions have endeavored to undertake anticorruption measures and policies on deficient data.

In light of this context, this publication seeks to provide an exhaustive elaboration of the police corruption in Albania. It aims to contribute to the improvement of anticorruption measures and to a broader academic debate on corruption by helping to address the current vacuum of empirical studies on police corruption in Albania.

This study is the product of a civil society organization project to contribute to the reduction of corruption and to the strengthening of police integrity in Albania. It aims to conduct an assessment of the corruption in the State Police in Albania by focusing on the extent of corruption among the

Albanian police, on the types of the police corruption, and on the causes that drive or restrain police corruption.

At first, the study reviews the international literature on police corruption, its types and causes. Next, the study deals with empirical data to analyze the extent of the spread of corruption and the types of corruption and causes that encourage this phenomenon in the Albanian police.

The study concludes with an assessment of the anticorruption policies and instruments and gives few recommendations on improvement of the anti-corruption framework by placing an emphasis on the need to strengthen police integrity and address corruption by treating this problem as police organization's rather than as merely conduct of corrupt police officers.

3. Methodology

It is necessary to combine several research methods and techniques to explore a delicate topic, such as corruption, and to accomplish a complex goal of contributing to the improvement of anticorruption measures by acquiring a more thorough knowledge of police corruption and the factors that drive or control it. In this context, the methodological approach selected and applied was the triangulation of data. This study used the methodological triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and data source triangulation. The methodological triangulation included the use of qualitative method (interviews, analysis of documentation) and quantitative method (survey and statistics) in the exploration of similar inquiries of the study.

Triangulation was chosen for this study not only to validate the findings of this research but also to help ensure a more thorough and extensive analysis of the issue under consideration. In the foundation of the source triangulation lies the advantage of a greater accuracy as a result of the combination of various viewpoints. This matched with our goal, which was to assess: (1) the levels and forms of police corruption; (2) factors that drive police corruption; and (3) relevance, efficacy, efficiency and sustainability of the anticorruption from the political, economic, social and organizational culture viewpoints. The theoretical triangulation was employed

to interpret the findings of the study. Various theories, diagrams and interpretative schemes used extensively in other international studies were used to increase the credibility of the data analysis of this study.

Sources of this study included previous research on police corruption, legal and subregulatory framework, various national and international reports as well as other secondary data, which were analyzed in the first phase of the study. During this stage, the anticorruption policies and measures undertaken to date were assessed by applying four criteria determined by the World Bank: relevance, efficacy, efficiency, and sustainability.

The study, then, generated primary data by means of the surveys.

3.1. Methodology of Survey with Citizens

A public survey was conducted at national scale including about 1,100 respondents over 18 years of age, of which, in gender terms, 54% were males and 46% were females, selected quite at random. The questionnaire used for this survey included 60 questions divided in 10 sections seeking to gather data on the perceptions and direct experiences with police corruption. (See *Annex 4*)

The size of the selected sample provides an error margin of +/-2.95% within a confidence level of 95%. Descriptive statistics have been used to analyze the data and present the findings.

3.2. Methodology of Survey with State Police Officials

A similar polling instrument (questionnaire) was used with the State Police officials. The sample included 370 respondents at national level. The questionnaire (given in *Annex 5*) used with the police officers included 44 questions organized in nine sections. The size of the selected sample provides an error margin of +/-4.98% within a confidence level of 95%. Random selection method was employed to select respondents.

The randomly selected sample's gender representation was dominated by males (83%). Rank-wise speaking, 41.7% of the respondents were inspectors, 26.3% were prime inspectors, while the rest were first-line senior

leaders, commissars, and prime commissars. In terms of representation of departments and services within the police, 68.3% of the respondents were officials of the Public Security Service, 14% came from the Organized Crime and Serious Crime Department, 12.6% of the respondents were from the Border and Migration Police, 4.2% worked at Support Services, and 0.9% from the Police Training Service.

The data generated by this questionnaire were analyzed separately, but were also compared with the findings of the public survey.

3.3. Qualitative Analysis

Once problems were identified with quantitative methods, qualitative methods were employed to explore the perceptions of the police officials on corruption, rule of law, and interaction of the police with the citizens. To this end, several deepened, semi-structured and individual as well as group (focus group) interviews were conducted. The interviews sought to explore in depth the reasons that influence the problems identified in the surveys.

3.4. Interviews with Hypothetical Scenarios

Besides these interviews, several deepened interviews were conducted with some police officers. These interviews were conducted on the basis of certain scenarios that sought to explore the perceptions, knowledge, and practices of the police officers. (See Annex 5) A series of interviews were conducted with 90 State Police officers selected from Police Department of Tirana Region through quota sampling as follows: 6 commissariats of the capital city, police commissariat of Kavaja, Traffic Police Department, and the Border and Migration Police Department.

The approach of hypothetical scenarios was employed in order to obtain the most sincere answers and to avoid any possible resistance to give answers to questions on real cases of engagement in corruption by the police officers or their colleagues. The approach to conduct the survey only in Tirana relates with the rationale provided by the group of researchers. Firstly, researchers considered the fact that the State Police is a vertically-orga-

nized institution with unique rules applied uniformly across the territory of the country. Therefore, the findings of the survey conducted in Tirana can be considered applicable to the entire State Police. Secondly, Tirana is the largest administrative unit in the country and a place where police officials are most likely to face a variety of situation and opportunities to engage in corrupt acts. Thirdly, an analysis of the data of surveys conducted with the public and police showed that the differences among the regions were insignificant. Thus, conclusions drawn from this data could quite well apply to the entire State Police. This does not, however, rule out the importance of conducting the questionnaire in other town in follow-up studies to see potential differences, if any, and to analyze their causes.

Respondents were asked to give their opinion on 11 hypothetical scenarios of police misconduct, including conflict of interest, taking/soliciting bribes, misuse of authority, and embezzlement. Essentially, 10 scenarios describe situations in which the aim to gain drives the police officer's conduct. One scenario includes the use of force. Each respondent was asked to assess the scenarios by answering seven questions. Six questions focused on reflecting the policing integrity as a tendency to resist temptation of abuse with the rights and privileges of occupation. Out of these, two questions related with the fact how severe police officers perceive each scenario for themselves and for other police officers. Two questions dealt with the disciplinary measures that according to police officers would be given and the one they thought should be given for each violation foreseen in the scenario. Two other questions related to the will to report cases of misconduct committed by the officer him/herself and his opinion on the will to report on other officers' misconduct. Question no. 3 sought to take answers on whether police officers thought that the conduct described in the scenario constituted a violation of the official policy of the police organization.

As a final point, one of the main limitations of this study should be pointed out. It relates to the difficulty to generate comparative analysis among years and among sectors. This deficiency stems from the lack of studies conducted using similar methodology applied in this sector.

4. Police Corruption

4.1. What Is Corruption?

Corruption is a phenomenon with no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition. The word comes originally from the Latin ‘corruptus’ meaning ‘rotten’, and ‘corrumpere’ meaning ‘destroy’.¹

The efforts to develop a precise definition encounter problems of legal, criminological, and, in many countries, political nature. For example, some governments consider that specific forms of corruption, such as nepotism, are better dealt with civil legislation rather than criminal provisions.² In the conditions of no universal definition on corruption, the latter takes on various meanings in different countries.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption defines corruption as: *‘the promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties’.*³

Council of Europe defines corruption as *‘requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof.’*⁴

1 United Nations Handbook On Practical Anti-Corruption Measures For Prosecutors And Investigators, Vienna, September 2004

2 UNDOC Handbook 2004

3 Law No. 9492, dated 13.3.2006, “On Ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption”

4 Law No. 8635, dated 6.7.2000, “On Ratification of Civil Convention ‘On Corruption’”

Academic definitions of corruption are broader. Khan defines corruption as ‘*behavior which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives, such as wealth, power, or status.*’⁵

Nye, on the other hand, defines corruption as ‘behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.’⁶

The most punished corrupt acts include bribery, conflict of interests, fraud, nepotism, gifts, etc. Bribery may be passive or active and may be in the form of money, valuable items, favors, etc. Corruption may be individual, institutional or systemic.

Some of the more commonly encountered forms of corruption are considered below.⁷

Grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of a government, from which come significant abuses of office and power. In this case, we also have the ‘state capture’ from corruption. Petty corruption can involve the exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favors by those seeking preferential treatment or the employment of friends and relatives in minor administrative positions.

Active and passive corruption. Active bribery usually refers to the offering or paying of the bribe, while passive bribery refers to the receiving of the bribe. The difference may be used to distinguish between a particular corrupt action and an attempted or incomplete offence.

Bribery. Bribery is probably the most common form of corruption known and the “benefit” in bribery can be virtually any inducement: money and

5 Mushtaq H Khan, (1996), ‘A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries’,

6 Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, American Political Science Review, vol. 61, (1967)

7 United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 3rd Edition, Vienna, September 2004

valuables, company shares, inside information, various favors, employment, or the mere promise of incentives. The United Nations Convention against Corruption defines bribery as: a) the promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; and, b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.⁸

Embezzlement, theft and fraud. These forms involve the taking or conversion of money, property or valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them but, by virtue of his or her position or employment, has access to them.

Extortion. Whereas bribery involves the use of payments or other positive incentives, extortion relies on coercion, such as the use or threat of violence or the exposure of damaging information, to induce cooperation.

Abuse of discretion. This is a form of corruption used by administration officials for personal gains. Such abuse is often associated with bureaucracies where there is broad individual discretion and where oversight or accountability structures are either lacking or weak.

Favoritism, nepotism and clientelism. These forms involve abuses of discretion. Such abuses, however, are governed not by the self-interest of an official but the interests of someone linked to him or her through membership of a family, political party, tribe, religious or other group.

4.2. Police Corruption and Its Types

Similar to definition of corruption as a general phenomenon, the definition of police corruption reveals its own challenges. It is a widely known fact that police officers get involved in a series of corrupt activities.⁹

⁸ United Nations Convention against Corruption, Article 15

⁹ Mark A Lauchs and Shannon Merrington. "Noble cause corruption: the Wood Inquiry." (2012).

It is necessary to know police corruption and its forms, because different forms of police corruption come with specific challenges and may require different types of interventions. The first step in designing effective anticorruption strategies is to develop a solid understanding of the various manifestations of police corruption, in order to be able to target anti-corruption approaches accordingly.¹⁰

The term ‘police corruption’ has been used to describe many activities: bribery; violence and brutality; fabrication and destruction of evidence; racism; and, favoritism or nepotism,¹¹ which do not necessarily classify as corruption act.

According to Newburn, the following are the types and dimension of police corruption, which progressively range from violation or rules to illegal conduct:

Corruption of authority. When an officer receives some form of material gain by virtue of their position as a police officer without violating the law per se (e.g. free drinks, meals, services).

Kickbacks. Receipt of goods, services or money for referring business to particular individuals or companies.

Opportunistic theft. Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as ‘rolling’), from traffic accident victims, crime victims and the bodies or property of dead citizens.

‘Shakedown.’ Acceptance of a bribe for not following through a criminal violation.

Protection of illegal activities. Police protection of those engaged in illegal activities (prostitution, drugs, pornography) enabling the business to continue operating.

The fix. Undermining of criminal investigations or proceedings, or the ‘loss’ of traffic tickets.

10 Marie Chêne, ‘Anti-Corruption and police reform’, U4 Expert Answer, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 31 May 2010, Number: 247

11 Tim Newburn and Barry Webb. Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature. No. 110, Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 1999

Direct criminal activities. A police officer commits a crime against person or property for personal gain ‘in clear violation of both departmental and criminal norms’.

Internal payoffs. Prerogatives available to police officers (holidays, shift allocations, promotion) are bought, bartered and sold.

‘*Flaking*’ or ‘*padding*’. Planting of or adding to evidence (particularly evident in drugs cases).

Prenzler suggest a typology divided in six categories seeking to reveal broadly the police misconduct and to differentiate among the various types they have.¹²

Classic corruption. This type of corruption occurs when a police officer abuses with the duty for personal gains. Bribery, graft or gratuities, or protection racket solicited from offenders, such as brothel den or drug dealer, for not doing his/her duty are some forms of classic corruption. Likewise, this category include other forms of corruption, such as extorting money and taking cash “on the spot” for not charging an apprehended drug dealer or a speeding motorist. In some cases, classic corruption may also include “petty corruption”, such as gratuities or discounts, even though in small value, but entail an expectation of favorable treatment by the police to the gift giver.

Process corruption. This type of corruption involves tampering with, or fabricating, evidence as revealed in miscarriages of justice cases. The victims of this type of corruption may be innocent or guilty of the crimes, but police pursues a conviction in court though fraudulent means. Process corruption involves any perversion of the course of justice, including police lying in the witness box, withholding contrary evidence, or coercing suspect into making confessions. This type of corruption may also occur in the investigation phase, when information is obtained by illegal searches or wiretaps, or when suspects are not advices of their rights or are denied legal advice, etc.

Use of excessive force or ‘brutality’. It covers the wide range of forms of

12 Tim Prenzler, Police corruption: Preventing misconduct and maintaining integrity. CRC Press, 2009.

unjustified force. This can be anything from “rough handling” – such as excessive frisking – through to serious assault, torture or murder. Verbal abuse, intimidation, or threat of violence also belong in this category, as do dangerous high-speed vehicle pursuits (which pose a physical threat). The capacity of the police to use force is normally restricted to “minimal”, “reasonable”, or “proportionate” required when police intervene to protect people, arrest resisting suspects, or act in self-defense.

Unprofessional conduct or miscellaneous misconduct is a broad category covering other types of deviances toward the public –sometimes grouped together in typologies as “misconduct” or “disciplinary offenses”. This area is distinguished from graft in that there is no clear or direct material benefit to the police officer involved. Unprofessional conduct can include harassment and incivility, racial or sexual discrimination, inaction and laziness, misuse of confidential information, (e.g., looking up the address of a person for nonwork-related reasons), and neglect of crime victims or detainees. It can also include refusal to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, this category can extend to decisions in investigations and prosecutions that deliberately favor relatives or friends –“nepotism” and “cronyism”– and discriminate against “enemies”, including political parties, other activist organizations or social groups. The use of police status in pursuit of private disputes also belongs in this category.

Internal corruption or workplace deviance. This category includes harassment (including sexual harassment) of police employees and discrimination or favoritism in assignment and promotion, abuse of sick leave, being intoxicated on the job, and lower level misuse of departmental time and resources, use of illicit drugs, or embezzlement.

Unbecoming or unprofessional conduct off duty. This category includes criminal offenses and inappropriate behavior committed off duty but deemed to reflect adversely on the officer’s work, such as drunk driving, assault, or abusive language.

Another approach to analyze the types and forms of police corruption is the USAID Program on Anticorruption and Police Integrity.¹³ According

13 Rachel Neild, “USAID Program Brief: Anticorruption and Police Integrity.” United States Agency for International Development, 2007

to this approach, there are four categories of corruption:

Petty Individual-Corruption	<p>Minor bribes from ordinary civilians (traffic police in particular)</p> <p>Accepting gratuities and free services</p> <p>Selling information such as criminal files</p> <p>“Losing” court dockets, evidence, etc.</p> <p>Theft while searching</p> <p>Keeping seized contraband</p> <p>Helping prisoners escape</p> <p>Use of police resources for personal matters (police vehicles used to run family errands; hiring out police weapons to criminals, etc.)</p>
Bureaucratic (Official) Corruption	<p>Contracting and purchasing kickbacks, sweetheart deals, etc.</p> <p>Theft of assets and police resources including salaries, benefits systems, lower ranks pay, etc.</p> <p>Selling information such as criminal files</p> <p>“Losing” court dockets, criminal records, evidence, etc.</p> <p>Irregular and unlawful issuing of gun licenses and other permits</p> <p>Undermining internal investigations and discipline</p> <p>Bribes and kickbacks required for recruitment, graduation from training, assignments, and promotions</p>
Criminal Corruption	<p>Bribes or kickbacks from known criminals</p> <p>Extorting regular pay-offs from criminal groups / gangs, etc.</p> <p>Providing support for criminal activities with equipment, information, cover-ups, etc.</p> <p>Direct participation in crime and organized crime (drug trafficking; kidnapping rings; “arrest-for-ransom”; “social cleansing”)</p> <p>Theft of seized contraband</p> <p>Protection of illegal economic activities (resource extraction)</p>

<p>Political Corruption</p>	<p>Manipulating criminal investigations</p> <p>Initiating false investigations</p> <p>Providing confidential information to politicians</p> <p>Suppressing freedom of speech and association (public demonstrations, strikes and other union activities, etc.)</p> <p>Carrying out or covering up political killings</p> <p>Suppressing political dissent / freedom of information / legitimate political party activities</p> <p>Leaking information to guerrillas and other illegal armed groups</p>
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4.3. Corruption, Deviance and Misconduct

As already seen from the definitions of various authors and institutions, another difficulty in defining corruption lies in the differentiation among various types of police corruption and between deviance from administrative rules of the police and violation of the law as well as the relationship these acts may have with one another. The difficulty to differentiate among misconduct, corruption and the offense committed by police officials becomes even more meaningful in the cases of police failure to act rather than committing a certain offense.

It is difficult to tell whether a police investigation has not been conducted properly for objective reasons or because police officers are intentionally obstructing the investigation. Furthermore, the goal could be diverse, varying from conduct that violates police ethics and rules, such as the urge to revenge against a fellow officer or supervisor who is responsible for the case, the want to escape the overload of work, etc., to criminal acts, such as cooperation with criminals to harm investigations.

On the other hand, the issue becomes even more complicated when one needs to determine whether this conduct is limited to certain police officers or when upon collusion among many of them.

Kutnjak Ivkovic gives a definition on corruption trying to draw the limit line between police corruption and ethical conduct on one hand, and be-

tween police corruption and other forms of police misconduct.

*‘Police corruption is an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempted action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer’s misuse of the official position, motivated in significant part by the achievement of personal gain’.*¹⁴

Based on four factors (1) the corrupt act, (2) an agreement between the corruptor and corruptee, (3) timing of the payment, and, (4) the potential personal gain resulting from the transaction, Kutnjak Ivkovic provides a matrix that help to tell the difference between corruption and other forms of police misconduct.

Abuse of office	Collusion	Use of force	Illegal gain	Classification
+	+	-	+	Police corruption
+	+	-	-	Other forms of police misconduct
+	-	+	+	Police corruption
+	-	+	-	Use of excessive force
+	-	-	+	Police corruption
+	-	-	-	Other forms of police misconduct

Table 1: Combination of major factors that define corruption

The above definition and table help to make the difference between police corruption and other forms of misconduct. When the abuse of office and collusion lead to personal gains, the police officers have committed a corrupt act. Likewise, when abuse of office and use of excessive force bring personal gains, even in this case, the police officers have committed a corrupt act. And, finally, when abuse of office results to personal gains

¹⁴ Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, ‘Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption: Controlling Police Corruption’, Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005

without collusions or use of excessive force, the police officer has again committed a corrupt act.

Punch and Karp both draw distinctions between officer misconduct and police corruption. Karp specifies that misconduct that involves misuse of power is corruption. Karp then illustrates misuse of power with a scenario in which an officer learning about corrupt actions of another officer and not properly reporting the corrupt acts.¹⁵

Punch, who provides four concepts of deviant behavior of police officers, offers the means to address each of the four categories, all of which include the element of abuse of authority, but vary in the seriousness of the offence.¹⁶

Type of misuse of duty	Description	Means to address
Deviance	All forms of police activity that transgress internal regulations, the law and public expectations of legal and ethical conduct by the police	Internal regulations, Codes of conduct
Misconduct or ‘occupational deviance’	Drinking on duty, poor punctuality, disrespect of a superior, neglect of duty	Internal disciplinary codes and regulations
Corruption	Taking petty bribes; attempts to pervert the course of justice, receiving payments or favors, corrupt handler informant relationships, leaking confidential information, extraction and supply of seized controlled drugs, firearms, etc.	Criminal Code
Crime	Gratuitous violence, armed robbery, rape and murder	Criminal Code

Table 2: Categories of deviant conducts by police officers and means to address them according to Punch¹⁷

15 Mark E Foreman and James T. Turner. “Comparative review.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 34, no. 1 (2011)

16 Philip Gounev, Rositsa Dhekova, and Tihomir Bezlov. “Anti-Corruption Measures in EU Border Control.” CSD Occasional Papers III (2012): 1-165

17 Adapted from Gounev et al, 2012

While misconduct and police corruption vary from one another, they are, however, interrelated. Once a police officer engages in even relatively small and minor violations of departmental rules like accepting a free meal or discounts, then they have taken the first steps towards other more serious forms of misconduct, which can eventually lead them into a downward slide into major crime practices.¹⁸ As shown in Figure 1, police deviance starts with the gradual aggravation of self-restraint by the police officer, associated with the perception of a sense of allowability to further deviance. The police deviance matrix shows that ‘police corruption’ stays somewhere in between the ‘police misconduct’ on one side and ‘predatory policing’ on the other. The concept of predatory is important, because this form makes police corruption proactive making police officers slip from accepting bribes in exchange of omission towards a more active role by extorting money from the public or from criminals by providing protection and other ‘services’ to them. Among other types of corruption discussed above, extortion from citizens or criminal organizations is another form of predatory policing.

18 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Mark Lauchs. “Conceptual Framework for Managing Knowledge of Police Deviance” *Policing & Society* 20, no. 2 (2010): 204-222.




Figure 1. Matrix of police deviance according to Dean et al

4.4. Police Integrity and Corruption

Police integrity in this study will mean ‘the inclination among police to resist temptation to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’.¹⁹

Taking into account this definition, if we consider corruption to be a reflection of integrity, then more integrity will mean less corruption and vice versa. Consequently, corruption can also be measured by measuring integrity.

Measuring corruption through police integrity is based on the approach of treating corruption as an organizational problem, unlike the traditional approach that considers corruption as a problem of officials inclined to violate the rules. To this end, police integrity used in this study is different from the ‘test of integrity’ that police organizations use as a means to identify police officers involved in corruption or misconduct.

Due to difficulties of measuring corruption, the concept of police integrity is applicable, because it is an additional instrument to measure corruption. According to this approach, police integrity is based on four organizational and occupational dimensions.²⁰

Organizational rules. The first dimension concerns how the organizational rules that govern corruption are established, communicated, and understood. This is important because police officials need to know what activities are formally prohibited from the rules and other acts developed by the institution. It happens oftentimes that in the absence of knowledge of these rules police officers are subject to unwritten regulations.

Prevention and control mechanisms. The second dimension of corruption emphasized in contemporary approaches is the wide range of mechanisms that police agencies employ to prevent and control corruption. Examples include education in ethics, proactive and reactive investigation of corrup-

19 Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Maria R. Haberfeld. ‘Enhancing Police Integrity’. Springer 2006. f.1

20 This approach was applied in the United States by a group of researchers who used this approach to measure police integrity in US and in some other countries.

tion, integrity testing, and corruption deterrence through the discipline of offenders. However, the extent to which agencies use such organizational anticorruption techniques varies greatly.

The Code. The third dimension of corruption, inherent in the occupational culture of policing, is The Code or The Blue Curtain that informally prohibits or discourages police officers from reporting the misconduct of their colleagues. A police institution with integrity does not tolerate officials who abuse with the rights and privileges of their occupation.

Public expectations. The fourth dimension of police corruption is the influence of the social, economic, and political environments in which police institutions, systems, and agencies operate. A police institution with integrity is aware of the opportunities and risks of the external environment and takes measures to resist pressure of corruption coming from this environment. On the other hand, corruption spread for a long time shows that public expectations on the police play an important role, because they indicate that police have not been successful to resist pressure of corruption.

5. Police Corruption in Albania

5.1. Corruption as a General Phenomenon

Since the collapse of the communist regime, corruption has been and continues to be one of Albania's major problems. Periodic measurements of public perceptions and studies have constantly revealed the spread of corruption in almost all levels and sectors of the state activity.

While it started to be addressed as a problem after the fall of the communist regime, corruption was not a new phenomenon. It was a fundamental feature of the Ottoman society²¹ and the culture of corruption inherited from the Ottoman Empire has had its influence in the later decades. The terms in the Albanian language “bakshish” (baksheesh) or “ryshfet” (bribe) come from the Turkish language and are used on daily basis, indicating the

21 Meeker, Michael E. ‘A Nation of Empire: the Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity’ University of California Press, 2002

legacy of that culture.

Corruption continued to be a widespread practice even in the period between the two world wars and was one of the main causes of limited popular support to King Zog's rule.²²

After the World War II and upon installation of the communist regime, the social-economic system transformed radically. The centralized economy system, the form of organization of state institutions, and the application of the principle of equal revenues brought about structural changes that discouraged corruption in its traditionally-known forms. Furthermore, the communist regime made the fight against corruption as one of the major priorities of its ideological war, considering the phenomenon as a rudiment of the ottoman past and King Zog's rule, the periods identified with the country's backwardness. Corruption was also considered as a phenomenon tied to bourgeoisie and capitalism.

On the other hand, addressing corruption with ideological means and considering it as an individual conduct rather than a social phenomenon made the communist regime fail in establishing administrative capacities to fight it adequately. This was also reflected in the criminal law that lacked a definition of corruption as a criminal offense. Instead, it defined bribery, abuse of office, negligence at work, etc., as criminal offenses and stipulated severe punishment for these offenses.²³

In addition, communist systems themselves created conditions for corruption to flourish. The deficient possibilities for competition among elites and a high level of institutionalization of administration made the communist system rely on hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelistic networks.²⁴

22 Bernd J. Fischer, 'Mbreti Zog dhe përpjekja për stabilitet në Shqipëri' (King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania), Çabej, Tiranë 1996

23 The Criminal Code of 1952 and 1977 stipulated jail terms of up to ten years for taking bribes and up to 3 years for giving bribes. Law No. 1470, dated 23.5.1952, the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of Albania, Articles 204 and 205; Law No. 5591, dated 15.6.1977, the Criminal Code of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, Article 109

24 Kitschelt, Herbert. "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies Theoretical Propositions" Party politics 1, no. 4 (1995): 447-472.

In the Albanian context, the corruption culture inherited from the previous political systems acclimatized to the newly-established rule. Exchange of favors in financial or in-kind form, even though of inconsiderable values, continued to be present in many sectors, but mainly in healthcare, transport, consumption of commodities, etc. On the other hand, administrative corruption was prevailing in the form of favors and amenities to profit from the system, such as appointment in privileged positions, distribution of scholarship for university studies, etc. As the economic crisis of the 1980s deepened, particularly in the period of food portioning, these forms of corruption increased until appropriation of public property gradually turned into a systemic phenomenon, while because of the continuous weakening of the communist regime, the state was losing its reactive force at an alarming rate.²⁵

Increase of corruption during the last decade of dictatorship brought to light the failure of the communist state's approach to address corruption with basically ideological means. With the decline of the smashing capability of the dictatorship and the increasing disclosure of the ideological falsity of the system coupled with the incapability to address the problem administratively made corruption acquire soaring levels.²⁶

The fall of the communist system made the country vulnerable to the spread of corruption in larger extent because of the structural changes in the economic and societal relations.

From the structural aspect, the failing economic system needed rapid transformations and these needs were exploited by the political elites for personal and party gains.²⁷ This was a general feature of the post-communist countries, in which the transition and privatization processes in the economic provided even more opportunities for corruption.²⁸

25 SIDA, 'Albania Anti-Corruption Study', Rambøll Management, Copenhagen, December 2007

26 Rica, Rozario. "Measures against Corruption in Albania" (2012)

27 Åslund, Andres, Peter Boone, Simon Johnson, Stanley Fischer, and Barry W. Ickes "How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1996): 217-313

28 Sandholtz, Wayne, and Rein Taagepera. "Corruption, Culture, and Communism" *International Review of Sociology* 15, no. 1 (2005): 109-131.

From the human aspect, former communist countries entered the phase of political, economic, and social transition with much insecurity. An aspect of this insecurity was the lack of monetary values. One of the characteristics of the communist society, lack of private property, was compensated with power and position in society. A party leader or head of a state enterprise did not own the apartment he lived in, but his position gave him the possibility to profit from the collective asset in a privileged manner. This position was insecure, because with the loss of the position, privileges were gone, and as the system weakened, the tendency to turn privileges into money or other material values began to emerge. Thus, interpreting the lack of economic right during the communist period as a right to unconstrained freedom made citizen consider the transition as an opportunity to profit at any form, including corruption.²⁹

The fall of the ideological base of the communist system and the moral vacuity created during the transition helped to create the broad conception that corruption was a normal phenomenon of the capitalist system. Foreign investors, who justified corruption as a means to set to motion the rusty Albanian bureaucracy had a negative impact by making Albanian citizens consider the phenomenon as a practice that was in conformity with the norms and rules of capitalism. (SIDA 2007) On the other hand, state institutions were weak to reshape the societal conduct and to adapt to the new conditions.³⁰

The high corruption in all sectors of the country's life very soon became a crucial challenge to the post-communist government. Corruption in privatization was endemic and the perception that public property was apportioned unjustly caused frustration among the people against the government.³¹ President Berisha would justify his loss in the referendum for adoption the country's Constitution by the end of 1994 as a result of the government's failure to combat corruption.³²

29 Daniela Irrera, Is Albania ready for Europe yet? Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics no. 68, 2013

30 Ibid.

31 Luarasi, Aleks. Legal and institutional reform in Albania after the democratic revolution" NATO Report 1997

32 Louis Zanga, Albania: Corruption Takes its Toll on the Berisha Government, Transitions Online, 12 May 1995

The merge of fraudulent pyramid scheme helped corruption acquire colossal dimensions. The considerable amounts of money and the high level of political involvement created greater moral perplexity of the public making corruption invade the public administration.

In this period, particularly after the collapse of the Ponzi schemes, the image of the business politician began to consolidate, because many former government officials became important businessmen and entrepreneurs.³³ This practice is becoming increasingly common, as indicated by the rising number of representatives elected in the Parliament of Albania during year 2000 and on.

The government that came to power after the social unrest and crisis, triggered by the collapse of the pyramid schemes, failed to bring about changes in this direction. The resignation of the Prime Minister Fatos Nano in 1998 was preceded by harsh criticism for government's inability to address corruption as well as by the resignation of the Minister of Interior for deficient commitment to the fight against corruption.³⁴

In the subsequent years, mainly with the opening of the EU integration perspectives and due to the pressure from the international community, the issue of corruption began to be addressed in an institutionalized manner. Regardless of this, corruption continued to remain a common phenomenon and was one of the major causes that led to the political rotation of year 2005.

Aware of the problem of corruption, the Democratic Party-led Government that came to power in 2005 undertook a series of reforms in the legal and institutional field by establishing new institutions and agencies, adopting legal framework to facilitate business and services, and increasing the severity of punishment for corruption, etc.³⁵

These reforms produced positive results that were reflected in the Trans-

33 SIDA 2007

34 BBC World, 'Albania Gets Europe's Youngest PM', 29 September 1998

35 World Bank 2008. 'Doing Business 2009: country profile for Albania - comparing regulation in 181 economies' Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/09/9894666/doing-business-2009-country-profile-albania-comparing-regulation-181-economies>

parency International Index. During 2008-2010, Albania improved considerably jumping from a low place of 105 in 2007 upward to 85 in 2008.

In the following years, however, the country experienced a significant drop. In 2012, Albania stepped down to rank 113 and in 2013 its position dropped by three more places going to 116. With a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of 31 (3.1) out of 100 points, Albania ranks among the most corrupted countries in Europe and with the highest level of corruption when compared with the countries of the region.




Figure 2: Perception of corruption in Albania during 2002-2013

5.2. Types of Corruption

Most studies elaborating corruption in Albania have focused mainly on bribery taken by public officials from citizens. While bribery is probably the most widespread form, studies on corruption in post-communist countries reveal a diverse typology of corruption, as shown in Table 3.³⁶

36 Karklins, Rasma. "Typology of Post-Communist Corruption" *Problems of Post Communism* 49, no. 4 (2002): 22-32.

Low-level administrative corruption

- Bribery of public officials to bend rules
- Deliberate over-regulation, obfuscation, disorganization
- Using licensing and inspection powers for extortion

Self-serving asset stripping by officials

- Diverting public resources for civil servant spoils
- Mismanagement and profiteering from public resources
- Profiteering from privatization
- Malpractice in public procurement
- Nepotism, clientelism, and “selling” of jobs

“State capture” by corrupt networks

- De facto* takeover of public institutions for private business or criminal activity
- Forming collusive networks to limit political competition
- Undermining free elections through slush funds, hidden advertising, etc.
- Misuse of legislative power
- Corruption of the judicial process
- Misuse of auditing, investigatory, and oversight powers
- Using *kompromat* for political blackmail and coercion
- Corruption of and in the media

Table 3: Typology of corruption in post-communist countries

Studies show that corruption is one of the biggest problems in Albania. It takes up many different forms from bribing public officials, abuse of tenders, faulty privatization, rewarding of public contracts, formation of monopolies on basic goods, discriminatory application of laws and taxes, illegal funding of political parties, to outright theft of state property and revenue.³⁷

37 Aiste Skardziute, Corruption in Albania. Hertie School of Governance, 2010 <http://www.againstcorruption.eu/ep-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-23-TGG-Albania-new.pdf>

One of the most widespread forms of corruption includes practices in the recruitment in public sector, which, while shrinking during the last decade, constitutes about 20% of the workforce. Due to the sheer size of and frequent turnover in the public administration, recruitment is affected by corruption in the form of nepotism, cronyism or even bribery. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 36% of the respondents in Albania in year 2010 who did not get a job think that somebody else was employed due to cronyism or nepotism, while an additional 25% believe that somebody else was hired due to bribery. Only 15% believe that somebody else better fitted the job requirements.³⁸

While data from comprehensive studies on typology of corruption in Albania are missing, the reports of the media and international institutions indicate the existence of other forms of corruption listed in the ‘state capture’ category.³⁹ Furthermore, the data reveal that corruption is also closely interlinked with organized crime with many of the senior state officials being involved in smuggling, contrabands, tax evasions and land grabbing.⁴⁰

A Transparency International report points out that political corruption in Albania is one of the most serious challenges faced by Albania and a barrier to the country’s candidature for EU membership.⁴¹ The measures undertaken in the last decade to reduce political corruption include improvement of legislation on conflict of interest, restriction of the immunity of high-level public officials, politicians and judges, regulating the annual funding, etc., have not produced any positive impact. The report finds out that due to corruption Albania faces the risk of ‘state capture’ because ‘the separation of powers is fragile, political interference in the civil service is commonplace and an elite has blurred the boundary between the private and public spheres by prioritizing political and individual goals over institutional procedures.’⁴²

38 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Corruption in Albania: Bribery as Experienced by the Population’, Vienna 2011, f.29

39 Matthew Jenkins, ‘Albania: Overview of Political Corruption’, Transparency International, 2014

40 Aiste Skardziute, Corruption in Albania. Hertie School of Governance, 2010 <http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-23-TGG-Albania-new.pdf>

41 Matthew Jenkins, ‘Albania: Overview of Political Corruption’, Transparency International, 2014

42 Ibid.

5.3. Police Corruption in Albania

Because the communist regime did not recognize corruption as a social widespread phenomenon, there is no data on police corruption during the period of communist dictatorship. Yet, favoritism was an endemic phenomenon in almost all spheres of public administration during the communist rule. Therefore, police did not make an exception in this regard. At institutional level, during 1980s, police was exposed to corruption by which time the communist government engaged surreptitiously in the facilitation of smuggling activity.⁴³

The fall of communist regime and the radical political, social, and economic changes that followed exposed the police to numerous vulnerabilities of corruption. The many opportunities for personal gains and organization profits made police organization one of the most affected institutions by corruption.

The communist system tackled corruption with ideological means. This attitude gave police no practical experience in the fight against the phenomenon. Furthermore, as one of the most politicized institutions in the country, the political corruption in the police was probably one of the major legacies of the previous regime. Police recruitment without clear professional criteria but on political party affiliation and the use of the police to manipulate the electoral process and intimidate opposition constituted some of the most prominent aspects of this legacy.^{44 45}

During the 1990s, the police were situated in the triangle of organized crime, politicization, and organizational weaknesses to respond to corruption and were, thus, involved in grand-scale corruption. Western media report that “Albania has turned into a repressive one-party state, where corruption is rife at all levels and a largely gangster-based economy is under the strict clientelistic control of the ruling party”.⁴⁶

43 Xhudo, Gus. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” *Transnational Organized Crime* 2, no. 1 (1996): 1-20.

44 Biberaj, Elez, and Robin Alison Remington. ‘Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy’. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

45 Vickers, Miranda, and James Pettifer. *Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity*. NYU Press, 2000

46 Andrew Gumbel, ‘The Gangster Regime We Support’, *The Independent*, 14 February 1997 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-gangster-regime-we-fund-1278436.html>

Reports on involvement of government ministers and other top officials in arms trade in the Bosnian war⁴⁷ or “as organizers of drugs trafficking”⁴⁸ show that police had become part of system captured by corruption.

Police corruption remained unaddressed during the 1990s, while the first measures started to be taken in the early 2000s with the initiation of integration process and intensification of international pressure. Fairly regular data on police corruption in Albania began to appear after this period.

An examination of the data of various polls and indexes conducted over the years revealed that the perception on the level of police corruption had continuously been high. (See below, Figure 3)




Figure 3: Level of perception of police corruption in Albania according to surveys of SELDI (2001, 2002), IDRA (2005⁴⁹, 2008⁵⁰, 2009⁵¹), IDM (2013)⁵²

47 Xhudo, Gus. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” *Transnational Organized Crime* 2, no. 1 (1996): 1-20.

48 Andrew Gumbel, ‘Albania in Crisis: Why Has Europe Turned a Blind Eye to the Corruption that Has Poisoned a Nation?’, *The Independent* 14 February 1997 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/albania-in-crisis-why-has-europe-turned-a-blind-eye-to-the-corruption-that-has-poisoned-a-nation-1278494.html>

49 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): *Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2005*

50 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): *Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2008*

51 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): *Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2009*

52 Survey conducted with citizens in the framework of this study (IDM 2013)

When analyzing police corruption based on these data, we need to consider, however, that they rely on the perception of the public in its interaction with the administration and are mainly focused on bribery. On the other hand, there are few data on other unaddressed forms, such as police corruption, while, as will already be elaborated in the chapter on police corruption and its types, the forms and typology of police corruption are diverse.

Yet, irrespective of the widespread corruption, the police are not among institutions with the lowest public trust, even though this fact is attributed to the public distrust in institutions in general rather than its performance. In year 2009, the public perception ranked police third to media and civil society in the fight against corruption (media 63.6 points, civil society 48.3 points, and police 45.5 points).⁵³ Likewise, police were not among the institutions with the highest public trust, ranking the sixth (with 47.8 out of 100 points), but leaving behind other important institutions, such as the Prosecutor's Office, government, parliament, etc.⁵⁴

6. Literature Review on Factors of Police Corruption

The forms of corruption are diverse and so are the causes of deviance, misconduct, and police corruption. On the other hand, it is important to identify the causes of corruption, because it contributes to development of strategies and most appropriate means to address corruption adequately. To this end, the causes of corruption constitute a controversial issue to researchers.

For quite some time, police corruption was explained with characteristics of individual police officers who engaged in corruption because of misconduct of certain dishonest or criminalized police officers rather than

53 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2005

54 Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA): Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experiences, Survey 2009

with the failure of the recruitment and training system.⁵⁵ This understanding of corruption was determinative to the approach of addressing corruption; it was based on identification and punishment of corrupt individuals, also called “rotten apples”.⁵⁶

Investigation commissions established to investigate police corruption in police departments in the United States during the 1970s disclosed new facts on causes of corruption.⁵⁷ The findings of investigation commissions proved that only in rare cases police corruption could be explained with the ‘rotten apple’ rationale. The ‘rotten apples’ are found in ‘barrels’ or in ‘orchards’; the latter allow apples to decay or remain rotten. The ‘rotten apples’ and the ‘rotten barrels’ are often to be found within an organizational or broader social-political environment.

In the cases of corrupt police officers and neglectful or accomplice police organizations, the environment plays a great role by allowing vulnerability to corruption and misconduct, including the political corruption, also known as ‘rotten orchards’, which supports police corruption.⁵⁸ Subsequent studies show that there is overall agreement to search for the causes of corruption beyond the ‘rotten apple’ model.

6.1. Combination of PESTL Factors

A broad approach is the combination of political, economic, social, technological, and legal (PESTL) factors, which have a positive or negative impact on the extent and type of corruption.⁵⁹

Political factors: Pressure from politicians (executive, legislative, political parties) on the police to get advantages for themselves and/or others

55 Newburn 1999: 14

56 Maurice Punch, ‘Rotten Orchards: “Pestilence”, Police Misconduct and System Failure’, *Policing and Society* 13, no. 2 (2003): 171–196.

57 Knapp Commission, a five-member panel Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, formed in April 1970 to investigate corruption within the New York City Police Department. Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency was established in 1978 with the mission to improve the criminal justice system in Pennsylvania.

58 Pierre Aepli, (Ed) ‘Toolkit of Instruments on Police Integrity, DCAF 2012

59 Ibid.

Economic factors: Pressure from economic groups or lobbies to obtain advantages. Corruption related to economic situations causing the police to extort bribes from members of the public

Social factors: General values of society more or less permissive to corruption in official institutions

Legal factors: Legal “gaps”. Judicial attitude towards certain violations may cause the police to discontinue enforcement of a law. Corruption in the judiciary may have consequences for the police;

Technological factors: Systems and developments which can be favorable to the development of certain corruption.

6.2. Combination of Structural and Cultural Influences

Another approach links causes of police corruption with the combination of (1) structural influences and (2) cultural influences.⁶⁰ *Structural influences* focus on the nature of police work, or the “task environment”, and the way in which the police “are structured” into larger social systems and institutional role creates vulnerability for police officers and structures to get engaged in corruption.⁶¹ Economic concepts of supply and demand apply to illegal behavior where corrupt police officers act upon the opportunity to profit from these activities. In the long run, this helps to create economic networks that protect and support illegal activities. These illegal industries, mainly drug trafficking, prostitution, etc., benefit from police officers who engage in opportunities for personal gain.

A structural aspect is the nature of work of police officers, who are spread out in the field, not subject to direct supervision and with high level of discretion inherent in much of their work. For example, units dealing with in licensing are involved in organized corruption because of the very complex nature of licensing process. Crime investigation units are also involved in the corruption of evidence collection for use in the court. Due to difficulties to match evidence with the suspects, particularly during the

60 Tim Prenzler, *Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity*, Taylor & Francis Group 2009, f.20

61 Pierre Aepli, (Ed) ‘Toolkit of Instruments on Police Integrity, DCAF 2012, p. 21

judicial appeal, police officers try to identify ways to overcome these difficulties through corruption.

Cultural influences relate to the organizational culture of police services and are closely linked with the secrecy and solidarity among fellow officers.⁶² Since police organizations are closed, the silence or the blue wall of silence is developed as a self-defense form, based on the unwritten rule of withholding from reporting the mistakes and violations or offenses of a fellow officer. This culture develops as police officers rely on one another for their security and wellbeing. Their working conditions face them with the most obscure side of the society. These circumstances exert a lot of pressure on them and trigger the development of solidarity among peers, therefore, cheat or other forms of protection for fellow officers.⁶³ Practice has shown that when recruitment techniques have worked well, and, consequently, police officers with high standards have been hired, these standards have aggravated over time.⁶⁴

6.3. Combination of Constant and Variable Factors

Newburn suggest an approach based on the combination of 13 factors divided in two categories: 1) constant factors, and, 2) variable factors. Constant factors are those which facilitate corruption, the extent of which is subsequently influenced by a number of variable factors.⁶⁵

Constant factors include:

Discretion that police officers have in exercising their function is one of the major factors. The forms of work, resources made available and the decision-making discretion about whether to enforce particular laws in particular situations, giving rise to the opportunity for such decisions to be influenced by considerations of material or other gain rather than by professional judgment. The second aspect of ‘discretion’ concerns the possible existence of both internal and external conflict about the goals of po-

62 Tim Prenzler, *Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity*, Taylor & Francis Group 2009, f.23

63 Pierre Aepli, (Ed) ‘Toolkit of Instruments on Police Integrity, DCAF 2012: p. 230

64 Prenzler 2009: p. 24

65 Newburn 1999: p. 16

licing. Thus, whereas there is a legalistic presupposition that the purpose of police organizations is to enforce all laws, not only is this impractical, but ‘clients’ of police organizations will tend to the view that it is appropriate for there to be priorities in enforcement practices. In most organizations, goals and priorities are set by a continually evolving group of people best conceived of as a ‘dominant coalition’ (which may consist of people outside the organization as well as those inside). It is the reaction of the dominant coalition to deviant practices which marks the boundary between individual and organizational deviance.

Low managerial visibility. Since police officers are spread out in the field, not subject to direct supervision, as already stated above, they have the discretion inherent in much police work and, as a matter of fact, it is often difficult for supervisors oversee decisions made by their police officers. Even when managerial level is corrupt, influence is being brought and may encourage malpractice, which may be further increased by the low visibility. Some senior officers may constantly reiterate the need to stick to the formal rules but then, in their behavior, display an emphasis on success even where the rules may have been bent, including use of excessive force, manipulation of evidence, etc.

Low public visibility also affects police corruption, because much of what police officers do is only visible to the person or people with whom they are immediately engaged and have considerable access to ‘private spaces’ where they cannot be observed at all: premises and domestic dwellings that have been burgled; buildings where there is reason to believe a crime may be committed, confiscated goods, etc.

Peer group secrecy is another constant factor and is one of the unwritten rules of the corrupt police units, which use this type of secrecy to minimize the chances of external control being mobilized and to keep corrupt activities at a ‘reasonable’ level. Whether or not he participates financially in corruption activities, an officer’s adherence to the ‘blue curtain of secrecy’ rule puts him squarely within the ‘corruption system’, the members of an organization who comply with the deviant goal’.

Managerial secrecy. The code of silence is not simply something which

applies to the 'rank and file'. Police leaders oftentimes choose to conceal corruption, because they fear the consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself.

Economic status of police officers with perceived inequities of income within police forces may put them to temptations toward material and financial gains, particularly when they are paid unequally. Low pay is a cause of a lack of integrity for people in all positions of police service, particularly in societies where consumption is highly valued but salaries are low

Association with lawbreakers/ Contact with temptation. The interest of criminal organizations to interact with the police as a means to achieve their objectives is one of the major causes of corruption. Criminal organizations have considerable means to their disposition and through corruption they can win more than they can lose, thus the pressure to police officials is very high. If one adds in to the mix the discretion available to the officer, and the limited visibility of police actions, not to mention a code of secrecy, the opportunity to succumb to the temptations with which an officer will inevitably come into contact are great.⁶⁶

Variable structures include:

Community structure, or the context in which police agencies work, is always likely to have a very significant impact on the nature and style of that work, including the extent to which officers engage in corrupt practices. The political environment and political culture in influencing levels of corruption, 'community tolerance, or even support, for police corruption can facilitate a department's becoming corrupt, i.e., they may legitimate corruption.

Organizational characteristics are another variable factor that affects the extent of corruption. A service that is seen to do what it can to maintain high morale, to encourage personal and career development, to avoid boredom, frustration, stress and cynicism, to develop meaningful understanding and practical guidance in relation to ethical and integrity issues, and to emphasize its role of service, is far less likely to have a serious corruption

66 Newburn 1999: p. 21

problem than a service which ignores these factors.

Legal opportunities for corruption influence the level of corruption. There are laws that criminalize activities which are prohibited by legislatures around the world, but which large numbers of people continue to engage in. Enforcement of legislation on prostitution, gambling, and narcotics is failing, because the number of people involved in these offenses is increasing and the opportunities for negotiating a ‘price’ for the exercise of discretion become frequent. For this reason, decriminalization of several criminal offenses may also reduce the risk of police corruption.

Corruption controls. It is noted that the differences in levels of corruption between police departments that appear to have similar ‘organizational resources’ and political environments may be accounted for by the ‘social control’ inside and outside the agency. Thus, weak anticorruption institutions, the absence of appropriate control mechanisms, or inadequate funding of, or other support for, such controls are a powerful stimulant to corruption in a police institution.

The social organization of police corruption activities constitutes another factor that affects the level of corruption. Corrupt acts may be ‘arrangements’ and ‘events’. All corrupt acts are events. When they are duplicated, generally on a regularized basis, they become arrangements. The latter are more susceptible to detection by premonitory investigatory methods. They are equally susceptible to postmonitory control. In theory, therefore, the greater the degree of organization characterizing corrupt activities within a force the easier they should be to detect proactively. This is dependent however on a number of other factors, including both the means and will to engage in detection of corrupt activities.

Moral cynicism. In their daily work, police officers are exposed to a steady diet of wrongdoing. In the course of this intensive exposure they discover that dishonesty and corruption are not restricted to those the community sees as criminal. It is not unusual for them to develop a cynical attitude in which they view corruption “as a game in which every person is out to get his share, and so should police officials take their share.” A further subject of police cynicism may be the criminal justice system itself, which,

through the lack of justice, the lack of dignity, and the ineffectiveness of the criminal process, pushes them to contempt the law and engage in corruption, mainly in process corruption.

6.4. The Combination of Individual, Organizational and Societal Factors

Another approach suggests the classification of the causes of police corruption based on a combination and interaction of the following factors: (1) individual factors; (2) organizational or agency-related factors; and, (3) external or society-wide factors.⁶⁷

The impact of individual factors is based on the criminological studies, according to which the propensity toward rule-breaking behavior is not dispersed equally, and some individuals are more likely to become involved in such behavior than others. This means that police officers, as members of the society, have unequal inclinations to break the law. Police officers, who previously engaged in law-violating behavior, are *more likely to engage in corruption*.

Another dimension is the *propensity toward risks*. People are rationale beings. Their decision to engage in corrupt behavior is a consequence of the calculation of its costs and benefits. When the sum of net benefits minus the costs of corrupt behavior exceeds the sum of the net benefits minus the costs of law-abiding behavior, the police officer will have a greater inclination to engage in corruption.

In addition to individual factors, there are several organizational factors that affect police corruption.

One of these factors is the quasi-military organization of the institution of police and this is one of its main features. Despite the variations in the policing models and the recent emphasis on community policing, the paramilitary principles still dominate the police institutions. Just like in the army, it starts with the recruitment and selection process and continues with the training and supervision, incorporating various aspects of rule

67 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 'Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption', Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005, f.64-94

establishment, communication, and enforcement that stimulate, allow, or prevent police officers from turning their propensity toward corruption into actual corruption behavior. Likewise, their activity is guided by numerous rules, clear lines of authority, and secrecy. The police have the legitimate right to use violence.

One of the consequences of the quasi-military organization of the police is the development of a combat mentality and soldierlike perceptions of their duties among police officers who acquire a hostile approach towards the public, which is seen as an opponent. This could lead to use of excessive force. One other consequence is the difficulty in duly enforcing all rules. In the course of their career, police officers end up violating some of the existing rules. In this way, the practical unavoidability to breaking the rules makes police officers develop some tolerance to violation of rules.

Leadership. Irrespective of limited rules and powers, in practice top officials have substantial power and control over the functioning of their agency. They may exert a substantial influence on the recruitment standards, internal control mechanisms, discipline, and rewards. There is wide consensus on the fact that police top officials' attitude towards corruption is decisive in the effectiveness of addressing this problem. Although it is unlikely that any police chief would openly advocate police corruption as an acceptable practice, chiefs may choose not to talk about corruption, hesitate to discuss it, or protect individual corrupt police officers. Likewise, a police leader may put the fight against corruption in the list of low work priorities during the planning process.

Resources. Decisions on the size of budget and how it is spent may affect the fight against corruption. For example, if resources are inadequate at the recruitment stage, personnel may be overworked and/or understaffed, and in such conditions it may opt to cut corners in the recruitment process. Similarly, the leaders may not have sufficient resources to supervise this process. Insufficient resources may affect the activity and effectiveness of the internal control units.

Corruption-related rules. The police departments adopt official rules to regulate even the tiniest details of their activities. However, these rules

may not be clear and studies have shown that there is a constant correlate between the clarity of anticorruption rules and corruption. On the other hand, while rules may be well formulated and clearly communicated, informal rules govern those written in the book. Thus, even when rules specify that police officers should accept gratuities from the public, unwritten rules on what is a gratuity may be subject to interpretation.

Recruitment and selection. Police agencies characterized by widespread corruption, in addition to being plagued by other organizational problems, such as failure of the internal control mechanisms, absence of effective supervisions, etc., are also more likely to have continually failed in the recruitment and selection process. Some of the failures of the recruitment and selection process included lack of indicators on propensity toward corruption and deviant behavior in the selection criteria, too much emphasis on requirements to do the job by overlooking the criteria of evaluation of integrity, honesty, etc.

Lack or inadequacy of the programs of *training in ethics and integrity* is a major element in police education, preparing young recruits for ethical dilemmas they face in their future work and sending a message about expected behavior and the consequences for deviating from it. Ethics training programs may be inadequate in terms of their approach. First, they may be based on the rotten-apple approach. Secondly, they may be inadequate in terms of their content, focusing more in theoretical lectures rather than in modules on practical interactions in various situations. Third, they may be conceptualized as initial training courses rather than career-long training adapted to real life situations.

Peers. Due to the nature of their work, police officers' sense of isolation generates perceptions that nobody understands them and that they cannot trust other community members. As a consequence, an intense sense of solidarity, loyalty, and mutual trust develops among police officers, who are the only people they feel comfortable around. This sense culminates in the code of silence –blue wall of silence, or blue curtain– a set of unwritten rules in the police subculture that prohibit them from reporting on their fellow officers. The code of silence is transmitted from senior officers to

the new recruits in the form of socialization. In this way, it becomes an indispensable part of the police culture. Thus, even honest police officers decide to not report on corruption, because they see reporting as more despicable than corruption itself. While the extent of code of silence may vary by police service or police unit, it is more pervasive in those police services or unit with high level of corruption.

Supervisors. Because of the quasi-military nature of the police organization, police supervisors are perceived as disciplinarians who apply sanctions. First-line supervisors, the part of the administration apparatus that has the closest supervisory capacity, have one of the strongest and most resonant voices in the formation of perception that police officers develop about the actual stance on corruption. Findings of investigation commissions and studies have shown that first-line supervisors get subjected to informal rules and/or engage in corruption and generate gains from it or find it difficult to discipline their peers with whom they shared the same values and have been involved in the violation of the rules. Consequently, first-line supervisors have insufficient reasons to investigate suspicion of corruption and regularly and continually punish corrupt officers.

In cases in which they are not directly involved in corruption, supervisors nevertheless may contribute toward creating an environment tolerant of corruption by either failing to take a serious stance on corruption or failing to react in accordance with their declared stance.

Internal control system. This system includes units of receipt complaints, their investigation and referral of completed case files to decision makers. When a police service is characterized by endemic and systemic corruption, this service suffers from an utter failure of its internal control system. In these cases, the internal control system itself is involved in corruption. The failures of the internal control system are usually triggered by the intentional omissions of police leaders and control units to act as well as by purposeful attempts to make corruption investigation and disclosure hard.

Societal factors. Every police department, no matter how coherent and self-contained a unit, is necessarily an integral part of a larger political and social environment. Characteristics of that environment affect the level of

police corruption in an agency, both directly and indirectly. At the same time, the larger environment may itself be affected by the level of corruption in the police service in many forms, such as police officers' refusal to accept bribes from speeding motorists or conduct more effective investigations of corruption in other sectors.

Opportunities for corruption constitute one of the external factors that affect police corruption. Expensive life, low salaries, and opportunities to interact with citizens are some of the causes that push police officers to corruption for financial and material gains.

Public views on corruption may contribute to broadening or narrowing the extent of corruption. Although the legislatures may enact laws prohibiting certain behaviors, they are not enforced when public does not necessarily have to disapprove of those behaviors and thereby, implicitly or explicitly, may generate demand for corruption. Police services and the public are oftentimes confused by double standards, which accept tips for certain services and occupations (waitresses, barbers, etc.), making certain parts of the society to see gratuities to police for their services quite justifiable. Thus, restaurant and bar owners view tipping as a natural part doing business when they tip police officers for the security service they provide.

Levels of corruption in the criminal justice system and society at large. A police officer is a member of the society who has been socialized to accept the norms of that society. When a society accepts bribery as a norm and form of reward for various services, it is difficult for police officer to refuse it, because rejection of a bribe by an officer may cause the briber to wonder if the officer hasn't already been won over to the other side or is being purposely malicious. Furthermore, when corruption is rife at all levels, it is quite likely that police officers were hired on the basis of political connections and promoted based on bribes. In these conditions, police officers can cut these connections and get rid of these norms if they are perceived by the police and society at large as elite unit with high integrity.

External mechanisms of control include a heterogeneous group of institutions from prosecutors and courts to the media and the public at large. If external mechanisms operate properly, they play an important role, be-

cause they signal to police officers that the risks of engaging in police corruption are very high. If the level of corruption is high and the number of penalized police officers is low, then the external mechanisms of control are not operating properly.⁶⁸

6.5. Other Factors

There are other factors that influence the type and level of corruption, such as *historical* and *geographical* factors. In the US, police corruption is a legacy of penetration of police organizations by local governments and mayors linked with the criminal organizations that control gambling, prostitution, and drugs trafficking. In North European countries, police corruption is mainly related with the efforts of police organizations to bring before justice the criminals at any cost, including process corruption.

In post-communist countries, police corruption is linked with the radical political and economic changes as well as with the moral vacuity created after the collapse of the communist system and its falsity.⁶⁹

One factor affecting the level of police corruption in a country is its geographic extent. Geographically spread-out countries breed more corruption as dispersed territorial units make it harder to monitor officials, and corrupt employees have less chance of being reported, as they work in smaller conglomerations. A major reason that such vulnerability translates into higher levels of corruption in the border police and other border control agencies is the influx of irregular migrants. In addition, national capitals, large cities, or tourist resorts with their large markets for illicit goods and services usually make law enforcement more vulnerable to corruption pressure than other cities.

68 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, 'Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption', Oxford University Press, Sep 30, 2005, f.64-94

69 Pierre Aepli, (Ed) 'Toolkit of Instruments on Police Integrity, DCAF 2012. p. 46

7. Assessment of State Police Anticorruption Framework in Albania

This chapter assesses the anticorruption measures, including anticorruption strategy, legislation, administrative capacities and results achieved in the fight against corruption, the resources made available as well as the monitoring and supervision of this system.

The assessment was conducted based on the *relevance*, *efficacy*, *efficiency* and *sustainability* of the anticorruption measures, which are criteria generated and applied by the World Bank (WB).⁷⁰

The assessment was conducted based on the *relevance*, *efficacy*, *efficiency*, and *sustainability*. In this framework, *relevance* refers to the extent to which the anticorruption measures are consistent and relevant to achieve the objectives in the institutional and political context of the country. *Efficacy* refers to the extent to which the established objectives are achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* refers to the considerable reduction of corruption at the lowest cost,⁷¹ and *sustainability* refers the extent to which anticorruption measures have created resistance to corruption in the long term and have brought changes to how public officials perceive accountability.⁷²

The assessment relies on an analysis of the strategic documents, legal and subregulatory acts, data from Albanian and international reports, previous polls, surveys, and interviews.

70 Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, “Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: A framework for Evaluation”, Policy Research Working Paper 2501, World Bank, Washington, 2000, p.8

71 Ibid., pp. 10-11

72 Ibid., p.11

7.1. Anticorruption Policy

7.1.1. National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2013

The National Cross-Cutting Strategy for Prevention, Fight on Corruption and for Transparent Governance 2008-2013 (herein national anticorruption strategy) is the most comprehensive anticorruption state document. Prior to the adoption of this strategy, the anticorruption policies were mainly sectoral and did not have a cross-cutting strategic document or approach to the problem of corruption.

The national anticorruption strategy was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2008 as a multi-year (2008-2013) political instrument with the aim of addressing the problem of corruption at political and sectoral level. The strategy is based on a threefold approach: (1) prevention; (2) investigation and punishment, and, (3) accountability and monitoring. It includes a list of fundamental sectoral reforms. The vision of the national anticorruption strategy is “*the progressive and sustainable reduction of corruption, strengthening of the institutions integrity and promotion of values in the governance.*”

While the national anticorruption strategy marks another important endeavor to address the problem of corruption, its *a posteriori* assessment indicates that the contribution has been minimal or insignificant.

Some of the main deficiencies of the national anticorruption strategy, as already indicated by international reports, are the lack of sufficient resources for its implementation, lack of measurable indicators, lack of realistic mechanisms of implementation and the timeframes of its enforcement.⁷³

One of the major failures of the national anticorruption strategy was its deficiency to address the fundamental causes of corruption. Indeed, this is an essential deficiency when adopting anticorruption strategies, because no appropriate measures can be undertaken unless the causes and forms

73 Commission Staff Working Document - Albania 2009 Progress Report

of corruption are recognized or scrutinized.⁷⁴ In this aspect, a comprehensive assessment of the context and specific risks of corruption in Albania should have preceded the national anticorruption strategy. Adopted three years after taking power by the coalition headed by the Democratic Party, the national anticorruption strategy dealt with corruption as a problem almost completely linked with the previous government.

The national anticorruption strategy makes a mention of sectors with high level of corruption, such as healthcare, education, and the judiciary, but it does not specify why corruption is so endemic in these sectors. Likewise, there are no data on specific territorial or cultural characteristics of the country or citizens' approach and attitude to corruption. Failure to address these elements leads to the creation of an estranged reality and, resultantly, to adoption of inefficient anticorruption measures.

In relation to police, the national anticorruption strategy recognizes the high level of corruption as assessed by the international reports, which identify the police as one of the most corrupt sectors together with customs, tax, judiciary, and healthcare. Furthermore, the national anticorruption strategy stipulates the fundamental role of the police in the investigation and punishment of corruption and foresees the enhancement of the control and self-control mechanisms of the police structures.

The national anticorruption strategy was inclined to focus on certain sectors and standard technical solutions, such as adoption of the legal framework, while it lacks capacity assessment and strengthening of accountability. This deficiency is also noted in the EU assessment reports, which point out "the commitment of the authorities to combat corruption has not been backed by consistent implementation of legislation." Likewise, some reports place an emphasis on the political dimension of corruption, underlining that "state institutions involved in the fight against corruption remain weak to political influence and pressure."

In addition, an efficient anticorruption strategy should consider how various forms of corruption drive or control state capacity in the implementation of the necessary reforms. This element was missing in the national

74 Pradhan et al., "Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate", World Bank, Washington D.C., 2000, p.xix

anticorruption strategy, because, during the strategy development phase, it would have been more appropriate to conduct an assessment of the tendency of corruption forms (like political corruption, administrative corruption, etc.) rather than take for granted an assessment by the scale of global ranking of the corruption perception (such as the national strategy relying heavily on the assumption that in 2005 Albania ranked among the 24 most corrupt countries and in 2008 it had left behind 95 countries of the world).

Irrespective of the identified deficiencies, one of the most laudable aspects of the national anticorruption strategy was the expression of the political will to combat corruption. This dimension was, however, compromised by the incongruity between the political rhetoric and the reality on the ground. Thus, corruption was used as an instrument in the electoral campaigns –albeit repetitious declarations against corruption– and the government had tried to manipulate the data to demonstrate that corruption does not exist.

This bears witness to the high level of political corruption, which, according to Transparency International “is one of the most serious challenges faced by Albania and a barrier to the country’s candidature for EU membership.”⁷⁵

In a nutshell, it can be stated that the national anticorruption strategy is inappropriate to address the country’s challenges in the fight against corruption, because it does not suit with its environment and specific features. Similarly, priorities are not compatible with the perceived challenges. This failure is, to a certain extent, related with the unrealistic determination of priorities, while it completely ignores the need to assess the causes of corruption. In addition, the national anticorruption strategy relies on general statements, such as “in order to have further success in the fight against corruption, it is necessary to rigorously enforce the existing legal framework, to consolidate all the administrative inspection and judicial institutions, and to continue the reforms on preventing corruption.” These are not sufficient and comprehensive ways to reduce corruption automatically.

75 Matthew Jenkins, ‘Albania: Overview of Political Corruption’, Transparency International, 2014

7.1.2. State Police Strategy 2007-2013

For the first time in its history, the State Police adopted a long-term strategy for the period 2007-2013. This strategy aimed to guarantee the enforcement of the law and increase the performance of the police structures by employing modern forms of police performance review and by changing the leadership mindset through the application of modern management concepts.

The goal of the 7-year strategy consisted in strengthening the direct position of the state police in the fight against crime in general and in the prevention of and fight against the phenomenon of corruption in particular.

Overall, the State Police Strategy pursues a reactive approach to the crime in the country. This is observed in the continuous mention of the need to increase the police performance in the area of identification and reporting criminal activities as well as for “an improvement of the manner and method of reporting the crimes by means of accurate statistics in relation with other justice institutions, because this phenomenon considerably affects the public trust in the police.”⁷⁶

While the State Police Strategy identified major priorities in pursuance of the Law on State Police, of the GoA’s policies, and of the obligations stemming from the Stabilization-Association Agreement, it should have placed corruption in the spotlight of its list of recognized priorities. Indeed, the fight against corruption is only mentioned in the framework of the fight against money laundry and economic-financial crimes. Corruption is referred to as a factor with negative impact in the country’s economic development and “the fight against it calls for a coordinated development of police investigative measures, securing of legal evidence, and sequestration of assets originating from such activities.”⁷⁷

Since the State Police is one of the most important institutions in the fight against corruption across the country and in consideration of the preva-

76 State Police – Albania, “Strategy of the State Police 2007-2013”, Tirana, 2007, p. 15.

77 State Police – Albania, “Strategy of the State Police 2007-2013”, Tirana, 2007, p. 19.

lence of corruption in the police, the fight against police corruption should have been a major priority in the State Police Strategy. A police with high level of corruption cannot effectively combat the phenomenon in the other sectors.

On the other hand, the strategy creates confusion, because it does not differentiate organized crime from corruption, as they are two completely different phenomena and require different means to resolve, even though they lead to similar consequences.

In conclusion, it can be stated the State Police Strategy is an inappropriate document in the fight against police corruption, because it does not address police corruption and the fight against corruption as priority problems.

7.1.3. National Plan on Implementation of Stabilization and Association Agreement 2009-2014

The National Plan for Implementation of the Stabilization-Association Agreement (SAA) 2009-2014 (herein the National SAA Plan) expresses a clearer vision on the need to fight corruption in the country. The National SAA Plan states its goal to be “the progressive and sustainable reduction of corruption coupled with the strengthening of integrity of institutions and a radical change of the governance mindset.”

The National SAA Plan addresses the fight against corruption in a one-dimensional manner, i.e., only in its internal environment, focusing particularly on the institution of Internal Control Service (ICS). As a matter of fact, the ICS is charged with the duty of “consolidating, cleansing, and strengthening the police force, expelling from the State Police structures certain police officials, who commit illegal and corrupt deeds, thus breaking the ethics and harming the image of the police as defender of public order and safety; to make police more effective, trustworthy, and ready to solve community problems.”⁷⁸

While the National SAA Plan placed primary importance to ICS and investigation of criminal acts committed by police officers, undertaking preven-

78 Council of Ministers, “National Plan on Implementation of Stabilization-Association Agreement 2009-2014” Tirana, 2009, p. 40-41.

tive measures occupies a tiny place even though this reactive approach to corruption conflicts with the very recommendations of European Commission, which recommends strengthening and implementation of proactive measures.

Furthermore, the National SAA Plan elaborated the priorities and measures to be undertaken in the short, mid, and long term. Yet, some of these priorities do not match with their implementation activities. If a short-term priority is “to strengthen the institutional priorities for the investigation and criminal prosecution of corruption”, implementation activities (Table 4) –mainly training of ICS officers– are unlikely to ensure an effective implementation of this priority, because strengthening of preventive measures and, therefore, increase of integrity, should be initially applied to the police officers.

As already mentioned in the National SAA Plan, the creation of the Inspection Department as an administrative structure of the support services with a completely civilian staff will allow for common and special inspections in all State Police structures. These inspections will help to measure the efficacy and efficiency of the police performance. Development of the code of ethics and anticorruption conduct for the State Police officials constitutes a long-term priority. This means that the code will be adopted 4 years after the approval of the National SAA Plan. Until then, the role of the Inspection Department in strengthening the efficacy and efficiency of the police performance is considered to be extremely limited.

The priorities determined in the National SAA Plan should have started with the development of the code of ethics for the police officers and should have ended with the further strengthening of ICS capacities. This suggested scheme would help to enhance the integrity of police officers and would render the Inspection Department work on isolating “rotten apples” among police officers easier.

In conclusion, the scheme foreseen by the National SAA Plan to fight corruption does not bring any value added and cannot be considered relevant.

The Fight against Corruption			
	Priorities	Legal Initiatives	Implementation Activities
<i>Short-term (2009-2010)</i>	<p>Strengthen institutional capacities for the investigation and criminal prosecution of corruption</p> <p>Implement legislation on prevention of corruption by relying on appropriate inter-institutional coordination</p> <p>Training programs intended for relevant officials must be organized for the prevention of corruption</p>	<p>Draft and approve a Council of Ministers' Decision on the establishment of the Inspection Department at the General Directorate of the Internal Control Service</p> <p>Draft and approve the Instruction of the Minister of Interior, "On Definition of Rules and Procedures to Be Followed in the Course of Conducting 'the Integrity Test' of the State Police officers"</p>	<p>Application of two types of 'integrity tests', the random test and planned test</p> <p>Two-week training on "Investigations of the Internal Control and Inspections on Abidance to Applicable Acts"</p> <p>Participation of ICS in national and international activities (regional and cross-regional forums, workshops and conferences) for the training and analyzing issues linked with the prevention of and the fight against corruption;</p> <p>Continuing training of ICS officers on investigation of criminal offense of corruption and use of special techniques and means of investigation;</p>
<i>Midterm (2011-2012)</i>	<p>Improve considerably the logistics of the Internal Control Service</p> <p>Increase the use of special investigation means, interception of telecommunications and use of intelligence information;</p>	<p>Draft Minister of Interior's Order "On the Establishment of Internal Communication Network of ICS operational agents"</p> <p>Draft Minister of Interior's Order "On Permitting Complete Computerization of Information Available to ICS"</p>	<p>Establish an internal communication network for ICS operational agents</p> <p>Develop capacities for the collection and analysis of information by ICS relevant units</p>

<p><i>Long-term</i> (2013-2014)</p>	<p>Achieve visible results in the fight against corruption identified in all structures of the State Police and the Ministry of Interior</p> <p>Increase awareness of the State Police officers on the causes of and preventive measures for corrupt practices</p>	<p>Draft the Code of Ethics and Anticorruption Conduct for the State Police officers</p>	<p>Make police officers aware, update general instructional materials on the topic of corruption;</p> <p>Write topics and give lectures on the prevention of corruption to police officers in their training centers</p>
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Table 4: Measures foreseen by the ICS in the National Plan on Implementation of the Stabilization-Association Agreement 2009-2014

7.2. Legal Framework

The activity of the Albanian State Police (ASP) is regulated by a package of legal and subregulatory acts adopted during 1998-2008. The fundamental law that regulates the organization and functioning of the police in Albania is the Law on State Police,⁷⁹ while the key legislation on strengthening of integrity and the fight against corruption includes the Law on Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior, Law on Code of Ethics of Police as well as Council of Ministers' Decrees on Regulation of Discipline and Staff (Figure 4).⁸⁰

The Law No. 10002, dated 06.10.2008, "On the Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior", is the key piece of legislation for the fight against corruption in the State Police.⁸¹ The basic mission of the ICS in pursuance

79 Law No. 9749, dated 4.6.2007, 'On State Police', Articles 1 and 6

80 The Law on State Police and the Law on Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior for complaints and internal affairs in the Ministry of Interior adopted in July 2014 have not been analyzed in this chapter because they have no effects on the practices to date.

81 Law No. 10002, dated 06.10.2008, "On Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior"

of this law is “to guarantee an accountable, democratic, and transparent service to the community.”⁸² According to the law, the ICS is authorized to prevent and to disclose and investigate criminal offenses committed by the State Police officers. In addition to this, the ICS is responsible to inspect enforcement of the laws by the state police in order “to guarantee their accountability, effectiveness and efficiency.”⁸³




Figure 4: Key legal and subregulatory framework of the State Police

The Law on the Internal Control System in the Ministry of Interior does not, however, refer to corruption as a problem to address. The Law on Code of Ethics of the Police (Code of Ethics) refers to corruption and stipulates that police officers “fight corruption with determination”.⁸⁴ The Code of Ethics foresees the police officers’ obligation to report “any act of appearance” of corruption and abuses.⁸⁵

82 Law No. 10002, dated 06.10.2008, “On Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior”, Article 2

83 Law No. 10002, dated 06.10.2008, “On Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior”, Article 3

84 Law No. 8291, dated 25.2.1998, “On the Code of Ethics of the Police”, Article 5

85 Code of Ethics, Article 5

A crucial deficiency of the legal and subregulatory acts is that they do not provide a definition on police corruption. For this reason, the definition used in the legal and administrative system is the one given by the Criminal Code, which defines corruption as “*The direct or indirect proposal, offer, or giving, to a person, who exercises public functions, of any undue benefit for himself or a third person in order to act or not act in relation to his duty.*”⁸⁶ In addition, the Criminal Code specifies jail terms ‘from six months up to three years *and a penalty fine from three hundred thousand to one million Leks*’ for engagement in corrupt practices.⁸⁷

Another form of legal violation foreseen in the Code of Ethics is the obligation to use force in accordance with the legal provisions.⁸⁸ The Law on State Police defines the use of violence on people as “*a direct action through physical force, equipment, other means or fire weapons*”.⁸⁹ Likewise, the Law envisages the use of force “*at minimal level of the necessary force*” and “*in accordance with the principle of proportionality.*”⁹⁰

The Regulation on Discipline qualifies “illegal or unreasonable use of force” as a serious violation,⁹¹ for which “a police officer may be punished with all disciplinary measures, including expulsion from the police.”⁹²

The Code of Ethics foresees the “obligation [of the police officers] to fight abuses in the performance of state duties”.⁹³ Yet, “abuse in the performance of state duties” is a very broad clause and is not specified in details in any other legal or subregulatory acts. In this respect, the Law on State Police is more specific, as it sets out the police officers’ obligation to report violations of discipline⁹⁴ as well as restrictions on conducting a second for-profit activity (work or business).⁹⁵

86 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, a publication of the Official Publication Center, September 2011, Article 244

87 Criminal Code, Article 244

88 Code of Ethics, Article 10

89 Law on the State Police, Article 118

90 Law on the State Police, Article 118

91 Council of Ministers’ Decision No. 786, date 4.6.2008 “On Adoption of the Regulation on Discipline of the State Police”, Article 11

92 Regulation of Discipline, Article 10

93 Code of Ethics, Article 5

94 Law on State Police, Article 71, 72

95 Law on State Police, Article 73

More specifically, the Law on State Police sets forth that the Regulation on Discipline defines “categories and types of disciplinary violations”.⁹⁶ Likewise, this law lays down the internal disciplinary procedures.⁹⁷

The Regulation on Discipline defines the disciplinary violation as ‘any action or omission of action, conduct or attitude that conflicts with the ethics of the officer, with this regulation, and normative acts envisaging the performance of duties by the personnel of the State Police’.⁹⁸ This regulation provides a detailed catalog of the types of disciplinary violations divided in general obligations (15 types of obligations)⁹⁹, general prohibitions (40 types of prohibitions)¹⁰⁰, obligations and norms of conduct in the course of duty/service (33 types of obligations and norms)¹⁰¹ as well as obligations and norms of off-duty/service conduct (33 types of obligations and norms).¹⁰² The Regulation on Discipline specifies other categories of disciplinary violations, which are divided in serious violations (28 types of violations)¹⁰³ and minor infractions, which include all other catalogued misdemeanors.¹⁰⁴ Petty offenses are punishable with disciplinary measures of ‘admonition’, ‘admonition with warning’, and ‘a penalty fine equal to a 5-workday’s pay’. Serious violations are punishable with all disciplinary measures including “expulsion from police”.¹⁰⁵

The Regulation on Discipline of the Internal Control Service at the Ministry of Interior has adopted the same terms as provided for in the Regulation on Discipline of the State Police with regard to types of violations and punitive measures.¹⁰⁶

Another form of legal infringement foreseen in the Code of Ethics is the

96 Law on State Police, Article 80

97 Regulation on Discipline, Article 74-81

98 Regulation on Discipline, Article 8

99 Regulation on Discipline, Article 4

100 Regulation on Discipline, Article 5

101 Regulation on Discipline, Article 6

102 Regulation on Discipline, Article 7

103 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11

104 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11

105 Regulation on Discipline, Article 10

106 Council of Ministers’ Decree No. 646, dated 11.6.2009, “On Adoption of the Regulation on Discipline of the Internal Control System in the Ministry of Interior”

obligation to safeguard secret information.¹⁰⁷ Similar to the criminal offense of corruption, the Criminal Code stipulates punishment ranging from “a fine or up to five years of imprisonment” for “exchanging, divulging, or informing facts, figures, contents of documents or materials, which, according to a publicly known law, constitute state secrets”.¹⁰⁸

However, none of the legal and subregulatory acts regulating the activity of the State Police provide any definition as to what constitutes “police secretes” as well as the procedures and level of classification, safeguarding, declassification, etc. The Law on Information Classified as State Secret regulates classified information, “whose unauthorized divulging may threaten national security”, which means “the protection of independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order and foreign relations of the Republic of Albania”.¹⁰⁹ The very mission of the State Police to “protect the public order and safety, in conformity with the law and by respecting the human rights and freedoms” rules out the police from enforcing the Law on Information Classified as State Secret.

This deficiency is addressed to a certain extent in the Regulation on Discipline of the State Police¹¹⁰ determining that “divulging or unauthorized publication of information entrusted [to the police officer] in the course of performing his duties”¹¹¹ is a serious violation of discipline and may punished by all established disciplinary measures including “expulsion from police”.¹¹² On the other hand, the Criminal Code foresees jail terms “from one up to five years” for “divulging of secret document or data contained in secret documents by the prosecutor of the judicial police officer”.¹¹³

In conclusion, it can be said that one of the major deficiencies of the legal and sublegal framework is that it does not provide a clear definition on police corruption and does not differentiate between misconduct and cor-

107 Code of Ethics, Article 11

108 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, Article 294

109 Law No. 8457, dated 11.02.1999, “On Information Classified as State Secret”, (Amended by Law No. 9541, dated 22.5.2006) (Amended by Law 25/2012), Article 2

110 Regulation on Discipline

111 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11, item 7

112 Regulation on Discipline, Article 10

113 Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, Article 295/a

ruption. This deficiency is a key problem in the fight against corruption, because it creates confusion to police officers. It also makes it difficult for the citizens and the police officials to appropriately response to corruption by reporting acts of their fellow officers to the anticorruption structures in the State Police and Ministry of Interior.

7.3. Institutional Framework

The anticorruption institutional framework in the Ministry of Interior is composed of two main pillars: 1) Internal Control Service, which operates under the authority of the Minister of Interior, and, 2) Professional Standards Department (PSD). While these structures operate independently, they coordinate their activity during investigation of disciplinary violations and cases of corruption.¹¹⁴

The function of an investigation is to identify and scrutinize violations that constitute criminally punishable offenses. The function of an inspection is to assess the performance of duties in the State Police in order to ensure that goals are achieved in conformity with the requirements of the legislation and standards.¹¹⁵ Inspection occupies an extensive area of control, including the legal infrastructure, the structural, functional, organizational, human resource, and logistics management up to the leadership, ethics, and individual and collective conduct of the police. The work practice has shown that the inspection output has served to the ICS as grounds for initiating criminal investigations against police officers.¹¹⁶

PSD is the responsible structure to identify complaints and follow up the disciplinary measures in the State Police.¹¹⁷

Complaints constitute the major form by means of which ICS and PSD identify and address misconduct and corrupt acts in the police. Complaints may be filed with the PSD by superiors of the police officers, police of-

114 Minister of Interior's Instruction No. 114, dated 12.04.2010, 'On the Procedures of Collection of Data and Coordination of Work of ICS with the State Police and Other Structures of the Ministry of Interior'

115 Law on Internal Control Service, Article 28

116 Annual Report 'On the Activity of the Internal Control Service' 2013 p. 15

117 Regulation on Discipline

ficers, citizens, other institutions, and the ICS. The manners for soliciting complaints are many,¹¹⁸ including:

- Minister of Interior
- Ombudsman
- Public Relations Department at the Ministry of Interior
- General Director of the Internal Control Service
- ICS Complaints Office
- General Directorate of State Police
- ICS Email
- Toll-free telephone line
- ICS regional structures

The forms of filing a complaint include reporting in person to the police station and the ICS at the commissariat, the toll-free telephone number 08009090, mail, and email. However, the most common form of filing a complaint is the telephone. During year 2011, 307 complaints have been filed with the police through telephone line, and 357 cases have been reported during 2012.

In the case of minor disciplinary infractions, the punitive measures are put by the direct superior of the police officer that has committed the violation.¹¹⁹ PSD sanctions punitive measures for serious disciplinary violations.¹²⁰ In case it is suspected that the violation contains elements of a felony, the case is filed with the ICS, which may return the case for review to the PSD when the offense does not constitute a felony.¹²¹ In case the offense qualifies as a felony, the ICS in collaboration with the Prosecutor's Office conduct an investigation and file the case with the court.

118 Annual Report 'On the Activity of the Internal Control Service' 2010, 2011

119 Regulation on Discipline, Article 26

120 Regulation on Discipline, Article 26

121 Law No. 10002, dated 6.10.2008 "On Internal Control Service in the Ministry of Interior" Article 26



Figure 5: The system of solicitation and review of complaints at the State Police

The ICS, which has a staff of 104 officers and is administratively organized at central and (12) regional offices, carries out two major functions: 1) investigation of criminal acts (by Department of Investigation) and, 2) Inspection (by Department of Inspection) (as shown in Figure 5). Nevertheless, the internal control departments often lack expertise and remain insufficiently focused on fighting corruption, particularly in implementing proactive measures.¹²² Politicization has been one of the major problems of the ICS. As already indicated by the attitudes of the major political parties, the ICS has been regarded with distrust, which has led to radical changes whenever political rotation of power has taken place.¹²³ PSD is a central office in the General Directorate of the Police and has a staff of 16 employees.

122 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2012 Progress Report, SWD (2012) 334 final, Brussels, 10.10.2013, p. 15

123 Assembly of Albania, Committee for Legal Issues, Public Administration and Human Rights, A discussion of the Draft Law on the Service of Complaints and Internal Affairs in the Ministry of Interior, Minute report, dated 09.06.2014 http://www.parlament.al/web/pub/procesverbal_ligjet_09_06_2014_17908_1.pdf

7.4. Results in the Fight against Corruption

The conclusions drawn from the above analysis indicate that the legal and institutional framework has been ineffective in reducing corruption, even though according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer for 2007-2013 police corruption in Albania has remained constant at 3.7 (in a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is least corrupt and 5 is most corrupt).^{124,125}

International reports point out that corruption among law enforcement agencies continues to be high.¹²⁶ State police officers do not always enforce the law equally.¹²⁷ Even though government's Internal Control Service has conducted audits, police sometimes accept bribes in return for not issuing citations or not entering personal information into crime.¹²⁸

With the adoption of the Law on State Police in 2007, the Albanian State Police Law is having a positive effect on the behavior of police managers, on recruitment and on career structures for officers.¹²⁹ Yet, in the long run, corruption and misconduct among police officers show that corruption continues to be an unresolved problem.¹³⁰ The overall management of police human resources is still unsatisfactory and high turnover of previously trained and competent staff has continued. This contradicts with the Law on State Police.¹³¹ Frequent change of staff have affected the quality of services and harmed the continuation and development of professional values and standards.¹³²

124 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Berlin, 19 July 2013, p. 35

125 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Berlin, 6 December 2007, p. 22

126 European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, p. 9

127 US Department of State, Albania 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 5

128 US Department of State, Albania 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 6

129 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2008 Progress Report, SEC(2008) 2692, Brussels, 5.11.2008, p. 48; Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2009 Progress Report, p. 48

130 US Department of State, Albania 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 5

131 Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2008 Progress Report, p. 48; Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2009 Progress Report, p. 48

132 Rob MCCusker, Review of anti-corruption strategies, Australian Institute of

While corruption is rife at the state police, the results of the anticorruption mechanisms indicate that the effectiveness of the reactive measures has been weak, as already shown by the analysis of the data on investigations and punishments. (Figure 6)




Figure 6: Number of criminal filings to the ICS for 2010-2013, number of arrested police officers and number of officials convicted with imprisonment

Source: ICS annual reports of 2010-2013; the data are obtained from the General Department of Prisons, June 2014

In addition to the small number of filings and criminal convictions, the data indicate the declining trend over the years, while the level of corruption has remained almost intact.

The poor efficacy of the anticorruption system and of the ICS in particular is recognized by the Ministry of Interior, which pointed out that irrespective of “continuous investments to improve the personnel, treatment, training, and equipment, this service [ICS] has been unable to demonstrate the full potential of its function when compared with police oversight agencies of other countries.” ... “Because of the poor efficacy [of the ICS], the level of corruption has not decreased and the [level of] implication of State Po-

lice officials in criminal activities has not declined either.”¹³³

Data analysis show that criminal investigations and punishments leaned to officials of low ranks, even though data confirm that corruption in all branches of government was pervasive.¹³⁴ Investigation of law enforcers takes up the largest number of criminal cases dealt with by the ICS. (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Number of criminal filings by the ICS by seniority position during 2006-2013.

Source: ICS annual reports 2010-2013.

These data show that the system of complaints, discipline and investigation is established in such a way so as to allow senior officials to ‘dismiss’ cases where they may have been involved.

The discipline and the punishment systems have not worked effectively,¹³⁵

133 Report on the Law on the Service of Complaints and Internal Affairs in the Ministry of Interior, http://www.parlament.al/web/pub/relacioni_sherbimi_anke-sat_per_ceshtjet_brendshme_17079_1.pdf, accessed in August 2014

134 US Department of State, Albania 2013 Human Rights Report, p. 15, retrieved on 6 July 2014, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220457.pdf>

135 Commission of the European Communities, Albania 2009 Progress Report, p. 48.

as can be seen in the results of the disciplinary practice (Figure 8). The number of disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Professional Standards Department for breaches of discipline is low when compared to the number of violations.



Figure 8: Disciplinary proceedings initiated by Professional Standard Department during 2010-2013¹³⁶

The poor performance of the anticorruption system is also reflected in the low number of complaints. While public complaints and denunciations coming from citizens are one of the main forms to identify and address misconduct and corrupt practices of the police, figures show that this number is very low when taking into account the high level of perception of corruption by both the public and police officers. For example, during year 2012, only 12 complaints filed by citizens have triggered the initiation of criminal investigations by the ICS.¹³⁷

Furthermore, the data reveal a drastic drop of the number of complaints during year 2013 indicating that citizens’ trust that their complaints and denunciations will be addressed has dropped drastically. (Figure 9).

136 Annual reports on the Activity of the Internal Control Service for years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

137 Annual report on the Activity of the Internal Control Service 2012




Figure 9: Number of complaints filed with the ICS during 2010-2013.¹³⁸

The decline of the public trust in the complaint system of the State Police is also seen in the increasing number of complaints submitted to the Ombudsman. This number has grown considerably in the recent years.




Figure 10: Complaints filed against State Police officials during 2006-2009¹³⁹

138 Annual reports on the Activity of the Internal Control Service for years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

139 Lack of the data from the Ombudsman for the years 2010, 2011 and 2013 is related with the form of reporting of this institution for these years, in which com-

Source: Annual reports of the institution of Ombudsman and the ICS, 2003-2013.

The results of the surveys with the public and police officials indicate deficient knowledge on the framework for the prevention or investigation of corruption. Those who do have this knowledge and information place little trust in this framework.

Low confidence in the anticorruption measures is also reported in the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer. According to the Barometer of year 2007, 27% of the respondents in Albania think that government actions to fight corruption are ineffective, 53% believe that these efforts are neither effective nor ineffective, and only 20% of the respondents think that government efforts to fight corruption are effective.¹⁴⁰ Likewise, the Barometer of year 2013 showed that only 24% of the respondents thought that government anticorruption effort were ineffective, 34% thought that these efforts did not produce any effects, 30% thought that government anticorruption efforts were neither effective nor ineffective, and only 9% of the respondents stated that these efforts were effective.¹⁴¹

Police officials themselves have limited knowledge on the anticorruption framework, taking into account that 31% of the respondents say they have little knowledge and 8% admit that they have no knowledge at all about the anticorruption framework. Most interviewed police officers (over 70%), however, state that the anticorruption framework is implemented partially or to a limited extent.

On the other hand, the survey revealed a low number of denunciations made by police officers for their colleagues and supervisors involved in corrupt practices, even though this reporting is a legal requirement. During the last year (as this survey was being conducted), 54% of interviewed police officers say that they have been asked (47% one or few times, and 7% oftentimes) by a fellow officer to do him a favor and 33% say that their supervisor has asked them (29% one or few times and 7% oftentimes) to

plaints against police officers have not been presented separately.

140 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007, p. 24

141 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=albania>

make concessions to someone. Only 8% say they have reported on their fellow officer and 5% state that they have reported on their superior.

The data generated from the interviews and informal discussions with police officers reveal that the level of the police officers' confidence in the anticorruption system is low. On the other hand, the divergence of opinions between the public and the police officers on a few questions and lack of coherence in some attitudes and experiences in the interaction and communication with the police officials reveal that in general police officers in Albania are little open to discussions on corruption. In the meetings conducted with them in various commissariats while conducting this survey or when communicating and discussing about findings of the study, the police officers stated that they talk little or not at all about the topic of corruption. Similarly, one could see their constant concern to reflect a more positive image of the police organization and this speaks of the difference between the opinions of the public and that of the police officers on some of the questions that assessed the institution and its performance.

8. Extent and types of police corruption in Albania

As already discussed in the chapter on police corruption, this type of corruption has never been a specific subject or topic of survey or study in Albania. Therefore, while there is data on the level of police corruption, it has mostly been based on public perception on bribery. Thus, knowledge on most common types of corruption and the structures most infected by it are lacking and this affects the approach to the anticorruption measures, because the latter have to be appropriate to address various types of corruption, mainly for its prevention.

Taking this into account, this study aimed to identify, through surveys of the public and police officers, the scale of corruption and its various types and level of spread in the institution of the State Police and its structures.

8.1. Extent of Spread of Corruption

Similar questions were asked to the public and police officials to get answers on the scale of the spread of corruption as well as on the institutions or structures most or least affected by corruption. Respondents were initially asked about the frequency of obtaining information on corruption and the means of information.

Overall, the number of respondents who gave an answer on the most or least corrupt police organizations and structures was low. Similarly low was the number of respondents from the public with experience in giving or being asked for bribes and favors. (See Annex 1 for complete data.) On the other hand, about half of interviewed police officers say that they have had experiences in exchanging favors or bribes with citizens, fellow officers and superiors. (See Annex 1 for complete data.)

These experiences account for the gap between the high public perception of corruption and direct experiences with it, coupled with the fact that most respondents from the public (74%) and police officials (71%) admit that the media is the main source of information on corruption, reporting

frequently on cases of this phenomenon.

8.1.1. Spread of Corruption According to the Public

At first, respondents were asked to give their opinion about which police organization was most corrupt. This open question had a twofold objective: 1) Obtain public opinion on corruption; 2), Examine the extent of public knowledge on police organizations, bearing in mind that the reforms undertaken in the last two decades have been coupled with the creation and dissolution of various police structures and that there are several police organizations operating in Albania.

The majority of interviewees (33%) said that corruption is “spread at a considerable extent” and another considerable part (18%) said that corruption is “quite spread and serious” when answering the question “to what extent is corruption spread in the State Police?” (See Figure 11)




Figure 11: Spread of corruption in the State Police

About 10% answered the question “which police organization is most corrupt?”. Some 61% of the respondents identify several State Police structures as most corrupt, singling out the traffic police and public order police (as shown in Figure 12).




Figure 12: Spread of corruption in specific police services

When asked about the least corrupt police organizations, respondents identified various structures, within and outside of the State Police. Most of them (11.5%) pointed out the private security companies, also known as ‘private police’, anti-crime structures of the State Police, and police organizations of the local governance as least corrupt. (See the graph below.)




Figure 13: Spread of corruption in police organizations

8.1.2. Spread of Corruption according to Police Officers

As already highlighted in the previous chapter on assessment of the anticorruption framework, the survey and the interviews with the police officers revealed reticence to discuss on police corruption. This is actually identified in the answers to the question on the frequency of hearing or reading about corrupt police officers. Some 60% of the respondents said that they ‘rarely’ heard about corrupt police officers and 8% confirmed they ‘never’ heard about police officers engaged in corrupt practices. Only 25% of the respondents stated that they had ‘frequently’ or ‘always’ heard about corrupt police officers. Irrespective of the reluctance to answer, interviewed police officials think that there is corruption in the State Police, but in ‘isolated cases’ (37.1% of the respondents) or ‘not at serious level’ (32.6% of the respondents). Only 12% of the respondents think that corruption is a widespread or serious phenomenon. (See Annex 1 for complete data.)

The following graphics show the spread of corruption by level of leadership and by various sectors within the State Police (Figure 14 and Figure 15).




Figure 14: Spread of corruption by level of leadership (1 – does not exist; 5 – very widespread)




Figure 15: Spread of corruption by sector of policing (1 – does not exist; 5 – very widespread)

8.2. Types of Corruption

8.2.1. Official and Media Reports

An analysis of the official documents and reports on corruption reveals that the most widespread types of corruption in the State Police, for which the anticorruption structures at the Ministry of Interior have conducted investigations and have initiated criminal prosecutions in the last few years, include:¹⁴²

- Passive corruption
- Drugs trafficking
- Falsification of documents
- Fraud
- Intimidation
- Battering

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- Actions that obstruct disclose of truth
- Embezzlement
- Theft by abuse of office
- Embezzlement and theft by abusing the office
- Exploitation of prostitution
- Trafficking of motor vehicles
- Abuse of office
- Arbitrary actions
- Other offenses

Out of the offenses listed above, the criminal offenses of passive corruption, abuse of office, arbitrary actions, and other offenses take up the largest number of investigations carried out to date. Drugs trafficking and falsification of documents are two corruption types for which the number of investigations initiated by the Internal Control Service in the last three years has increased.¹⁴³ The reports do not, however, provide specific data on the forms of passive corruption, abuse of office, arbitrary actions, or other offenses that make up the broad category where various forms of corruption are included.¹⁴⁴

Media reports indicate that some of the most common forms of police corruption include facilitation of smuggling in the customs, extortion through blackmail, obstruction of investigations, non-registration of citizens crossing the national border, corrupt appointments in office, compromising of public procurement procedures, misuse of police information, soliciting sexual favors, use of firearms and means of police when off-duty, etc.

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144 Article 259, Passive Corruption by Public Officials, in the Criminal Code defines: Soliciting or taking, directly or indirectly, by a person who exercises public functions, of any undue benefit or of any such promise for himself or for a third person, or accepting an offer or promise deriving from an irregular benefit, in order to act or not act in the exercise of his duty, is punished with a prison term from two up to eight years and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand up to three million Leks.

8.2.2. Public Perception

To identify the types of corruption and their spread, the public respondents were asked to estimate how often the following offenses occurred at the State Police. (Table 5)

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Almost never)	2	3	4	5 (Very often)
Bribery	5%	9%	23%	27%	36%
Favors from third parties (outside police)	7%	18%	32%	26%	17%
Favors to third parties (from police)	7%	20%	32%	24%	17%
Favors to their fellow officers (within the police)	6%	15%	25%	26%	27%
Misuse of police funds	13%	23%	26%	18%	21%
Misuse of police means	15%	21%	25%	20%	19%
Manipulation of evidence	12%	21%	29%	21%	26%
Use of excessive violence by the police	16%	23%	25%	19%	18%

Table 5: Types of police corruption and their spread according to the public

The respondents from the public were asked to give their opinion on the following questions (see table below) in order to explore whether the corruption within the police is endemic and whether police corruption is an individual phenomenon or an organizational and structural problem.

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Do not agree at all)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
Police officials collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	13%	28%	26%	14%	19%
Police officials are involved in illegal activities (trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	10%	28%	30%	15%	17%
Recruitment of police officers is made on corrupt basis	11%	24%	28%	19%	18%
Appointments and promotions to top levels of the police are corrupt	12%	21%	26%	21%	20%
Appointments and promotions to medium and low levels of the police are corrupt	11%	22%	28%	21%	18%
Political leaders use police for corrupt purposes	9%	20%	25%	20%	26%
Political leaders and the police officers collaborate for corrupt purposes	9%	19%	25%	21%	26%
Police officers collude for corrupt purposes	9%	21%	28%	19%	23%
Procurements in the police are conducted on corrupt practices	13%	25%	27%	17%	18%
Police officers create vulnerabilities on their own themselves for gain through corruption	8%	20%	27%	20%	25%

Table 6: Features of police corruption according to the public

As shown from the answers, the public thinks that police corruption is widespread at institutional level and affects the institutional culture through the corruption of the police officers' recruitment and promotion processes. This is also reinforced by the public opinion on the collusion among police officers and between police leaders and their subordinates to achieve cor-

rupt gains. The public opinion about police officers creating vulnerabilities on their own for gain through corruption indicates a tendency towards predatory corruption.

8.2.3. Police Officers' Perception

The survey of the police officers, irrespective of the officials' obvious reticence to discuss about corruption, shows that the forms of corruption are diverse. The most common and frequent form of corruption is abuse/misuse of funds and means of the police. Bribery and favoritism are two common forms, even though respondents think that these forms do not occur frequently.

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Almost never)	2	3	4	5 (Very often)
Bribery	41,4	38,5	12,2	5,8	2,1
Favors from third parties (outside police)	36.4	37	17.7	6.5	2.4
Favors to third parties (from police)	42.2	36.8	14.3	5.5	1.2
Favors to their fellow officers (within the police)	40.3	33.3	15.5	7.3	3.6
Misuse of police funds	45.1	22.1	12.4	9.8	10.6
Misuse of police means	42	23.9	15.2	8.4	10.5
Manipulation of evidence	78.5	13.9	5.2	1.2	1.2
Use of excessive violence by the police	61.2	26.8	7.6	2.9	1.5

Table 7: Types of police corruption and their spread according to police officers

It should be pointed out that a high percentage of respondents among police officers think that manipulation of evidence and excessive use of violence in the course of duty are not common forms of corruption. Taking into account that these two forms are not driven by personal gain, but

abuse of authority and occupational discretion to impact the results of the police work, it can be concluded that the most common forms of corruption are those linked with the motive of personal gains.

On the other hand, 22% of the respondents think that manipulation of evidence is one of the forms of corruption and that the media have frequently reported on cases of failure of high profile criminal investigations indicating that evidence has been compromised in exchange of gains, even though interviewees say this form of corruption is not widespread. Indeed, it is worth mentioning the fact that it is difficult to identify manipulation of evidence as a form of corruption taking into account that the prosecutor's office and the prosecutors are responsible to head and handle investigations.

Manipulation of evidence as a form of corruption requires further exploration bearing in mind that the prosecutor's office results to be one of the institutions with endemic corruption – 92% of the public and over 80% of the police officers think corruption is rife at the prosecutor's office, for which 35% of the public respondents think corruption is very widespread and over 80% of the police officers think that corruption at the prosecutor's office is widespread (34% of the public and about 30% of the police officers think corruption at the prosecutor's office is very widespread).

Interviewed police officers were asked the same questions made to the public for soliciting their opinion in order to explore whether the corruption within the police is endemic and whether police corruption is an individual phenomenon or an organizational and structural problem.

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Do not agree at all)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
Police officials collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	60.2%	29.7%	5.8%	2.6%	1.7%
Police officials are involved in illegal activities (trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	58.6%	28.6%	8.5%	2%	2.3%
Recruitment of police officers is made on corrupt basis	61.9%	21.7%	9.4%	2.3%	4.7%
Appointments and promotions to top levels of the police are corrupt	42.4%	21.8%	16.3%	7%	12.5%
Appointments and promotions to medium and low levels of the police are corrupt	48.1%	27.1%	11.9%	5%	7.9%
Political leaders use police for corrupt purposes	49.6%	20.5%	13.5%	6.4%	10%
Political leaders and the police officers collaborate for corrupt purposes	58.2%	23.4%	7.6%	5.8%	5%
Police officers collude for corrupt purposes	69.8%	17.7%	9.5%	1.2%	1.8%
Procurements in the police are conducted on corrupt practices	54.1%	21.1%	9.9%	7.6%	7.3%
Police officers create vulnerabilities by themselves for gain through corruption	59.2%	24.6%	11.2%	1.8%	3.2%

Table 8: Features of police corruption according to police officers

The above answers reveal that police officers think corruption of the State Police is widespread at institutional level and irrespective of the extent of the spread, which is higher in the processes of appointment, promotions, or procurements, the fact that over 40% of respondents think political leaders use police for corrupt purposes is a testimony of how endemic political corruption is.

9. Causes of Police Corruption in Albania

The causes of police corruption have been relatively unexplored due to the lack of a comprehensive research on police corruption in Albania, as already stated earlier in this report. However, the efforts made to date to address corruption have shown that some of the identified causes that have served to undertake certain policies and measures include low salaries, legal deficiencies, poor training, leadership weaknesses, etc.

This chapter seeks to explore in depth the variety of causes of the police corruption in Albania taking into account the theoretical evaluations elaborated above on the causes of police corruption and comparing them with the data obtained from the survey with the public and police officers.

9.1. Public Perceptions

Public perception of corruption and public expectations to institutions are important driving or preventive factors to corruption.

Institution	Percentage by response				
	1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (very wide-spread)
President's Office	35%	30%	16%	10%	9%
Parliament	16%	22%	26%	16%	21%
Council of Ministers	16%	23%	22%	19%	20%
Ministry of Interior	15%	23%	28%	19%	15%
Prosecutor's Office	8%	11%	22%	25%	34%
Courts	5%	9%	15%	22%	49%
Supreme State Audit	11%	17%	31%	21%	20%
High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interests	9%	17%	26%	23%	25%
Media	16%	29%	31%	13%	11%
Civil society	29%	33%	21%	11%	6%
Ombudsman	33%	29%	19%	9%	10%

Table 9: Spread of corruption in institutions according to the public

Interviewees from the public were asked to give their opinion on extent of corruption in the institutions listed in the following table in order to identify the spread of corruption in various institutions that are important players in the environment where police operate and with which police cooperate.

The data from the responses shows that, irrespective of differences in terms of extent, the public thinks that corruption is rife at major institutions of the country. With regard to relationship among corruption, the financial aspects and the police organizations, the data demonstrate that the public, almost unanimously (over 95%), thinks that low salaries, poor training, political influence, and culture of corruption are factors that drive corruption in the police.

On the other hand, the data indicate that a part of the public tolerates certain corrupt conducts or unjust attitudes of police officers to corruption.

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Do not agree at all)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
It is right for state police officers do another job when off-duty	43%	14%	17%	9%	17%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in bribery	4%	6%	8%	15%	67%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in divulagation of police information to criminal people/organizations	4%	5%	6%	13%	72%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in criminal organizations	3%	4%	4%	11%	78%
Some of the rules may be broken by state police officers to the benefit of the work	25%	16%	21%	15%	23%
Doing a second job when off-duty by state police officers has negative impact on the performance of police duty	20%	14%	17%	14%	35%

Table 10: Tolerance to corruption

Likewise, 18% of the respondents did not consider a police officer's acceptance of free service by private entities to be a violation, whereas 8-10% of interviewees did not see it as corruption the case where a police officer intervenes to help someone to obtain a service by skipping the waiting queue, or when the police officer violates traffic rules when off-duty, or even in the case when a police officer manipulates evidence. (See Annex 2 for complete data on responses.)

9.2. Police Officers' Perceptions

9.2.1. Overall Environment

As already explored above, there is a close link between the overall environment and police corruption. An environment with endemic corruption and tolerant to the phenomenon makes police officers see it as a legitimate practice. Thus, 84% of respondents think that culture of corruption in the Albanian society coupled with political influence on police (80% of respondents) have an impact on police corruption.

Likewise, police officers in general regard institutions as corrupt, irrespective of differences about the scale of the spread of corruption in these institutions. It is worth pointing out that over 80% of police officers think that courts and prosecutor's offices are corrupt. Taking into account that these two bodies are the major institutions with which the police cooperate in the fight against corruption, police officers' perception of high level of corruption in these two institutions directly affects their trust that their cases will be fairly addressed and tried in due process. This drives police officers to see corruption as an opportunity that they should take advantage of.

The Supreme State Audit and the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests, which have a key role in the fight against corruption, are also perceived by police officers as institutions with prevalent corruption.

Institution	Percentage by response				
	1 (Not at all)	2	3	4	5 (very wide-spread)
President's Office	60.4	21.9	6.6	4.5	6.6
Parliament	45.7	22.1	15.2	6.9	10.1
Council of Ministers	54.8	19.4	16.4	4.6	4.8
Ministry of Interior	60.2	21.5	10.5	5.7	2.1
Prosecutor's Office	19.6	16.7	16.1	17.9	29.7
Courts	14.6	12.8	13.4	16.3	42.9
Supreme State Audit	32.3	22.9	18.6	14.9	11.3
High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interests	26.9	21.5	17.6	14	20
Media	25.9	25.6	24.4	10.4	13.7
Civil society	41.2	30.1	15.8	6.9	6
Ombudsman	53.8	21.8	12.2	5.9	6.3

Table 11: Spread of corruption in institutions according to police officers

9.2.2. Organizational Factors

According to police officers, among factors that drive corruption are low salaries, deficient working conditions, insufficient training, and culture of work at the institution of the police.

Factors	Percentage by response				
	1 (No impact at all)	2	3	4	5 (A lot of impact)
Low salaries	11.5%	6.9%	13.2%	12.6%	55.8%
Salaries of the medium and low ranks in the state police are sufficient for a normal life	45.5%	23.4%	15%	6.8%	9.3%
Salaries of the high ranks in the state police are sufficient for a normal life	11.4%	18.1%	23.6%	15.4%	31.5%
Culture of work at the institution of police	23%	14.4%	20.7%	17.4%	24.5%
Poor training	17.9%	13.9%	21.8%	17.6%	28.8%

Table 12: Factors that drive corruption

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (do not agree at all)	2	3	4	5 (fully agree)
There are many uncorrupted police officers in the State Police.	24,9%	13,6%	5,5%	8,7%	47,3%
Police officers are corrupt before joining the State Police.	54%	20,3%	13%	5,9%	6,8%
The more police organizations in the country, the higher the corruption.	40,7%	14,1%	16,6%	6,3%	22,3%
Older (by age) police officers in the State Police are more corrupt than young officers.	47,7%	17,3%	14,1%	9,1%	11,8%
Male police officers in the State Police are more corrupt than female police officers.	40%	19,3%	15,5%	9,1%	16,1%
The institution of the State Police is not corrupt; certain individuals within it are corrupt.	24,9%	15,3%	9,4%	6,7%	43,7%
Police officers working in the field are more corrupt than those working in the office.	46,3%	22%	17%	5%	9,7%
Senior police officers at the State Police tolerate corruption of their subordinates.	41,7%	21,9%	19,8%	8,6%	8%
State Police leaders' unwillingness to fight corruption discourages police officers.	24%	14,5%	12,4%	10,9%	38,2%
Most police officers of the State Police are motivated to law enforcement.	13%	6,3%	13%	11,5%	56,2%
Most police officers of the State Police use law as a means of pressure over citizens for gainful purposes.	45,3%	27,3%	14,7%	6,8%	5,9%

Table 13: Factors that drive corruption according to police officers

As already discussed in the chapter on extent of police corruption, one of the causes –and consequences at the same time, i.e., a form of corruption– is the culture of corruption within the institution of police bred from recruitment, appointments and promotions by means of corruptive forms.

The influence of supervisors and fellow officers constitutes another cause that breeds corruption. According to the survey, 54% of police officers admit that in the last year they have been asked at least one time to do a favor to a fellow officer, whereas 34% of them state that during the last year their supervisor asked them, at least once, to make concessions. Such superior-inferior relations show that the message conveyed to police officers is that corruption is tolerable. About 58% of respondents think that police senior leaders at the State Police tolerate corruption.

The following table contains data that seek to explore the relationship between corruption and few dimensions, such as gender, age, seniority in service, etc.

Some 26% of the respondents think that their working conditions are good or very good, whereas 29% think that these conditions are bad, and 44% think they that work in acceptable working conditions. However, interviews with police officers revealed that there is ambiguity with regard to evaluating the working conditions due to the lack of standard typologies of the conditions to be created for various police services, so that officers can perform their duty professionally. Therefore, the assessment is mainly based on key conditions, such as office, uniform, or vehicles in the case of mobile units, etc.

Another aspect the survey sought to explore was to what extent police officers understood and differentiated among misconduct, corruption, and criminal conduct as the most severe form of corruption. As elaborated earlier in the chapter on causes of corruption and while misconduct and corruption are different, toleration of minor infractions will gradually lead to toleration of more severe forms of misconduct and corruption.

These aspects are initially made known by means of training and clear rules. Therefore, police officers were asked about whether rules allow room for corruption. In addition, since corruption is prevalent, the survey

explored the level of toleration to corrupt practices by police officers.

The data provided in the following table indicate that police officers are not clearly divided in their understanding of corrupt conduct or the one that leads to corruption as well as in the stances they should keep towards corruptive acts.

Statement	Percentage by response				
	1 (Do not agree at all)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
It is right for state police officers do another job when off-duty.	36.1%	15.2%	14.9%	8.6%	25.2%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in bribery.	11.9%	6.8%	12.4%	10.4%	58.5%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in divulgence of police information to criminal people/ organizations.	10.3%	5.6%	5.9%	5.3%	72.9%
A police officer must report on his fellow officers who engage in criminal organizations.	5.6%	3.9%	6.8%	5.4%	78.3%
Some of the rules may be broken by state police officers to the benefit of the work.	32.3%	15.4%	18.3%	11.5%	22.5%
Doing a second job when off-duty by state police officers has negative impact on the performance of police duty.	31.9%	11.7%	13.7%	11.4%	31.3%

Table 14: Distinction between corruption and misconduct according to police officers

Likewise, the following graphic shows that about 2/3 of responding police officers consider non-punishment of a police officer for violation of traffic rules, acceptance of free services or manipulation of evidence as a corrupt act.




Figure 16: Tolerance to corruption and misconduct according to police officers

In addition to the culture of toleration of corruption imbued over the years, another factor that affects the causes of failure to address the problem relates to the insufficiency and low effectiveness of acts that should help police officers to address corruption. Most of the respondents think that the code of ethics of the police has not helped at all in preventing corruption (about 70%) and that the internal regulations leave space for corruption (about 54%).

9.2.3. Trust in the Anticorruption System

Taking into account that the trust in the anticorruption system and active participation of police officers in the fight against corruption are key factors to enhance the culture of non-toleration of corruption and the integrity of police organization, the survey explored the opinion of the respondents on these matters.

The results show that most respondents think that it is completely possible for police to fight corruption in itself (about 70%) and it is completely possible to reduce corruption in the police (about 58%). However, the number

of police officers that have little or no confidence at all that corruption can be fought remains high.

Likewise, the trust of police officers in other institutions in the fight against corruption is shaky. The trust in other institutions, with the exception of Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, is small.

Institution	Percentage by response				
	1 (No trust at all)	2	3	4	5 (A lot of trust)
Prime Minister	5%	9%	11%	12%	63%
Minister of Interior	5%	6%	10%	12%	67%
General Director of State Police	4%	4%	10%	18%	64%
Internal Control Service	6%	10%	15%	17%	52%
Attorney General	12%	17%	21%	15%	35%
Ombudsman	12%	19%	17%	14%	38%
High Inspectorate for the Dec- laration and Audit of Assets and Conflicts of Interests	17%	18%	23%	15%	27%
Parliament	15%	16%	22%	18%	29%
Judiciary	27%	17%	21%	11%	24%
Prosecutor's Office	20%	17%	25%	13%	25%
Supreme State Audit	17%	19%	25%	14%	25%
Political Parties	46%	22%	14%	5%	13%
Civil Society	14%	14%	25%	17%	30%
Media	15%	12%	20%	20%	33%

Table 15: Trust in institutions in the fight against corruption in the State Police

In terms of timeframes, the survey results show that a good part of police officers (33%) see the success of the fight against corruption linked with EU membership, while another part (8%) of respondents thinks that the fight against corruption will never yield results.




Figure 17: Anticorruption measures and their effect

10. Police Integrity and Corruption

Structured interviews were conducted with police officers to solicit additional data on corruption. Respondents were asked to give their opinion on 11 different scenarios. (See the chapter on methodology and Annex 5 for more information.)

In general, the respondents expressed their stance against the violations ranking them by severity as per their opinion. The more severe the violation is, the more severe is the disciplinary measure that they think should be given. Likewise, their willingness to report violations of a fellow officer is higher for serious offenses.

Police officers show a tendency of tolerance to a series of violations that are qualified as severe breaches of discipline in the Regulation on Discipline; they say that less severe measures should be taken for these breaches. It is unclear whether this attitude is a result of not knowing the rule or lack of their support to these rules. Yet, regardless of the reason, this shows significant deficiencies in how anticorruption rules in the State Police are communicated and understood.

The survey results show that the low willingness to report on colleagues' violations constitutes an important element of the culture of police integrity, because police officers do not see non-reporting on a fellow officer among most severe violations.

Scenario	Severity of Violation				Discipline				Readiness to Report			
	Thought for oneself (question 1)		Thought for others (question 2)		Disciplinary measure that SHOULD be taken		Disciplinary measure that WILL be taken		Oneself (question 6)		Most of other officers (question 7)	
	Average	Mode	Average	Mode	Average	Mode	Average	Mode	Average	Mode	Average	Mode
Scenario 1 Dual employment	1.91	1	2.10	1	2.43	None	2.50	None	2.72	1	2.28	1
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	3.37	5	3.12	5	3.03	Oral admonishment	3.20	Oral admonishment	3.46	5	3.13	5
Scenario 8 Coverage of a violation of a fellow officer	3.69	5	3.38	5	3.50	Written admonishment	3.42	Written admonishment	3.31	5	3.18	5
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	3.82	5	3.48	5	3.47	Written admonishment	3.51	Written admonishment	3.66	5	3.33	5

Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	3.93	5	3.54	5	3.43	Written admonishment	3.40	Written admonishment	3.41	5	3.29	5
Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	3.94	5	3.58	5	3.90	Written admonishment	3.84	Written admonishment	3.55	5	3.36	5
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	3.95	5	3.66	5	3.47	Written admonishment	3.53	Oral admonishment	3.79	5	3.24	5
Scenario 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	4.30	5	3.98	5	3.78	Written admonishment	3.75	Written admonishment	3.87	5	3.52	5
Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	4.55	5	4.20	5	4.53	Dismissal from work	4.61	Dismissal from work	4.09	5	3.86	5
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.86	5	4.39	5	4.84	Dismissal from work	4.87	Dismissal from work	4.20	5	3.92	5
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	4.94	5	4.66	5	4.48	Dismissal from work	5.41	Dismissal from work	4.49	5	4.10	5

Table 16: Results of survey to assess scale of severity of violation, disciplinary measure and willingness to report it

10.1. Assessment of Severity of Conduct

Interviewed police officers consider some of the types of misconduct to be more severe than the others when assessing the 11 scenarios. They state that ‘opportunistic theft’, ‘taking bribes’, and ‘theft of lost-and-found items’ are severe violations. The scale of severity is also reflected in the disciplinary measures they think will be taken or should be taken. This will be explored in details later on.

On the whole, these assessments point out that police officers’ knowledge of the rules is incomplete and inadequate, because, with the exception of ‘doing another job’, which the Regulation on Discipline does not consider as a violation when the second job ‘does not constitute a conflict of interest and is in compliance with the relevant legislation’,¹⁴⁵ violations described in scenarios 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10, are infractions, which the Regulation on Discipline lists as severe breaches.¹⁴⁶

An aspect that warrants a specific analysis is the police officers’ stance to dual employment. This scenario was deemed as a less severe violation and the only one that respondents thought their fellow officers would consider as a more serious violation than they themselves would.

This level of tolerance shows that doing a second job is now a major feature of the organizational culture at the State Police and this must become a concern calling for more attention. While the Regulation on Discipline says dual employment is not a violation unless it constitutes a conflict of interest and if it complies with the relevant legislation, it is not clear as to how dual employment will be assessed on case-by-case basis since the level of discretion and the risk for superiors to engage in corruption is high.

Another aspect of interest in the analysis of the survey data is the difference between the assessment of police officers on each scenario and the opinion they have of other officers. Unlike in the dual employment scenario, police officers think that their fellow officers would deem the

145 Regulation on Discipline, Article 4, paragraph 14

146 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11, paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 14, and 20.

violations stated in the other 10 scenarios as less severe. This shows that there is a level of tolerance towards corruptive conduct and breach of rules at the organization.

10.2. Support for Disciplinary Measures

All in all, the survey data indicate a high level of tolerance to violations. With the exception of dual employment, for which police officers think there should be no disciplinary measures, they state that all other infractions should be punished either with oral admonishment, written admonishment, or expulsion from police forces.

Yet, as already confirmed above, many violations are not deemed as severe and the disciplinary measures that police officers think that are or should be given for most violations described in the scenarios include oral or written admonishment, even though the Regulation on Discipline qualifies many of these violations as severe breaches¹⁴⁷ and punishable with up to expulsion from police.¹⁴⁸

The evaluation on disciplinary measure points out the attitude towards the use of excessive violence. Even though police officers think that the measure to be taken for this violation is oral admonishment, while they think that written admonishment should be given, the attitude towards this infraction is not in line with the Rule on Discipline, which qualifies the ‘unreasonable use of violence’ as severe violation¹⁴⁹ and punishable with ‘expulsion from police’.¹⁵⁰

Similarly, they think that written admonishment will be given for accepting gratuities and gifts, for misuse of occupational competencies or soliciting commissions for recommendations.

Embezzlement and bribery are offenses that police officers think the most severe punishment will and should be given. In fact, a harsher attitude to these offenses seems to arise from the high level of public awareness on

147 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11, paragraph 8, 10, 12, 14, 20

148 Regulation on Discipline, Article 10, paragraph 8, 10, 12, 14, 20

149 Regulation on Discipline, Article 11, paragraph 14

150 Regulation on Discipline, Article 10, paragraph 2

these acts.

A detailed analysis of the data reveals differences in the support for measures that police officers think should be given and will be given. These differences do not lean on the same side. There is less support for the disciplinary measure that should be given for offenses such as bribery, accepting gratuities from citizens while off duty, and theft of lost-and-found item. The only offense for which there was wide support on the measure, dismissal from work, to be taken is opportunistic theft.

10.3. Willingness to Report Violations

An analysis of the survey data indicates that the code of silence is another important dimension of the integrity culture at the State Police. This is seen in the evaluation made by police officers on the severity of violations committed a fellow officer (see the table below) as well as in their willingness to report it. The readiness to report an infraction of a fellow officer is very low, ranking next to the willingness to report on dual employment, which most police officers do not consider as a punishable violation.

This shows that, while the Regulation on Discipline stipulates the police officers' obligation to report on violations,¹⁵¹ their willingness to comply with this requirement is quite low and so is the support they exhibit to have for this official policy of the State Police.

The low-level willingness to report on violations is also pointed out when comparing the data on the evaluation of scenarios by the extent of severity of violation and the readiness to report on the violations. As already indicated in the following table, with the exception of scenarios 1 and 4, the average rates of willingness to report are lower than those on the evaluation of the extent of severity of violation.

151 Regulation on Discipline, Article 4

Scenario	Severity of violation		Severity of violation	
	Opinion for oneself (question 1)	Opinion for oneself (question 1)	Oneself (question 6)	Most of other officers (question 7)
	Average	Average	Average	Average
Scenario 1 Dual employment	1.91	2.10	2.72	2.28
Scenario 4 Accepting rewards from citizens when off-duty	3.37	3.12	3.46	3.13
Scenario 8 Coverage of a violation of a fellow officer	3.69	3.38	3.31	3.18
Scenario 2 Accepting rewards from citizens while on duty	3.82	3.48	3.66	3.33
Scenario 7 Misuse of occupational competencies	3.93	3.54	3.41	3.29
Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	3.94	3.58	3.55	3.36
Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	3.95	3.66	3.79	3.24
Scenario 9 Accepting gifts for dismissing violations of the law	4.30	3.98	3.87	3.52
Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	4.55	4.20	4.09	3.86
Scenario 3 Taking bribes	4.86	4.39	4.20	3.92
Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	4.94	4.66	4.49	4.10

Table 17: Evaluation of severity of violation and willingness to report it

10.4. Compliance with the Official Policy

The third question asked to respondents related to their opinion on whether the given scenario constituted a violation of the State Police official policy. Interviewed police officers think that opportunistic theft, taking bribes, and theft of lost-and-found items are the three conducts that conflict with the State Police official policy.

Dual employment is seen by most respondents as not in contradiction with the official policy of the police. Likewise, accepting a gratuity from citizens while off duty is not seen as a violation of official policy by majority of interviewed police officers.

The blue code of silence and lack of willingness to report on fellow officers is again revealed as part of the organizational culture in the answers to this question. (Table 18)

Ranking of scenarios	Severity of violation	Disciplinary measure	Willingness to report	Compliance with the official policy
	Scenario 3 Taking bribes (for speeding)	Scenario 3 Taking bribes (for speeding)	Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft
	Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	Scenario 3 Taking bribes (for speeding)	Scenario 3 Taking bribes
	Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	Scenario 5 Opportunistic theft	Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items	Scenario 11 Theft of lost-and-found items
	Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation	Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation of business	Scenario 9 Accepting a gift to overlook violation of law	Scenario 9 Accepting a gift to overlook violation of law

	Scenario 9 Accepting a gift to overlook violation of law	Scenario 9 Accepting a gift to overlook violation of law	Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	Scenario 10 Use of excessive force
	Scenario 8 Concealing a fellow officer's violation	Scenario 8 Concealing a fellow officer's violation	Scenario 2 Accepting gratuities from citizens while on duty	Scenario 7 Misuse of envisaged competencies
	Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	Scenario 10 Use of excessive force	Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation of business	Scenario 2 Accepting gratuities from citizens while on duty
	Scenario 2 Accepting gratuities from citizens while on duty	Scenario 2 Accepting gratuities from citizens while on duty	Scenario 4 Accepting gratuities from citizens while off duty	Scenario 6 Taking a commission for recommendation
	Scenario 7 Misuse of envisaged competencies	Scenario 7 Misuse of envisaged competencies	Scenario 7 Misuse of envisaged competencies	Scenario 8 Concealing a fellow officer's violation
	Scenario 4 Accepting gratuities from citizens while off duty	Scenario 4 Accepting gratuities from citizens while off duty	Scenario 8 Concealing a fellow officer's violation	Scenario 4 Accepting gratuities from citizens while off duty
	Scenario 1 Dual employment (conflict of interest)	Scenario 1 Dual employment (conflict of interest)	Scenario 1 Dual employment (conflict of interest)	Scenario 1 Dual employment

Table 18: Ranking of results by severity of violation, disciplinary measures, willingness to report and compliance with the official policy

The blue code of silence as part of the police culture is also reflected in the results of the survey of the police officers. This survey revealed that 44% of the respondents rarely or never hear about corruption in the police, even though the phenomenon is pervasive.

11. Conclusions and Recommendations

11.1. Conclusions

This study analyzes police corruption in Albania. Its main goal is to contribute to the improvement of anticorruption measures by acquiring a better knowledge of the police corruption and the factors that drive or restrain it. Likewise, the study aims to help address the deficiencies existing in the area of empirical studies on corruption in Albania with particular focus on police corruption.

At first, the study reviews the literature on police corruption focusing on its definition and peculiarities, types of police corruption and factors that drive or control it. Then, based on the secondary data and sources, the study analyzes the background in which corruption appeared and developed in Albania. It also examines the anticorruption institutional policies and legal framework. After this, the empirical data collected through surveys with the public and police officers and the information gathered from the interviews with police officials on police corruption are used in the study to analyze the current scale of the spread of phenomenon in Albania, the various forms and causes that drive it.

From the onset, the study starts with the assumption that police corruption is a phenomenon, whose causes are to be found in the broader environment and the organizational culture and problems of the police. Findings show police corruption in Albania is rife at all policing levels, including the political leadership of the police institution.

Most common types of corruption include bribery and favors by citizens as well as corruption of officials. Among most prevailing forms of officials'

corruption are corrupt processes of recruitment, appointments and promotions, where police officers are both the objects and subjects of this corruption. Other widespread forms of corruption include abuse of financial and material resources of the police, corrupt procurement of goods and services intended for the police as well as misuse of police information or manipulation of evidence and proofs.

The main drive of corruption is the financial or material gain. The causes of corruption result from a combination of various factors, such as tolerance to corruption with historical and structural roots related with the post-communist transition, characteristics of policing, organizational culture of police, and the deficient effectiveness of anticorruption measures, which have led to a decline of the public and police trust. The measures for establishing and maintaining the integrity culture of the police organization have either lacked or been enforced partially. Poor integrity serves as the basis for individual or group conduct and for the corruption of the police officers.

11.2. Recommendations for the Reform

Police corruption has been traditionally treated as a phenomenon caused by the individual conduct of a limited number of untrained police officers with law-violating propensity. Therefore, the approach to address corruption was based mainly in strengthening investigation to identify and penalize individual cases of corruption and in improving training and recruitment standards.

Yet, in the last 2-3 decades, reforms have tried to address police corruption as a result of the combination of several factors that go beyond individuals, such as organizational weaknesses, issues linked with lack of transparency, lack of control and accountability systems, incomplete or inadequate legislation, overall weak institutions, and poor law enforcement.

Other factors affecting police corruption include nature of police work making the supervision of each patrol police officer's activity impossible, occupational solidarity and silence over misconduct of fellow officers, low

salaries, and frequent contacts with members of criminal organizations that have sufficient resources and the intention to corrupt police officers.¹⁵²

The complexity of causes of police corruption has led to the identification and application of approaches that address police corruption based on a strategy that combines stringent measures and punishment with preventive measures. It has also led to coordination of reforms that focus on implementation of law, structural changes, and on encouragement of public participation through education and communication.

The major goal of preventive measures is to impact the change of *structures* and *factors* that drive corruption and to establish institutional environment and conditions that decrease the urge and opportunities of involvement in corrupt practices.

The management system reform, the change of organizational culture of police institutions with means that strengthen integrity at all levels of police, the improvement of mechanisms of accountability, and the involvement of a well-informed and active public are some of the major preventive measures.

The poor human resource management systems create opportunities for and push police officers to turn to corruption as a means for achieving their goals. The inadequate recruitment system and poor criteria of selection lead to hiring of unqualified people with low integrity and propensity for corruption. Likewise, the promotion system must be transparent, fair, and open. So must be the recruitment and career system to make sure that applicants with professional qualifications and high ethical standards are hired.

The efforts to encourage standards of promotion based on the merit and career should focus on providing the police officers with the required knowledge and skills to perform their duties professionally and ethically. This includes capacity building so that police officers are able to differentiate misconduct and resist and avoid corruption in the course of performing their functions.

152 Gareth Newham, "Tackling police corruption in South Africa." Africa do Sul: Centre for the Study of Violence and reconciliation (2002).

Likewise, police supervisors must be trained and prepared on what is required from them to promote integrity and lead through their personal example. They must be provided with the knowledge and skills to motivate their staff through rewards for ethics-based performance.

The efforts for a police with integrity are unlikely to succeed, if the salaries are low, because financial needs create the urge for corruption. On the other hand, increase of salaries cannot help to reduce corruption unless combined with the establishment of an effective management system and ways to enforce the punitive measures.¹⁵³

Another measure that contributes to reduction of corruption is the increase of transparency in all sectors of police governance, both administrative and budgetary. Limitation of opportunities for police officers or sectors to use secrecy as a cover-up for corruption, restriction of possibilities for abuse with police competencies, improvement of data publication system for budgetary spending, and data systems on audits and controls are some measures that have direct impact on the decrease of corrupt conducts.

The transparency in all police governance segments may restrict opportunities for negative influence and may increase public trust. It must be made compulsory for the police to publish periodic statistics as well as to improve and report corruption reduction data and records to oversight institutions.

Another fundamental condition for the successful implementation of the anticorruption strategy and measures is the establishment of a credible leadership and commitment to support the fight against corruption inside the police and in the other institutions. Police supervisors and managers play an important role in promoting police integrity and, to this end, they must be one of the major objectives of the anticorruption reform. They must have the skills and the will to enforce rules and formal discipline system to earn the trust and respect of their subordinates.

In the best case, however, anticorruption strategies should aim to create an

153 Marie Chêne (2009). Low salaries and the culture of per diems and corruption, Transparency International/U4, (U4 Helpdesk query 220), Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=220>

organizational culture that is based on ethical culture and professionalism rather than in stringent measures and punishments. For this purpose, it is important to establish and enforce codes of conduct for all police staff. These codes must address all forms of unethical conduct.¹⁵⁴

Collaboration with the public and the links with the community are also important conditions to address police misconduct and corruption. The public must play an important role by reporting cases of corruption. At the same time cooperation between the police and the community may increase the legitimacy of the police by regarding police officers as a source of support rather than source of fear.

There must be, however, some reactive effective measures to identify, investigate and punish police officers that engage in corruption or misconduct.

Granting police supervisors and managers the authority to enforce disciplinary measures at all levels and strengthening their accountability system to exercise this function are some of the key measures for the improvement and enhancement of the internal audit system.

Also, conducting random and frequent integrity tests and empowerment of administrative controls, such as inspections and audits of file systems are some measures that help to strengthen the internal audit system.

The anticorruption reforms in the police cannot succeed without reforming the legislation and without the contribution of the judiciary. It is indispensable to incorporate in the legal and institutional reform the measures that improve the chances of exposing corruption and increasing severity of punishment. Redefinition of the corruption in the Criminal Code and increase of severity of punishment and sanctions for people engaged in corruption or increase of penalty measures for certain corruption offenses have resulted effective in countries where these measures have been implemented.^{155 156}

154 Gareth Newham, "Tackling police corruption in South Africa." Africa do Sul: Centre for the Study of Violence and reconciliation (2002).

155 Jon ST. Quah, "Combating corruption Singapore-style: Lessons for other Asian countries." Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 2007, no. 2 (2007): 1.

156 Valentine Anozie, Juhie Shinn, Katy Skarlatos, and Julio Urzua. "Reducing incen-

Another anticorruption measure includes external oversight by the Parliament, by independent institutions and the public. The Parliament plays a specific role, because it is the only institution that approves the budget and adopts laws that regulate the activity of the police. It also has the authority to oversee the enforcement and implementation of the laws. The Parliament must conduct regular hearing sessions with various stakeholders and exercise its institutional power to undertake measures that improve transparency and accountability of the police. Likewise, establishment of the investigative commissions to investigate certain cases or issues or broader topics related to corruption constitute irreplaceable instruments that lead to the improvement of accountability.

In addition, independent institutions, such as Ombudsman, Supreme State Audit, Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data, etc., have an important role in investigating cases of corruption that relate with the abuse of the fundamental human rights. They also help to prevent corruption by contributing to the enhancement of management of finances and other resources made available to the police.

Another important anticorruption means is the establishment of an effective complaint system, which will encourage citizens to report on police corruption. A credible complaint system must be user-friendly to the citizens, have the capacity to manage and resolve complaints, and must be able to take measures, give recommendations, and protect whistleblowers.¹⁵⁷

tives for corruption in the Mexico City Police Force.” In International Workshop, Public Affairs, vol. 869, pp. 2003-2004. 2004.

157 Marie Chêne, (2007). Anti-corruption complaints mechanisms, Transparency International/U4, (U4 Helpdesk query 132), Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway,

12. Annexes


12.1. Annex 1

Detailed report of public survey findings


The survey with citizens was conducted during January – March 2014 with 1.100 respondents in 36 centers of rural and urban areas of the country. The sample selection relies on a stratified sampling method with equal quotas for 12 major cities (regions' centers), 12 towns and 12 communes. The selection of interviewees in each resident area was carried out randomly by involving citizens older than 18 years.

12.1.1. Description of sample

Based on the selected method for sampling – which enables equal chances in selection of citizens (potentially interviewed) in big urban areas (municipality, region center), in medium and small urban areas (municipalities) as well as rural areas (communes) – the majority of respondents come from urban area (68%) and 32% of them are residents in rural areas. The gender component of the respondents is in a ratio of 54% to 46% in favor of males.




From the educational point of view, the group of respondents appears almost equal; between those with high school education level (49%) and respondents who have been graduated or have post-university degrees (in total about 44%). See Picture above.




Age-groups are represented in approximate levels between 18% and 25% with the exception of the respondents who belong to the age group of over 56 years, who compose 15% of the sample. See Picture.

As indicated in Picture below, the majority of respondents are declared as employed (45%) while 28% are unemployed. Students and retired people follow these two categories with respectively 10% and 9%.




12.1.2. Acquaintance with police organizations


Answering the Question like “Which police organization is more corrupt”, about 1/10 of the respondents have identified at least one police organizations or part of its structure (or another institution) as such.



Picture above presents relevant answers according to which about 61% of respondents identify the structures of the State Police as the most corrupt, while it is clearly noted that Traffic Police and Public Order police are more often identified, respectively by 16.5% and 10.9% of respondents. With regard to Public Order Police, the respondents reflect some hesitation, as this structure is ranked fourth among “the least corrupt police organizations” according to respondents”. Asked about the police organization least corrupt, the respondents identify different structures, within and outside State Police. The larger part of them declare that Private Police (11.5%) is least corrupt, followed very closely by the anti-crime structure (Crimes investigation and prevention) In the State Police and the local government police organizations (municipality/commune) with respectively 9.8%. See Picture below.




The respondents have been asked to identify the actual leadership of the Ministry of Interior (Mr. Sajmir Tahiri) and State Police (Mr. Artan Didi) as well as the former leadership, respectively Mr. Flamur Noka and Mr. Hysni Burgaj, of a total of 4 alternatives for each position (including also the exact names).



Picture above presents the percentages of the correct answers for each of

the leaders, where it is noted that more than 2/3 of the respondents correctly identify the actual leadership and former ones of these institutions. In the meantime, the difference between the two correct answers about the former leadership (specifically F. Noka and H. Burgaj) is only 4%, while this difference is significantly increased into 30% on the actual leadership.




This level of information undergoes a drastic fall when respondents are asked whether they know who are (1) Head of District Police, (2) Chief of Commissariat and (3) Police Inspector of the neighborhood/village in the areas they inhabit. On the other hand, it is worth underlining that the percentage of respondents who have such information increases in relation to familiarity that these police structures have with the community - from the district police inspector of that area being the person who “is faced” with citizens on daily basis. See Picture above.

While this trend is an indication related to the community policing, its positive aspect is questionable considering that more than half of the respondents (53%) do not know who the State Police are Inspector is.


81% of the respondents know of the State Police emergency number, but on the other hand, 75% declare that they have never asked the assistance of the police and only 16% has done so for in the last 12 months (January 2013 – January 2014).

12.1.3. Information and perceptions on corruption

Television remains the most important of means of information regarding the general developments in the country for 71% of the respondents, followed by internet in the second position (17%) and newspapers with 8%.




Media outlets (TV, newspapers, radio) also remain the most important mean of information about corruption in police according to 74% of the respondents, followed by the “social network and family” (18%). “Corruption in police” is less present as a topic among “colleagues and work environment” of the respondents (only 1%). See Picture above.




Almost ¾ of the respondents declare that they hear “OFTEN” 45% or “Almost always” 29% about Police corruption and only ¼ hear “Rarely” 21% or “Never” 2% (Refusal, 3%).

The Answers of the following Questions – How often do you hear or are encountered with information on corrupt police officers? – show a significant difference on the percentages given to alternatives “Rarely” and “Almost always”. More specifically, 60% of the respondents declare that they hear “almost always” (16%) or “often” such information, while 1/3 of them declare that they “rarely” (32%) or “never” hear information about corrupt police officers. See Picture below.




The following question “Do you believe that there are corrupt officers in State Police?” has been answered negatively only by 4% of the respondents, versus the majority part of 82% who believe that there are corrupt police officers (14% have no opinion).

On the other hand, asked about “to what extend is corruption spread in the State Police” most of the respondents think that it is “spread to a considerable extent” (33%) or “enough spread and serious” (18%). Picture 10 presents the total of answers given by respondents.



The survey has asked the respondents to evaluate the degree of corruption in different levels of State Police, starting from the top management positions in the General Directorate of State Police to the lowest level of the police officers in commissariats. As shown by “Picture 11”, the negative evaluation of respondents increases progressively the lower it gets from the top positions of the State Police (Directorate General) to the level of police officers in commissariats. The only exclusion is “middle management positions in commissariats”, which is evaluated more positively than the managers and leaders of the commissariat or basic level field officers.



Traffic police, sector against narcotics and trafficking as well as sector against financial crimes are perceived by citizens to be the three structures where corruption is most spread. Most significant is the traffic police, for which a total majority of 74% of respondents have scored as “4-spread”, (24.5%) or “5-very spread” (49.5%). Those structures where corruption is less spread based on the evaluation of citizens are – Internal Control Service, public order and administration of the regional police directorate and that of commissariats. Picture 12 presents the average evaluation from “1 – Corruption does not exist” to “5 – very much spread”.

The respondents have been asked to assess how much they agree with some statements related to corruption in State Police. The following table presents the percentage of each assessment of different statements in a rank from “1 – don’t agree” to “5-fully agree”. See Table 1.

Table 1. How much do you agree with the following statements?

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (do not agree)	2	3 (neutral)	4	5 (fully)
In the State Police there are a lot of not corrupted officers	9%	17%	24%	20%	29%
Police officers are corrupt before they join the State Police force	26%	27%	21%	14%	12%
The higher the number of police organizations (Police) in the country, the higher the corruption	20%	18%	25%	18%	19%
Old (aged) officers of the State Police are more corrupt than young officers	18%	16%	21%	21%	23%
Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt than female officers	7%	8%	18%	22%	46%

State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt	6%	13%	21%	20%	40%
Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices	12%	14%	25%	20%	29%
High rank officers in State Police tolerate corruption of their dependents	9%	15%	27%	24%	25%
Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers	4%	13%	23%	24%	35%
Majority of State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement	7%	18%	28%	24%	24%
Majority of State Police officers often use the law as a pressure on citizens for personal benefits	7%	16%	27%	22%	28%

Three statements for which the largest majority of the respondents have the tendency to agree are:

- Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt than female officers
- State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt
- Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers

Moreover, the majority of them do not believe that “*Police Officers are corrupt just before they get into the Police force*”. On the other hand, the respondents do not share their assessment with regard to the statement “*The more police organizations (Police) in the country, the higher the corruption*”. With regard to the other statements, the majority part of the respondents have the tendency to agree, but it is noted that a good part of them appear neutral.

12.1.4. Experiences with corruption

The following section of the questionnaire drafted for this survey aims to identify the specific experiences of the respondents related to corruption in State Police, in order to identify the expansion rate in practice and at the same time to confront “the perception” to the “experience” the respondents have had.

Less than ¼ of the respondents (24%) accept that they have had contact or interaction with a police officer in the last 12 months (January 2013 – January 2014) and 11% other, did so a year ago or even earlier. The vast majority of them (69%) have had interactions with State Police while the other part with another municipality police or other.

Asked whether it has happened to them personally to have been explicitly asked a bribe in the last year, 65% of the respondents have answered negatively. From the other part of the respondents (35%) who confirm such experience, 21% declare that they have been asked a bribe by the Traffic police officers, 4% from Border and Migration Police and same share by the municipality/commune police.

Table 2. “I have been asked to bribe” and “I have paid bribe”

Institution	I have been asked to bribe	I have paid bribe
Traffic Police	21 %	23 %
Anti-drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	2 %	1 %
Border and Migration Police	4 %	3 %
Public Order Police	2 %	2 %
Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	-	0,5 %
Internal Control Service	-	0,5 %
Regional Police Administration	2 %	1 %
Police Commissariat Administration	1 %	1 %
Municipality/Communal Police	4 %	3 %
Other	1 %	-


On the other hand, asked whether they have paid a bribe in the last year, again 65% of the respondents have answered “NO”, while from those who have paid a bribe, 23% of the respondents declare to have paid one for the traffic police. The following table presents the answers of the respondents that confirm the request for bribes and the fact that they have paid bribe in both questionnaires. See Table 2.

A lower percentage of the respondents have declared that in the last year they have been asked or they have offered some favor. 81% of the respondents declare that they have been asked no favor and 3% that they have offered no favor for different State Police officers. The vast majority of the respondents who confirm such experiences, again identify Traffic Police being the most problematic one – 10% of respondents affirm that they have been asked some kind of favor and 8% that they have offered a favor for members of the Traffic Police. See Table 3.

Table 3. “I have been asked a favor” and “I have made favors”

Institution	I have been asked a favor	I have made favors
Traffic Police	10 %	8 %
Anti-drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	1 %	1 %
Border and Migration Police	1 %	2 %
Public Order Police	2 %	2 %
Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	-	-
Internal Control Service	1 %	-
Regional Police Administration	-	-
Police Commissariat Administration	1 %	1 %
Municipality/Communal Police	3 %	3 %
Other	-	-

The other part has chosen for alternative “I don’t know / Refuse to answer”. 86% of them declare that the officers have accepted the bribe/favor while 14% have not accepted it.



A considerable part of the respondents (45%) do not know where to denounce an act (or tentative) of corruption by an officer of State Police. Even though in a total of 55% of citizens have information about where to denounce such an act, only 5% of the respondents declare that they have denounced an act/tentative of corruption of a police officer (91% say NO and 4% refuse to answer).

The respondents who declare that they have not denounced no corruption act/tentative by an officer of state Police (91% of the sample) have been further asked about the reasons. See Picture13.

Except for the respondents who have never encountered such a situation (56%) or those who refuse to answer (12%), to those who give a reason (in total 32%) it is to be noted that the majority declare that “they had no trust at the institution where who denounce” (12%) or that “it has been easier to solve the problem with a bribe/favor” (9%).

Compared to 45% of the respondents who declared as indicated above that they do not know where to denounce an act (or a tentative) of corruption by a State Police officers, only 6% of the respondents give reasons why they have not denounced the act/tentative of corruption.

12.1.5. Types and degree of corruption

The survey has also aimed at identifying and measuring the perceptions of the respondents regarding different types of corruption and their rate of spread at the Institution of State Police. With regard to the types of corruption, the respondents have been asked to evaluate how often the following acts happen in the State Police in a range from “1 – Almost never” to “5- Very often”. See Table 4.

Table 4. “How often the following acts do happen in State Police?”

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Almost never)	2	3	4	5 (very often)
Bribe	5%	9%	23%	27%	36%
Courtesies / favors of third parties (outside police)	7%	18%	32%	26%	17%
Courtesies / favors for third parties (by the police)	7%	20%	32%	24%	17%
Courtesies / favors for their colleagues (within the police)	6%	15%	25%	26%	27%
Misuse of police funds	13%	23%	26%	18%	21%
Misuse of police means	15%	21%	25%	20%	19%
Evidence manipulation	12%	21%	29%	21%	26%
Use of excessive violence by the police	16%	23%	25%	19%	18%

“Bribe” and “Courtesies / favors for colleagues within the police” are the only acts for which it can be affirmed for sure that they happen often in the State Police, as per perceptions of the respondents. In the meantime, in all other cases, the vast majority of the respondents give a score of 3, where problematic acts or other circumstances would be “manipulation of evidence”, “courtesies/favors from third parties (outside police)”, or “courtesies/favors for third parties (by the police)”.

The respondents have been further asked regarding other negative phe-

nomena which are perceived or have been reported earlier from different sources to be present in the State Police. Shih Table 5.

Table 5. “Do you agree with these statements?”

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Do not Agree)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	13%	28%	26%	14%	19%
Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	10%	28%	30%	15%	17%
Recruitment of police officers takes place on corruptive basis	11%	24%	28%	19%	18%
Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive	12%	21%	26%	21%	20%
Appointments and rankings in middle and lower ranks of police are corruptive	11%	22%	28%	21%	18%
Police leaders use police for corruptive affairs	9%	20%	25%	20%	26%
Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	9%	19%	25%	21%	26%
Police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	9%	21%	28%	19%	23%
Procurement in police is performed on corruptive basis	13%	25%	27%	17%	18%
Police officers create themselves the opportunity for profit through corruption	8%	20%	27%	20%	25%

Regardless of the fact that the neutral evaluation (3) for different problems remains quite high (25% to 30%), some conclusions are very clear. First of all, the respondents appear generally convinced that cooperation

with criminal organizations/incriminated people (first statement), or involvement of police officers in illegal activities (second statement) is not a concern. Such a finding related to the second statement should be taken with caution, not only due to the high level of neutral evaluation, but also due to the difference of only 5% compared to the percentage of those that consider it as a problem. Over 40% of the respondents agree (score 4 and 5) the truthfulness of the five statements, three of which identify “interference of politics” in the leadership and management of State Police, while two others deal with the service itself. More specifically:

- *Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive (41%)*
- *Police leaders use police for corruptive affairs (46%)*
- *Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes (47%)*
- *Police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes (42%)*
- *Police officers create themselves the opportunity for profit through corruption (45%)*

The difference between the respondents who do not agree with such statements is significantly high as almost $\frac{1}{4}$ of the respondents appear in general different. It is important to highlight here that the situation is rather clearer with regard to the statement that “*Appointments and ranking in middle and low rank police are corruptive*” (39% of the respondents fully agree).

12.1.6. External factors of corruption

The respondents have been asked about “*how spread is corruption*” for eleven different institutions (public or Not), in a range from “1-Not at all” to “5-Very spread”. Those institutions for which most of the respondents have expressed that corruption is not spread (evaluations 1 and 2) are: President (65%), Ombudsman (62%), and Civil Society (62%). Even though


with a lower percentage in evaluation 1 and 2 (total 45% of respondents) and with a higher average evaluation, 3 (31%), Media somewhat enjoy the trust of public as an institution where corruption is not spread. See Table 6.

Table 6. “How spread is corruption?”

Institution	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Absolutely not)	2	3	4	5 (Very spread)
President	35%	30%	16%	10%	9%
Parliament	16%	22%	26%	16%	21%
Council of Ministers	16%	23%	22%	19%	20%
Ministry of Interior	15%	23%	28%	19%	15%
Prosecution	8%	11%	22%	25%	34%
Courts	5%	9%	15%	22%	49%
High State Audit	11%	17%	31%	21%	20%
High Inspectorate of Declarations of Assets and Audit	9%	17%	26%	23%	25%
Media	16%	29%	31%	13%	11%
Civil Society	29%	33%	21%	11%	6%
Ombudsman	33%	29%	19%	9%	10%

Institutions for which the vast majority of respondents declare that corruption is very/spread (score 4 and 5) are Courts (72%) and Prosecution (59%). High Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets and Audit-HIDAA (48%) and High State Audit-HSA(41%) are also perceived as institutions under same category, even though the middle score (3) of the respondents reaches the amount of 31% in case of HSA and 26% for HIDAA. Three institutions for which the respondents appear different in their scores are Parliament (*percentages for each option from 1 – 5 vary from 16% to 26% of respondents*), Council of Ministers (*from 16% to 23%*) and Ministry of Interior (*percentages for each option are 1 – 5 vary from 14% to 28%*). About the last one, there is a slight difference in favor of scores 1 and 2 (37%) compared to scores 4 and 5 (34%).

The respondents have been asked about the degree certain institutions and other stakeholders with good influence in the country “have been effective in fight against corruption in state police”, in a range from “1-Not effective at all” to “5-Very effective”. See Picture below.



As it can be notices from Picture 14 the three most effective stakeholders in fight against corruption in State Police according to the perception of the respondents are the internationals (EU, USA, OSCE), Media and Civil Society. Less effective are Political Parties, President and Parliament.

The positive attitude of respondents regarding role of internationals in fight against corruption in State Police is also observed in the answers of the following questionnaire – “Do you believe that international assistance and EU have helped in reduction of police corruption?”. 67% of them declare YES and only 25% believe the contrary. However, the respondents appear rather ambiguous when questioned– “If membership in NATO has helped in reduction of corruption in police”. As such, 48% of them answer positively to questions, compared to 35% that declare NO and 16% “I don’t know”.

12.1.7. Internal factors of corruption

“Low salaries” have a lot of influence at the level of corruption in State Police according to 60% of the respondents. Almost half of them think similar on “Weak training” and “political influence”. As it can be noticed by the following data in Table 6, “culture of corruption in Albanian society” is considered to have a lot of influence from many respondents, compared to the “working culture in State Police as a factor”. See Table 7.

Table 7. “How much is the degree of corruption in State Police affected by...?”


Factors	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (No impact)	2	3	4	5 (Too much impact)
Low salaries	4%	4%	13%	19%	60%
Little training	3%	7%	18%	25%	48%
Political influence	3%	5%	17%	25%	49%
Working culture in police institutions	4%	7%	25%	28%	36%
Corruption culture in Albanian society in general	4%	8%	22%	27%	39%

Asked regarding work conditions of the State Police, the majority of respondents (44%) consider them as “acceptable”, 18% as good and only 3% as very good. 26% of respondents consider them “bad” while 9% do not have an opinion about this.

12.1.8. Tolerance to corruption

Acts, behavior and certain (non) actions by public officials are perceived by the citizens in different ways. Asked about some acts/actions like that performed by police officers (Picture below), a considerable part of respondents see them as corruptive acts. However, it is to be noted that a

good part of the respondents do not consider them as such, more specifically – 18% in the occasion when police officer “accepts free of charge services by private subjects”; 10% when police officer “helps someone to benefit 1 service disregarding the queue”; 9% on the case of “manipulation of evidence” and 8% when “traffic rules are violated outside working hours and he is not punished”.



Most of respondents (70%) are of the opinion that a police officer should be dismissed of State Police in case he is found to be involved in illegal activities or if he cooperated with incriminated people/criminal organizations. According to the opinion of respondents, alternative measures for him would be – “Written notice / warning for dismissal” (10%) or “Transfer to another post” (5%), while 6% of respondents do not have an opinion and 9% suggest the measure “Other”.

Last but not the least, (non)tolerance of respondents to corruption in State police is tested also in relation to some acts or other expectations from the police officers. Table 8 (below) presents the positions and opinions of the respondents to different statements, in a degree from “1-Do not agree” to “5-Fully agree”.

Table 8. “Tolerance to corruption – acts & expectations”

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Do not agree)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
It is fair that State Police officers perform another Nob outside working hours	43%	14%	17%	9%	17%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a bribery affair	4%	6%	8%	15%	67%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in provision of police information to criminal people/organizations	4%	5%	6%	13%	72%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a criminal organization	3%	4%	4%	11%	78%
Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the Nob	25%	16%	21%	15%	23%
Performing a second Nob outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfilment of the police duties	20%	14%	17%	14%	35%

Three statements for which the largest majority of the respondents are in full agreement while there is a very small percentage of those that do not comply with the agreement are:

- A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a bribery affair
- A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a criminal organization
- A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in provision of police information to criminal people/organizations


A good part of the respondents (43%) do not agree with the Statement that “it is OK that State Police officer perform a second job after working hours”. However, it is worth mentioning here that almost 26% of them score 4 or 5 and about 17% appear neutral.

The data presented in Table 7 indicate that there is no consensus among respondents regarding Statement that “Some rules can even be violated by the State Police Officers for the sake of the job”, where scoring is divided between 1-5 with amounts that vary from 15% to 25%.


Last but not the least, the vast majority of respondents has the tendency to support the opinion that “performing a second job after working hours by the State police officers has a negative influence on their policing performance”. However, the other half of respondents are divided between the neutral position (3) and the opponent one (1-2).

12.1.9. Trust in fight against corruption

Regardless of these positions and perceptions on corruption in State Police, the respondents are declared positive in general with regard to the perspective or possibilities to reduce corruption. See Figures below.



39% of the respondents declare that it is “absolutely possible” to reduce corruption in police and same percentage of respondents are of the opinion that SP is capable of fighting corruption internally; respectively 41% and 43% are of the opinion that it is possible “to a certain extent”. Reduction of corruption in SP and the capacity of the police to fight corruption internally are considered as mission “impossible” or “as mostly impossible” by 14% and 16% of the respective respondents.



While the majority part of the respondents (80%) show mostly trust that Police is capable of fighting corruption, not the same is applicable about the expectations and trust in other institutions with regard to fight against corruption in Police. Table 9 presents the evaluations of the respondents regarding question that follows:

Question: Do you trust that corruption in police will be combated by the listed. Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-No trust at all and 5-a lot of trust.


Table 9. Trust institutions in fight against corruption in State Police

Institution	Percentage of evaluation for each choice				
	1 (no trust)	2	3	4	5 (a lot of trust)
Prime Minister	13%	12%	17%	21%	37%
Minister of Interior	12%	13%	19%	20%	36%
General Director of State Police	11%	15%	24%	22%	28%
Internal Control Service	11%	16%	29%	23%	21%
General Prosecutor	18%	22%	30%	18%	12%
Ombudsman	18%	23%	25%	17%	17%
High Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets and Audit	24%	24%	30%	13%	9%
Parliament	24%	22%	26%	17%	10%
Judicial	36%	23%	20%	13%	8%
Prosecution	29%	23%	23%	14%	11%
High State Audit	16%	22%	32%	19%	11%
Political Parties	37%	25%	19%	12%	7%
Civil Society	13%	22%	25%	20%	20%
Media	7%	12%	24%	27%	30%

As it is indicated by Table 8, three main institutions for which more than half of respondents have a lot of/trust that will fight corruption in Police (score 4 and 5) are: Prime minister (58%), Media (57%) and Minister of Interior (56%). General Director of State Police also enjoys this trust from 50% of respondents. Three main institutions that enjoy little or not at all trust (score 1 and 2) among citizens regarding this challenge are: Political Parties (62%), Judicial (59%) and Prosecution (49%).

For all other it is noted the fact that the vast majority of respondents (25% to 32%) chose the medium score (3). However, the most positive trend (more trust) is given by the scores of respondents related to ICS (44%) and civil society (40%), while less trust (score 1 and 2) are given for HIDAA (48%), Parliament (46%), Ombudsman (41%), Prosecutor General (40%) and HSA (38%).

Despite of the trust, the respondents are divided according to the timely expectations related to the specific results of the fight against corruption in police – reduction of these phenomena. Picture below shows exactly this “lack of consensus” among the respondents.




12.1.10. Evaluation of anti-corruption legal framework and policies


In order to have a better understanding of the attitudes, perceptions, experiences and expectations of the respondents and in order to identify the level of information and perceptions on the anticorruption legal framework and policies in force, the last section of the questionnaire is focused exactly at their opinions and attitudes about this framework.

52% of the respondents declare that “have no information” and 38% have “limited information” on the anti-corruption legal framework and policies of the State Police, while only 1/10 of them have a “good” information (8%) or “very good” (2%).

This low information level of the respondents is also reflected in their answers when their opinion is asked about legal framework/policies adequacy on the prevention of corruption in police. More specifically, as it can be noticed in Picture below, there are 40% of the respondents who have no opinion on this matter. On the other hand, 30% are of the opinion that it is “somewhat adequate” and 15% “fully adequate”. See Picture below.



Almost same situation is presented even when the respondents were asked about the adequacy of the legal framework/ policies about investigation of corruption in State Police. 39% of the respondents do not have an opinion, 29% are declared “somewhat”, 15% completely inadequate and the rest “very little” (13%) or “not at all” (4%). The respondents are not that uniform when it comes to the level of enforcement of the legal framework and policies about prevention as well as those for investigation of corruption in State Police. Picture 20 graphically presents this slight difference, which is also notices at the alternatives “very little” and “Somewhat”.



More respondents (10%) are of the opinion that prevention gets somewhat more attention than investigation. Moreover, more respondents (34%) are of the opinion that the investigation framework is implemented “very little”, compared to the legal framework and that of prevention policies (26%).


In a degree from “1-not effective at all” to “5-very effective” the respondents have been asked to evaluate the Internal Control Service, inspections and Internal Audit:

Question: In your opinion, how effective are the following institutions in investigation of corruption in police?

With a standard deviation of 1.18, the respondents mostly score ICS (3,34) and Inspection (3.18), while internal audit receives an average score of 3.04.

Last but not the least, this survey aimed at identifying even the scoring of respondents regarding specific anti-corruption measures in State Police. See Picture21.

Question: How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in State Police? Please score in a rate of 1 to 5 where 1-not effective at all and 5-vry effective.



Three measures for which the respondents reflect clear skepticism are:

- *Replacement of State Police leadership*
- *Better accountability from Parliament*
- *Better examination of conflict of interest*

Three top preferences of the respondents regarding the proposed measures present a very interesting combinations between “incentives”, “capacities” and measure of a type of “repression. More specifically:

- *Salary raise*
- *Education/training enhancement*
- *More severe punishment*

“Improvement of working conditions” (4,16) also appears to be highly rated by their respondents, while two remaining measures – “Strengthening of the legal/institutional framework” and: improvements of anticorruption policies” = are rates somewhere in the middle.


12.2. Annex 2

Detailed report of findings of the survey with State Police officers

The survey with State Police officers was conducted during February – March 2014 in regional directorates and commissariats at national level. The survey sample involved 370 respondents and covers with representative quota each police structure that was interviewed. The selection of interviewees in each surveyed structure was carried out randomly by involving police officers present at the workplace.


12.2.1. Sample Description

The selected sample with state police officers, is dominated from the gender perspective by a vast number of males in a ratio of 83% to 17% in disfavor of women.




Picture 1 presents the sample according to age-groups represented in it, where it is clearly noted that respondents of the age group “36-45 years” are dominating (39%), followed by the age group “46-55 years” (27%) and “26 – 35 years” which reaches 23% of the sample. See Picture above.

From the educational point of view, 46% of the respondents declare that higher education is the highest education level they have performed and the same (46%) declare university degree. Only 7.6% have completed post-university studies while 0.4% refuse to answer.




As it can be noticed from Picture above which represents the full composition of the sample, based on the ranks of the State Police officers interviewed, “implementation level”(Vice-inspector, inspector, chief-inspector) dominate the composition of the sample, followed by “first leadership level” (vice-commissar, commissar and chief-commissar), while middle and high management level is less than 1% of the sample.

All respondents holding the rank “Inspector” (41.7%) and “Chief-inspector” (26.3%) compose almost 2/3 of the survey sample. See Picture above.



This survey has also aimed at focusing on the State Police officers who have a frequent contact with the citizens. Consequently, most of the respondents declare that they are field officers (79%) while 21% the opposite. See Picture.

The selected survey is spread in acceptable levels with regard to experience in service. The most represented category is the group of respondents who have “11 to 20 years” work experience in State Police (39%) and less represented (2%) the group that has “over 30 years’ experience”. See Picture below.




At last, Picture above presents the composition of the sample according to the sample composition in accordance with the police service in which the respondents have been engaged with.

The vast majority of the sample (68.3%) consists of officers of the public security service (public order, traffic police, crime prevention, etc.), 14%


of organized crime and heavy crimes and 12.6% of the respondents of Migration and Border Police. The administration/support and police training are less represented in the composition of the sample. See Picture above.

12.2.2. Acquaintance of police organizations

About 27.3% of the respondents have accepted to answer the question “Which police organizations most corrupt”. Picture 6 presents the perceptions of the State Police officers regarding this issue, where it is to be noted that the three most corrupt structures according to them are Traffic Police, Tax Police and Migration & Border Police.



Fewer respondents answered Question “What the police organization is less corrupt“(19.3 %). Unlike the previous question where the responses identify a structure outside the ASP (Tax Police), respondents tend to stay within the service when it comes to the less corrupt police organization.




As seen from Picture above less corrupt are Public Order and Safety police (27.1 %), ASP (24.3 %) and third place is shared between the border and migration police and Anticrime with 8.6 % each.

State Police employees participating in the survey use the TV (61 %) and internet (20 %) as the primary means of information on general developments in the country. Family and social groups (11 %), newspapers (5 %), radio (1 %) and other means of information (2 %) are used less by them for this purpose.

Most of the respondents (41%) declare that they hear “rarely” about Police corruption and 3% “never”. On the other hand, about half of the respondents declare that they hear “often” (35%) or “almost always” (14%). See Picture above.



Media remains also the main mean of information on corruption in police, while it is worth mentioning that “personal experiences” and “work environment” are also reported as alternative sources of information. See Picture below.



Asked about how often do they hear about or encounter information about corrupt police officers, the vast majority of respondents declare that they hear “rarely” (60%) or “never” (8%). Only ¼ of the respondents confirm to


have information on this issues, while 8% refuse to answer. See Picture 10.

Despite of the “hesitation” or “caution” regarding some of the questions above, a quite high number of respondents (58%) believe that there are corrupt officers in State Police. 16% of them believe the opposite and 26% don’t know.



Despite this perception, respondents do not see how the level of corruption in the State Police as a serious phenomenon. Most of them think that corruption is limited to “isolated cases” (37.1 %) or “No serious levels” (32.6 %). About 12 % see it as a widespread phenomenon or a serious one. See Picture above.

Although with extremely small differences, respondents are more “critical” to senior executives at the regional director or ASP Director General and more positive towards lower levels of service.




Picture above graphically presents these trends, which anyway give a general positive description of the service for its own.

The respondents were asked to assess the extent of corruption in various structures of the State Police using a scale from 1 (does not exist) to 5 (Very spread).

Although it is quite understandable, police officers tend to positively assess various service structures with estimates ranging from 1.65 to 2.74, slight differences anyway helpful to make some distinctions. More specifi-

cally, traffic police (2.74), financial crime sector (2.64) and the Border and Migration Police (2:51) receive negative assessment by the respondents.

On the other hand, the structures of the Public Order and Safety (1.65), Sector for serious crime (1.84) and administration of the State Police departments at district level and stations (1.89) show a positive trend in the evaluation of the respondents. Internal Control Service (ICS) also appears at this category with an average rating of 1.90. See Picture 13.



This survey aimed to analyze the attitudes of respondents, employees of the State Police, about some issues and allegations of corruption in the State Police. Table below shows the percentages for each different assessment of claims on a scale from “1 – Do not agree” to “5-Fully agree”. See Table 1.

Table 1. Do you agree with following statements?

Statement	Parentage for each choice				
	1 (do not agree)	2	3	4	5 (fully agree)
There are enough not corrupted police officers within the State Police	24,9%	13,6%	5,5%	8,7%	47,3%
Police officers are corrupt before Joining the State Police force	54%	20,3%	13%	5,9%	6,8%
The higher the number of police organizations (Police) in the country, the higher the corruption	40,7%	14,1%	16,6%	6,3%	22,3%
Old (aged) officers of the State Police are more corrupt that young officers	47,7%	17,3%	14,1%	9,1%	11,8%
Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt that female officers	40%	19,3%	15,5%	9,1%	16,1%
State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt	24,9%	15,3%	9,4%	6,7%	43,7%
Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices	46,3%	22%	17%	5%	9,7%
High rank officers in State Police tolerate corruption of their dependents	41,7%	21,9%	19,8%	8,6%	8%
Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers	24%	14,5%	12,4%	10,9%	38,2%
Majority of State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement	13%	6,3%	13%	11,5%	56,2%
Majority of State Police officers often use the law as a pressure on citizens for personal benefits	45,3%	27,3%	14,7%	6,8%	5,9%

Three statements on which the majority of the respondents have the tendency to agree are:

1. *There are enough not corrupted police officers within the State Police*
2. *State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt*
3. *Majority of State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement*


Despite a slight trend of agreement, respondents appear divided in their opinions regarding the statement that “*Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers*”. On the other hand, for all other statements, the respondents in most of the cases (scores 1 and 2) express a non-approval trend.

12.2.3. Experiences with corruption

In order to analyze more clearly and confront perceptions with reality, the subsequent section of the survey focuses on the corruption experiences of respondents. Picture 14. (Below) presents the experience of respondents with a Situation or corrupt phenomena in their daily work... See

Question: In the last 12 months, has any of the following situations happened to YOU in person?

As noted from the responses given, bribery or various favors are not an uncommon situation. During the last 12 months 36% of police officers interviewed confirmed they were offered at least once a bribe and this happened - at least 1 time in 18% of cases, sometimes by 12% and the rest declare that are offered often (3%) or very often (3%). Courtesies or favors are even more serious - 60% of respondents confirm this, namely: at least 1 time by 31% of respondents, sometimes to 19%, often 5% and very often 5% of respondents.




(54%) of the survey respondents, members of the State Police, confirm also the phenomena of favors requested by their police colleagues and - 30% of them state that it has happened at least once, 17% sometimes, 3.5% often and 3.5% very often. On the other hand, about one third 1/3 of respondents declare that it has happened that the supervisor has required to make courtesies/favors to someone - 20% at least 1 time, 9% some time, 3% often and 2% responded this happens very often.

¼ of the respondents confirm that they have denounced a citizen for attempted corruption. This figure drops to the level of 5% when it comes to denouncing the superior/supervisor and 8% for denouncing the corruption committed by a colleague, a police officer.

The respondents were also asked to share information on a corruption Situation or denounced acts of corruption by their colleagues that they have personally witnessed. The questions above and below of the questionnaire are interrelated as they serve to check and compare the answers given by the respondents for each of them. Clearly, the data reveals several important findings. See Picture 15.

Question: In the last 12 months, have YOU in person ever faces any of the following situations?



While 36 % of respondents stated they were offered a bribe at least once (See Picture 14) , only 13 % confirm that they have seen at least once a police officer taking bribes and 18 % that they saw a police officer asking for a bribe / favor from a citizen (see Picture 15) . Favors that citizens ask to police officers as in Picture 14 were confirmed by 60 % of respondents , but only 35 % claimed at succeeding question (Picture 15) to have seen a police officer to make a favor to a citizen . Percentages given in Pictures 14 and 15 are closer to each other when it comes to favors among State Police colleagues, respectively 47 % (personal experience) and 45 % (evidence of experiences of colleagues).

Regarding denouncing acts of corruption, 32 % declare that they have experiences at least once a situation when a police officer has denounced a citizen for tentative corruption. Only 11.5 % of respondents indicate that during the past 12 months, they have seen a colleague denounce another police officer or a supervisor.

12.2.4. Types and degree of corruption

The survey has aimed to identify the perceptions of the respondents regarding different types of corruption and their level of spread at the institution of State Police.

With regard to the types of corruption, the respondents have been asked to evaluate how often the following acts are happening in the State Police in

a degree from “1 – Almost never” to “5-Very often”. See Table 2.

Table 2. “How often do following cases happen in the state Police?”

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Almost never)	2	3	4	5 (Very often)
Bribe	41,4	38,5	12,2	5,8	2,1
Courtesies / favors of third parties (outside police)	36.4	37	17.7	6.5	2.4
Courtesies / favors for third parties (by the police)	42.2	36.8	14.3	5.5	1.2
Courtesies / favors for their colleagues (within the police)	40.3	33.3	15.5	7.3	3.6
Misuse of police funds	45.1	22.1	12.4	9.8	10.6
Misuse of police means	42	23.9	15.2	8.4	10.5
Evidence manipulation	78.5	13.9	5.2	1.2	1.2
Use of excessive violence by the police	61.2	26.8	7.6	2.9	1.5

Most respondents tend to be categorical in their assessments of the above types of corruption. In case of “manipulation of evidence” and “use of excessive force” almost 2/3 of the respondents declared that they almost never occur. On the other hand, there are about 20 % of respondents who claim that abuse of funds or of police vehicles happens often (4) or very often (5).

Respondents were further asked about the truthfulness or not about other negative phenomena which are perceived or previously reported by media and other sources as being present in the State Police. See Table 3.

Table 3. “Do you agree with these statements?”

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (do not agree)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	60.2%	29.7%	5.8%	2.6%	1.7%
Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	58.6%	28.6%	8.5%	2%	2.3%
Recruitment of police officers takes place on corruptive basis	61.9%	21.7%	9.4%	2.3%	4.7%
Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive	42.4%	21.8%	16.3%	7%	12.5%
Appointments and rankings in middle and lower ranks of police are corruptive	48.1%	27.1%	11.9%	5%	7.9%
Police leaders use police for corruptive affairs	49.6%	20.5%	13.5%	6.4%	10%
Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	58.2%	23.4%	7.6%	5.8%	5%
Police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	69.8%	17.7%	9.5%	1.2%	1.8%
Procurement in police is performed on corruptive basis	54.1%	21.1%	9.9%	7.6%	7.3%
Police officers create themselves the opportunity for profit through corruption	59.2%	24.6%	11.2%	1.8%	3.2%

As it can be noted from Table 3, the respondents flatly refuse even the above listed statements, which have been mentioned time after time by different stakeholders and media as main concerns. A slight “deviation” of this trend is noted in the positions of the respondents to three main statements:

1. *Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive*
2. *Appointments and rankings in middle and lower ranks of police are corruptive*

3. *Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes*

Even though the percentage of respondents who do not agree with these Statements remains relatively high (over 40%), a good share of the respondents, 10% to 20%, declare that they agree (4) or fully agree (5).

12.2.5. External factors of corruption

The respondents have been asked about “how much spread is corruption” at eleven different institutions (public or Not), in a range from “1-Not at all” to “5-Svery spread” (and “3-neutral”). See Table 4.


Table 4. “How spread is corruption?”

Institution	Parentage for each choice				
	1 (Absolutely not)	2	3	4	5 (Very spread)
President	60.4	21.9	6.6	4.5	6.6
Parliament	45.7	22.1	15.2	6.9	10.1
Council of Ministers	54.8	19.4	16.4	4.6	4.8
Ministry of Interior	60.2	21.5	10.5	5.7	2.1
Prosecution	19.6	16.7	16.1	17.9	29.7
Courts	14.6	12.8	13.4	16.3	42.9
High State Audit	32.3	22.9	18.6	14.9	11.3
High Inspectorate of Declarations of Assets and Audit	26.9	21.5	17.6	14	20
Media	25.9	25.6	24.4	10.4	13.7
Civil Society	41.2	30.1	15.8	6.9	6
Ombudsman	53.8	21.8	12.2	5.9	6.3

More than half of the respondents believe that corruption is not widespread in these institutions: the President, Council Ministers, Ministry of Interior and Ombudsman. Parliament and civil society follow the rankings with 70 % of respondents who provide scoring 1 or 2, followed by High State

Audit (about 55 %) and media (about 51 %). Courts are according to the vast majority of respondents (42.9 %) an Institution where corruption is very widespread, followed by the Prosecution (29.7 %) , while for HIDA respondents appear somewhat divided in their judgment , although the tendency for a positive score (1 and 2) is clear .

Respondents were asked “how effective have been in the fight against corruption in the State Police “ institutions and other influential stakeholders in the country, on a scale from “1 - Not effective at all “in “ 5 - Very effective”. See Picture below.



Three most effective institutions in the fight against corruption in State Police are according to respondents the Ministry of Interior (3.71), Police (3.7) and internationals (3.6). Council of Ministers , media and civil society follow closely this category while less effective Institutions are considered to be political parties (2.24), followed by the President and the Courts with an estimation of about 2.6 and an average score for the Prosecution and the Parliament rating 2.8 .

Positive attitude of respondents regarding the role of the internationals in fight against corruption in State police is noted also from the responses to succeeding Questionnaire.

Question: Do you think that international and EU assistance has helped in minimizing corruption in police force?

81% of them claim YES and only 10% think the opposite and 9% “I do not know”. The same positive trend albeit at lower levels is noted even when respondents are asked - “If NATO membership has helped reduce corruption in the police”. Thus, 61% of them respond positively to this question, despite the 23% who say NO and 16% “I do not know.


12.2.6. Internal factors of corruption

By analyzing the internal causes of corruption in the State Police, “low salaries” are the only factor which more than half of the respondents consider as very influential. Although other causes, as seen from the Table below, are evaluated as “very influential” by most respondents, ratings 4 and 5 together in no case reach 50% of respondents. However, other factors, “political influence” and “culture of corruption in society” are relatively valued high by respondents. See Table 5.

Table 5. “How much impact has the following in State Police...?”

Factors	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (No impact)	2	3	4	5 (A lot of impact)
Low salaries	11.5%	6.9%	13.2%	12.6%	55.8%
Little training	17.9%	13.9%	21.8%	17.6%	28.8%
Political influence	20.7%	12.1%	18%	15.9%	33.3%
Working culture in police institutions	23%	14.4%	20.7%	17.4%	24.5%
Corruption culture in Albanian society in general	16.3%	15.4%	20.1%	19.2%	29%

The picture below shows graphically the evaluation of working conditions by the police officers interviewed. See Picture below.



About 1/3 of respondents consider as bad the working conditions of State Police officers, while the majority part of respondents (44%) consider them as “acceptable”.

Four statements which relate to salaries in ASP, Ethics Code and regulations of internal service have been submitted to respondents for evaluation. See Table 6.

Table 6. In/sufficiency of instruments – Salaries, Code of Ethics & Internal Rules and regulations

Statement	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (Do not agree)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
Middle and low rank salaries in State Police are enough for a normal lifestyle	45.5%	23.4%	15%	6.8%	9.3%
High rank salaries in State Police are enough for a normal lifestyle	11.4%	18.1%	23.6%	15.4%	31.5%
Code of Ethics has not influences at all in prevention of corruption in State Police	28.9%	21.1%	15.8%	13.4%	20.8%
Internal regulations of State Police allow room for corruption	46.3%	23.2%	14.6%	6.4%	9.5%


More than half of the respondents have the tendency to (evaluation 1 and 2) about two Statements:

- Middle and low rank salaries in State Police are enough for a normal lifestyle
- Internal regulations of State Police allow room for corruption

On the other hand, a good part of respondents think that “*high-level salaries in ASP are sufficient for a normal life*”. Regarding the impact of the Code of Ethics, despite the tendency of half of respondents to assess it positively, about 1/3 of them do not think like that (ratings 4 and 5).

12.2.7. Tolerance to corruption

Certain acts, behavior and (no) actions by State Police officers are perceived differently from citizens. Asked about some acts/actions of their colleagues in State Police (Picture 18) more than 60% of respondents consider them as acts of corruption. About a quarter (1/4) of the respondents – an average of (22% to 27%) do not consider them as such, while about 10% have no opinion. See Picture below.



Tolerance of respondents - employees of the State Police - appears in al-

most the same levels even when they are asked what measures should be taken on a police officer who is confirmed to have been involved in illegal activities or has collaborated with incriminated people / criminal organizations. More specifically, 65% of respondents say that he should leave the ranks of the ASP, 19% suggest “warning / notice for dismissal”, and 3% vote for “transfer” and 6.8% for “other measures” 6.2% say I do not know.

Finally, (non) tolerance towards respondents about corruption in the State Police was tested in relation to certain acts or other expectations by police officers. Table 7 (below) presents the respondents’ opinions towards various statements on a scale from “1-Do not agree” to “5-Fully agree”.

Table 7. “Tolerance to corruption – acts & expectations”

Statement	percentage for each choice				
	1 (Do not agree)	2	3	4	5 (Fully agree)
It is fair that State Police officers perform another Nob outside working hours	36.1%	15.2%	14.9%	8.6%	25.2%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a bribery affair	11.9%	6.8%	12.4%	10.4%	58.5%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in provision of police information to criminal people/ organizations	10.3%	5.6%	5.9%	5.3%	72.9%
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a criminal organization	5.6%	3.9%	6.8%	5.4%	78.3%
Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the Nob	32.3%	15.4%	18.3%	11.5%	22.5%
Performing a second Nob outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfillment of the police duties	31.9%	11.7%	13.7%	11.4%	31.3%

Distribution of percentages in different rates of assessment for some of the above statements indicates about different ways of understanding or tolerance to various acts or expectations of police officers. Respondents largely agree (over 70%) with the claims that colleagues who “are involved in disclosure of information to persons/criminal organizations” or “involved in criminal organizations” should be denounced. 58% agree that “colleagues involved in bribery” should be denounced, but on the other hand there are about 19% which tend not to agree (evaluation 1 and 2).

Respondents appear to be divided in their views regarding recent Statement - Performing a second job after working hours by ASP officers has a negative impact in the fulfillment of the policing duty - in about 43% there is a tendency not to agree versus about 42% that show the opposite tendency (rating 4 and 5).


Last but not the least, despite of the fact that the majority of the respondents do not agree, about 1/3 seems that justify such choices (evaluations 4 and 5) about following statements:

- *It is Ok that State Police officers perform second job outside working hours*
- *Some rules can even be disregarded by the State Police officers for the good of work*


12.2.8. Trust in fight against corruption

The following picture (See Picture 19) presents the answers of the respondents regarding two following questions:

- Question 1: “Do you think that corruption in State Police may be reduced?”
- Question 2: “Do you think that State Police is able to fight corruption internally?”



Most of the respondents are optimistic about the two Questions, however they show more confidence regarding the second one. 70.6% believe that the ASP is able to fight corruption internally (absolutely possible). This level of optimism suffers a decline when it comes to concrete results - “reducing corruption within the PA” - about one third believe that this can happen to a certain extent.



Most of the respondents seem to show more trust in the leaders of several institutions such as Minister of Interior, Prime Minister or General Director of ASP, as well as to ICS. Political parties and the judiciary are the only institutions for which percentages of assessment “no trust” are larger than the estimate “very confident”. Picture below shows graphically the answers “very confident” and “no trust” for each of the institutions about which respondents are asked how much confidence they have that they will fight corruption in State Police. See Picture above.

Full assessments of respondents for each of the institutions are presented in Table 8.


Question: *How confident are you that they will fight corruption in the police. Please rank on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1-no trust and 5-a lot of confidence.*

Table 8. Trust in Institutions for fight against corruption in State Police

Institution	Percentage for each choice				
	1 (No trust)	2	3	4	5 (a lot of trust)
Prime Minister	5%	9%	11%	12%	63%
Minister of Interior	5%	6%	10%	12%	67%
General Director of State Police	4%	4%	10%	18%	64%
Internal Control Service	6%	10%	15%	17%	52%
General Prosecutor	12%	17%	21%	15%	35%
Ombudsman	12%	19%	17%	14%	38%
High Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets and Audit	17%	18%	23%	15%	27%
Parliament	15%	16%	22%	18%	29%
Judicial	27%	17%	21%	11%	24%
Prosecution	20%	17%	25%	13%	25%
High State Audit	17%	19%	25%	14%	25%
Political Parties	46%	22%	14%	5%	13%
Civil Society	14%	14%	25%	17%	30%
Media	15%	12%	20%	20%	33%


Besides the four first institutions, more than half of respondents trust (4) or are very confident (5) at Prosecutor General, Ombudsman and media. Unlike the case of the leader of the Prosecution, respondents appear fairly divided about the trust that they have at Institution of Prosecution, where estimates of 1 and 2 are almost equal to the percentages they take at 4 and 5. The phenomenon is also observed on the case of High State Audit where the difference between those who have trust (rating 4 and 5) and those without (estimate 1 and 2) is only 3%. Parliament, civil society and HIDAA also enjoy the confidence although at lower levels. It is worth mentioning anyway the contradiction between significant lack of confidence in political parties (estimates 1 and 2 levels of 68%) and trust given to institution of Parliament (rating 4 and 5 at the level of 47%), where in fact political parties participate.

Finally, it appears that the majority of respondents associate the success of the anti-corruption in State Police with the current majority government mandate. As shown in Picture 21, about 17% of respondents expect to see concrete results in the fight against corruption within the year, 35% believe that this will happen in the next two years and about 17% within 2017. See Picture below.




12.2.9. Review of legal framework and anti-corruption policies

More than half of the respondents stated that they know “very good” (54%) or “relatively good” (46%) the anti-corruption legal framework and policies for SP. 31% have less knowledge and 8% do not know.



Respondents in their answers make a slight difference between eligibility (or Not) of the legal framework and policies in force to “investigate corruption in ASP” and the one on “prevention”. As shown in Picture above there are more respondents who think that this framework is “little or not” suitable for the investigation of corruption in the police (26%) compared to the legal framework/policies on “prevention” (12%). There are also 6% to 7% fewer respondents who consider it as “fully” or “somewhat” suitable for investigation compared to the framework for prevention.

These differences disappear almost completely when respondents are asked about the implementation of legal framework / policies on investigation and prevention of corruption in the State Police. See Picture below.



As seen from above Picture, more than half of respondents claim that these legal frameworks and policies are implemented to some extent while the difference between those who declare “little or not at all” and respondents who stated “fully implemented” is about 5% in favor of the latter.


On a scale of “1-ineffective” to “5-very effective” respondents were asked to evaluate the ICS, Inspections and Internal Audit.

Question: In your opinion, how effective are the following institutions to investigate corruption in police?

Internal Control Service is estimated more effective (4) by the respondents, while internal audit (3.5) and Inspection (3.6) are scored in approximate levels (standard deviation = 1)

The following question of the survey aims to identify respondents’ assessments on the effectiveness of concrete measures to fight corruption in State Police. See Picture below.

Question: How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in State Police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-not effective at all and 5-very effective.



Improvement of “working conditions”, “salaries” and “education / training” are regarded as the most effective measures in the fight against corruption in the State Police. Respondents expressed somewhat skeptical about the effectiveness of measures such as:

- Replacement of ASP directors
- Better control of Parliament


The efficiency of other measures is assessed relatively high (over 4) by those police officers interviewed.

12.3. Annex 3

Comparative analysis of public and state police surveys' findings



12.3.1. Perception on corruption and police organizations

Citizens and police officers surveyed have the same answer for the most corrupt police organization / structure and incline that it is the Traffic Police. But they do not share the same opinion about police structures of the following the ranking. Thus, according to the public, part of the three most corrupt police structures except traffic police are generally public order police and ASP. Meanwhile, employees of ASP list the Police (Administration), Tax Police and Border and Migration Police after Traffic Police. See Picture1.




Public perception seems not to comply with the ASP employees regarding the three least corrupt structures. As shown in Picture 2, according to

public they are private police, Anticrime and municipal/communal police. On the other hand, respondents from the ranks of the ASP think that public order police is the least corrupt structures, followed by ASP in general and third positions shared between Anticrime Police and Border and migration police. The latter, turns out to be the third least corrupt police structure as shown in below Picture.




There are perceptible differences between the two categories surveyed regarding the question on how often they hear about State Police corruption in general. Despite more respondents from the ranks of the police that hear about it “rarely or never” (44% versus 36% of the audience), more citizens surveyed say they often or almost always hear about it (60% versus 49% citizens police officers).Picture above.




Unlike the respondents in the State Police, citizens interviewed overwhelmingly confirm that they “believe that there are corrupt police officers.” This percentage is at 58% among respondents

of ASP officers. See Picture above.





Lack of consensus between the opinions of the two categories surveyed deepens further when it comes to the question on how widespread is corruption in the State Police. As shown by Picture 5, about 51% of the public think that it is “serious or widespread significantly”. Only 12.3% of respondents from the ranks of the ASP share the same opinion. See Picture above.



The differences in evaluation given by respondents are visible, but on the other hand comparative analysis focuses on the trends that show both categories (public and ASP). Thus, according to citizens, corruption is more prevalent in the base level of state police officers in commissariats, while according to officers interviewed corruption is more prevalent in leadership of Departments of ASP at district level. Also, public thinks that the high level leaders in the General Directorate of ASP is the range where corruption is less widespread, while according to police officers it is less prevalent in middle management level in the commissariats. See Picture above.



The traffic police, anti-drugs and financial anticrime are the three police structures in which corruption is more prevalent according to public perception. Almost the same opinion is shared among respondents from the police, with the exception of third position, which ranks border police and migration, while anti-drug is in fourth place. ICS, public Order and Administration are three structures where corruption is less widespread

according to citizens. Again, almost the same sequence applies to ASP officers interviewed, with the exception of ICS, which ranks fourth and Serious Crime Section takes its place in the three structures least corrupt. See Picture below.



Respondents from the ASP ranks relatively agree with some of the statements for which the majority of the public agree. The only exception is the Statement that “Male officers are more corrupt than women officers”.

Unlike 68% of the public, only 25% of police officers agree or fully agree with this statement. See Picture above.




On the other hand, the only statement on which the police and the public claim “fully/agree” appear at Picture above.

Regarding the six other claims for which it is asking the assessment of the respondents from public and ASP ranks, respondents stand in opposite po-

sitions. More specifically, police officers interviewed quite largely declare “Do not agree” or “mostly disagree” related to them. On the other hand, people interviewed show lower percentage of these assessments related to all claims except of the statement that “police officers are corrupt before entering the State Police service”. See Picture above

12.3.2. Experiences with corruption


The Comparative analysis of the responses of the public and ASP officers in the section “Experiences with corruption” reveals interesting findings which confirm No single phenomenon, but also its outreach and depth.




Picture above shows the percentage of citizens who claim that bribes were asked by the state police and those from the police who confirmed that during the past 12 months they have been offered or have seen at least once their colleagues seeking bribes from citizens in exchange for impunity. See Picture above.

About 1/3 of the people interviewed claim to have paid a bribe to State Police. In order to identify the State Police perspective on this experience, the survey asked police officers if they have seen over the last 12 months, a police officer taking bribes. 13% of them confirm that they have witnessed at least once such a situation. See Picture below.

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


Denouncing corruption cases remains at low levels according to what was reported by both the public and state police officers surveyed in the polls. More specifically, only 5% of citizens confirm that they have reported at least once a police officer for corruption. On the other hand, police officers interviewed, confirm more often cases when they denounced citizens for attempted corruption (25%) at least once during the past 12 months. But this percentage drops to very low levels in cases of “denouncing within the State Police”. Thus, only 5% reported that they have denounced their superior and only 8% have reported another police officer (No supervisor). See Picture below.



12.3.3. Types of corruption in State Police – Bribe



Further comparative analysis focuses on the differences between the public and police officers associated with bribery as an act of corruption. More specifically, respondents were asked how often this phenomenon happens in ASP. Picture below shows precisely these differences at the options that get the highest percentage in the two categories. See Picture below.



While 63% of the public thinks that bribing in State Police happens often or very often, this assessment is shared by only 8% of ASP officers. The latter in a majority (41%) say that bribery in ASP almost never happens, despite 5% of people who share the same opinion.

12.3.4. External and internal factors of corruption


Two institutions (outside State Police) where corruption is mostly spread based on the input of two categories of respondents are the courts and prosecution. See Picture below.




Respondents from State Police ranks tend to be more categorical and select significantly the assessment “not widespread” for a good part of institutions (outside ASP) for which they are asked about. This trend is not perceived in the surveyed citizens. Picture 16 shows the difference between the two categories surveyed, especially when it comes to executive institutions.. See Picture above.

Internationals are one of the three institutions that have been most effective in the fight against corruption in the ASP under the two categories surveyed. The difference between the public and the State Police and at

the same time what they have in common, stands at two (of three) other institutions. The two categories list as part of the group (three most effective) institutions that can be considered “structures near them” - according to police they are ASP, Ministry of Interior and according to the public, media and civil society. See Picture below.





Regarding the internal causes of corruption in State Police, respondents in both categories (public and ASP) agree in many ways but also show differences. Asked about the impact of several internal factors to the extent of corruption in the Police, SP officers interviewed tend to select in a considerable extent “very influential”. Picture below graphically presents the percentages that this assessment receives from public and police.




12.3.5. Tolerance to corruption & confidence in fight against corruption


Both categories generally consider as acts of corruption certain actions of the state police officers on which they have been interviewed. Their differences are observed in the percentage of respondents who stated that those “are not acts of corruption”, actions like the manipulation of evidence or favor. Specifically, police officers surveyed seem to show a higher degree of tolerance to these acts than public does. Picture below graphically presents the answers “not considered an act of corruption” in both categories – public and police. See Picture below.




Differences extend when respondents are asked whether “police are able to fight corruption internally” and “if corruption in the State Police can be reduced”. Police officers interviewed are more optimistic than the audience for both Questions. See Picture above.



Although with significant differences in percentage, “Prime Minister” and “Minister of Interior” are two institutions (heads of institutions) for whom both categories confirm that they have more “very confidence” that they will fight corruption within the ASP. The third institution with the highest level of responses “very confident” is “Media” according to the public and “Director General of ASP” according to respondents from the state police. See Picture above.



On the other hand, there is complete consensus somewhat expressed at the level of percentages, with regard to institutions which do not enjoy the “no confidence” in the two categories for being able to fight corruption in the State Police. As shown in Picture above, these institutions are political parties, judicial and prosecution.




Finally, respondents from state police ranks have the tendency to associate time expectations for concrete results in fight against corruption (reduction of corruption) in ASP with the current majority government mandate. Thus, 70% of them choose one of the options “2017” as the time when these results are expected to become tangible. This percentage on the other hand is at the level of 45% of citizens interviewed. See above.


12.3.6. Appropriateness and enforcement of the anti-corruption legal framework/ policies

The public generally appears more hesitant in his judgment on the appropriateness of legal framework and policies for investigating and preventing corruption. Picture below shows graphically the differences between public and state police officers interviewed in this survey, regarding appropriateness of this framework for investigating corruption. More specifically, there are more respondents from police who choose the evaluation “somewhat” or “absolutely appropriate” compared to the survey with citi-

zens. See Picture below.




The same trend is present even when respondents are asked about legal framework and polices on the prevention of corruption. See Picture below.



Differences between two categories are further deepening when it comes to the enforcement of legal framework / policy framework on investigation and prevention of corruption in the State Police. Most of the public declares that this framework is implemented little or not at all, while over 70%

of police officers interviewed state that it is implemented “somewhat” or “fully implemented”. Another trend noted in Picture below which graphically presents these results, is the fact that public is more skeptical about the investigation while the state police respondents’ answers indicate that police officers are less positive regarding the enforcement of the framework for prevention of corruption. See Picture below.



12.4. Annex 4

Questionnaire of public survey

12.4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. GENDER

Male	• 1
Female	• 2

2. Resident in which district?

3. Live in urban area (town) or in rural area (village)

Urban area	• 1
Rural area	• 2

4. Which age-group do you belong to?

18 – 25 years	” 1
26- 35 years	” 2
36 – 45 years	” 3
46 – 55 years	” 4
Over 56 years	” 5

5. What is your highest education level completed?

High school	” 1
University degree	” 2
Post-university degree	” 3
Refuse to answer	” 99

6. Employment status

Employed	” 1
Unemployed	” 2
Student	” 3
Retired	” 4
Other (Specify) _____	” 5
Refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.2. ACQUANTANCE WITH POLICE ORGANISATIONS

7. Except of the State Police, how many other police organizations (Police) do you know being operational in Albania?

Another one	” 1
Two more	” 2
Up to four others	” 3
More than 5 others	” 4
I don't know	” 99

8. In your opinion, which police organization (Police) is most corrupt?

9. In your opinion, which police organization (Police) is least corrupt?

10. At the moment, who is the Minister of Interior?

Damian Gjikhuri	” 1
Flamur Noka	” 2
Pjerin Ndreu	” 3
Saimir Tahiri	” 4
I don't know	” 99

11. Who was former Minister of Interior?

Bujar Nishani	” 1
Flamur Noka	” 2
Gent Strazimiri	” 3
Saimir Tahiri	” 4
I don't know/Refuse to answer	” 99

12. Who is the actual General Director of State Police?

Ahmet Premci	” 1
Agron Kulici	” 2
Artur Didi	” 3
Hysni Burgaj	” 4
I don't know	” 99

1. Who was the former General Director of State Police?

Ahmet Premci	” 1
Agron Kulici	” 2
Artur Didi	” 3
Hysni Burgaj	” 4
I don't know	” 99

2. Do you know who is the Police Director of the Region where you live?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2

3. Do you have information about who is the Director of Police of the town/Commissariat you inhabit?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2

4. Do you have information about who is the Police officer of your neighborhood/village/zone?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2

5. Do you know the emergency number of State Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2

6. Have you ever asked for the assistance of Police?

No never	” 1
YES, in the last 3 months	” 2
YES, in the last 6 months	” 3
YES, in the last 12 months	” 4
Do not remember	” 5

12.4.3. INFORMATION ON CORRUPTION

7. What are your main means of information on the general developments in country:

TV	” 1
Newspapers	” 2
Internet	” 3
Radio	” 4
Friends /acquaintances / family	” 5
Other. Specify _____	” 6

8. Have you ever heard of corruption in Police?

Almost always	” 1
Often	” 2
Rarely	” 3
Never	” 4
Refuse to answer	” 99

9. From which source do you hear more about corruption in Police?

Media (TV, newspapers, Radio etc.)	” 1
Personal experience	” 2
Friends/Family	” 3
Other. Specify _____	” 5

Refuse to answer	” 99
------------------	------

10. How often do you hear or are exposed to information about corrupt Police officers?

Almost always	” 1
Often	” 2
Rarely	” 3
Never	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.4. PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION

11. Do you think there are corrupt officers in State Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

12. In what degree do you think corruption is spread in State Police?

Does not exist	” 1
Few, isolated cases	” 2
Exists, but it is not in serious levels	” 3
Is spread considerably	” 4
Is very much spread and serious	” 5
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

13. Evaluate the corruption degree in different levels of State Police. Please evaluate in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-does not exist and 5-very spread.

Leadership ranks in State in State Police	Level of corruption				
High rank leadership of “General Directorate of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High rank leadership of “Directorates of State Police in Region level”	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Commissariat Leaders of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Middle rank leadership in commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

Basic level of officers of State Police in commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
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14. Evaluate the degree of corruption in different structures within State Police. Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-does not exist and 5-very spread.

Structures of State Police	Corruption degree				
Traffic Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against narcotics and trafficking (Antidrugs)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Border and Migration Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector for investigation and prevention of crimes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector for Public order and safety (Order)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against financial crime	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against heavy crimes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Administration of Directorates in Regional Police ad commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Inspection	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

15. How much do you agree with following statements? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree and 5-fully agree.

Statement	Evaluation				
There are enough not corrupted police officers within the State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers are corrupt before Joining the State Police force	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
The higher the number of police organizations (Police) in the country, the higher the corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Old (aged) officers of the State Police are more corrupt that young officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt that female officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

High rank officers in State Police tolerate corruption of their dependents	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Majority of State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Majority of State Police officers often use the law as a pressure on citizens for personal benefits	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.4.5. EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

16. Last time you had contact/interacted with a Police officer has been:

In the last 6 months	” 1
In the last 6-12months	” 2
One year ago or earlier	” 3
Never had any	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

17. If you had contact/interaction with, which Police/Police organization? (You may choose more than one option)

State Police	” 1
Municipal/Communal Police	” 2
Other (Specify): _____	” 3
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

18. Has it ever happened to YOU to have been explicitly asked for a bribe in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

Institution	
NO, never happened	” 1
YES, with Traffic Police	” 2
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	” 3
YES, with Border and Migration Police	” 4
YES, with public Order Police	” 5
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	” 6
YES, from Internal Control Service	” 7

YES, with Regional Police administration	” 8
YES, with Police commissariat administration	” 9
YES, with Municipal/Communal Police	” 10
YES, other (Specify): _____	” 11

19. Has it happened to You in person, to have offered a bribe in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

Institution	
NO, never happened	” 1
YES, with Traffic Police	” 2
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	” 3
YES, with Border and Migration Police	” 4
YES, with public Order Police	” 5
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	” 6
YES, from Internal Control Service	” 7
YES, with Regional Police administration	” 8
YES, with Police commissariat administration	” 9
YES, with Municipal/Communal Police	” 10
YES, other (Specify): _____	” 11

20. Has it happened to YOU in person to have been explicitly asked for a favor in the last year from: (You may choose more than one option)

Institution	
NO, never happened	” 1
YES, with Traffic Police	” 2
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	” 3
YES, with Border and Migration Police	” 4
YES, with public Order Police	” 5
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	” 6
YES, from Internal Control Service	” 7
YES, with Regional Police administration	” 8
YES, with Police commissariat administration	” 9
YES, with Municipal/Communal Police	” 10
YES, other (Specify): _____	” 11

21. Have YOU in person offered any favors in the last year: (You may choose more than one option)

Institution	
NO, never happened	” 1
YES, with Traffic Police	” 2
YES, with Anti-Drugs (Police Sector against narcotics and trafficking)	” 3
YES, with Border and Migration Police	” 4
YES, with public Order Police	” 5
YES, with Anti-crime (Police Sector against heavy crimes)	” 6
YES, from Internal Control Service	” 7
YES, with Regional Police administration	” 8
YES, with Police commissariat administration	” 9
YES, with Municipal/Communal Police	” 10
YES, other (Specify): _____	” 11

22. If you have paid a bribe or offered a favor in the last year to the officers of any of the above mentioned structures, which has been their reaction?

Institution	
Has accepted the bribe / favor	” 1
Has not accepted the bribe / favor	” 2
I don't know / Refuse to answer	” 99

23. Do you know where to denounce an act (or tentative) of corruption by a State Police Officer?

YES	” 1
NO	” 2

24. Have you ever denounced an act (or tentative) of corruption by a State Police Officer?

YES	” 1
NO	” 2
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

25. If NO, what was the reason (why):

I have never been exposed to a corruptive act by State Police officers	” 1
I had no time, I have been in a hurry	” 2
I had no information about where to denounce	” 3
It has been easier to solve the problem with a bribe/favor	” 4
I had no trust at institutions where to denounce	” 5
Other (Specify): _____	” 6
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.6. TYPES AND DEGREE OF CORRUPTION

26. In your opinion, how often do following act happen in State Police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-most never and 5-very often.

Act	Frequency				
	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Bribe	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courtesies / favors of third parties (outside police)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courtesies / favors for third parties (by the police)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courtesies / favors for their colleagues (within the police)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Misuse of police funds	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Misuse of police means	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Evidence manipulation	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Use of excessive violence by the police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

27. Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree and 5-fully agree.

Statement	Evaluation				
	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Recruitment of police officers takes place on corruptive basis	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Appointments and rankings in middle and lower ranks of police are corruptive	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police leaders use police for corruptive affairs	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Procurement in police is performed on corruptive basis	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers create themselves the opportunity for profit through corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.4.7. EXTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

28. In your opinion, how much spread is corruption in the following institutions? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Not at all and 5-very spread.

Institution	Level of Corruption				
President	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Council of Ministers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ministry of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courts	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High State Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High Inspectorate of Declarations and Audit of Assets	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ombudsman	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

29. How effective have been the following institutions in fight against corruption in State Police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
President	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 99
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Council of Ministers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ministry of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courts	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political Parties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internationals (EU, USA, OSCE)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

30. Do you believe that international and EU assistance has helped in reduction of Police corruption?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

31. Do you believe that NATO membership has helped in reduction of Police Corruption?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.8. INTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

32. How much do following factors influence the level of corruption in Police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-No influence at all and 5-a lot of influence.

Institution	Evaluation				
Low Salaries	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Little training	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political Impact	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Working culture in State Police Institution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

Corruption culture in Albanian society in general	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
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33. How do you consider working conditions of State Police officers?

Bad	” 1
Acceptable	” 2
Good	” 3
Very good	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.9. TOLERANCE TO CORRUPTION

34. In your opinion, are the following situations qualified as corruptive acts?

Statement	YES	NO	I don't know / Refuse
A police officer outside service (working hours) violates traffic police rules and is not punished	” 1	” 2	” 99
A police officer <u>helps someone else</u> to benefit a service disregarding the queue	” 1	” 2	” 99
A police officer accepts free of charge services from private subjects (coffee shops, restaurants, petrol stations, etc.)	” 1	” 2	” 99
A police officer manipulates the evidence aiming at a quicker arrest of a suspected incriminated person.	” 1	” 2	” 99

35. If a police officer is involved in illegal activities or he/she collaborates with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations, he/she should:

Be given notice / warning for dismissal	” 1
Be transferred to another position	” 2
Leaves the Police	” 3
Other: _____	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

36. Do you agree with the following Statements? Please rank in a de-

gree from 1 to 5 where “1 – Do not agree” and “5 – fully agree”.

Statement	Evaluation				
It is fair that State Police officers perform another Nob outside working hours	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a bribery affair	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in provision of police information to criminal people/organizations	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a criminal organization	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the Nob	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Performing a second Nob outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfillment of the police duties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.4.10. TRUST IN FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

37. Do you believe that Police corruption can be reduced?

Yes, totally possible	” 1
Yes, but to a certain extent	” 2
Almost impossible	” 3
No, impossible	” 4
I don’t know/refuse to answer	” 99

38. Do you believe that Police is capable of fighting corruption internally?

Yes	” 1
To a certain extent	” 2
No	” 3
I don’t know/refuse to answer	” 99

39. How much trust do you have on the fight against Police corruption. Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Not trust at all and 5-a lot of trust.

Institution	Evaluation				
Prime Minister	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Minister of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
General Director of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Service	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
General Prosecutor	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ombudsman	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets and Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Judicial	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High State Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political Parties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

40. When do you expect that fight against corruption has given satisfactory results by minimizing Police corruption?

By the end of 2014	” 1
Within next 2 years	” 2
By the end of 2017	” 3
After being granted the EU candidate status	” 4
After we become EU members	” 5
Never	” 6
Other (Specify): _____	” 7
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

12.4.11. EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

41. How much do you know about anti-corruption legal framework and anticorruption policies for State Police?

I know know/have no information	” 1
Have little information	” 2

I know relatively well	” 3
I know a lot	” 4

42. Are the legal framework and policies in place appropriate for preventing corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
To some extent	” 3
Yes, totally appropriate	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

43. In your opinion, how much are the legal framework and policies in force implemented in prevention of corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
Somewhat	” 3
Totally implemented	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

44. Are the legal framework and policies in force appropriate for investigating corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
Somewhat	” 3
Yes, fully appropriate	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

45. In your opinion, how much are the legal framework and policies in force implemented in investigation of corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
Somewhat	” 3
Fully implemented/enforced	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

46. In your opinion, how effective are the following institutions in in-

investigation of corruption in Police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
Internal Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Inspection	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Service (ICS)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

1. How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in State police? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all and 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
Strengthening legal and institutional framework	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of anticorruption policies	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Replacement of State Police leadership	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Severe punishment	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of working conditions	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of salaries	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of education and training	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Better accountability from parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Better inspection of conflict of interest	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Other (Specify): _____	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.5. Annex 5

Questionnaire of Survey with Police officer

12.5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. MARK GENDER OF RESPONDENT:

Male	” 1
Female	” 2

2. What group age do you belong

Up to 25 years	” 1
26- 35 years	” 2
36 – 45 years	” 3
46 – 55 years	” 4
Over 56 years	” 5

3. What is your highest education level completed?

High school	” 1
University degree	” 2
Post-university degree	” 3
Refuse to answer	” 99

4. What is your actual rank?

Police Officer of Implementation Level	
Vice-Inspector	” 1
Inspector	” 2
Chief - Inspector	” 3
First Leadership Level Police Officer	

Vice-Commissar	” 4
Commissar	” 5
Chief-Commissar	” 6
Middle rank Leadership Police Officer	
Leader	” 7
First Leader	” 8
High Rank Leadership Police Officer	
Leader	” 9
First Leader	” 10
REFUSE TO ANSWER	” 99

5. Which service of State Police do you work for?

Criminal Police	” 1
Border and Migration Police	” 2
Public Order and Safety	” 3
Support Services	” 4
Police Academy	” 5

6. Are you a field officer in your actual position in State Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2

7. Since when are you part of the State Police service?

Less than 5 years	” 1
5 – 10 years	” 2
11 – 20 years	” 3
21 – 30 years	” 4
Over 30 years	” 5

12.5.2. ACQUENTANCE OF POLICE ORGANISATIONS

8. Except for State Police, how many other Police organizations (Police) do you know to be operational in Albania?

Another one	” 1
-------------	-----

Two more	” 2
Up to four others	” 3
More than 5 others	” 4
I don't know	” 99

9. In your opinion, which Police organization (Police) is the most corrupt?

10. In your opinion, which Police organization (Police) is least corrupt?

12.5.3. INFORMATION ON CORRUPTION

11. Which are you main means of information on general development in country:

TV	” 1
Newspapers	” 2
Internet	” 3
Radio	” 4
Friends /acquaintances / family	” 5
Other. Specify _____	” 6

12. Have you ever heard being talked about corruption in Police?

Almost always	” 1
Often	” 2
Rarely	” 3
Never	” 4
Refuse to answer	” 99

13. From which source do you hear more about corruption in Police?

Media (TV, Newspapers, Radio etc.)	” 1
Personal Experience	” 2

Friends/family	” 3
From colleagues and work environment	” 4
Other. Specify _____	” 5
Refuse to answer	” 99

14. How often do you hear or are exposed to information about corrupt police officers?

Almost always	” 1
Often	” 2
Rarely	” 3
Never	” 4
Refuse to answer	” 99

12.5.4. PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION

15. Do you think there are corrupt officers in State Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

16. To what degree do you think that corruption is spread in State Police?

Does not exist	” 1
Few, isolated cases	” 2
Exists, but is not in serious levels	” 3
Is spread to a considerable extent	” 4
Is very much spread and seriously	” 5
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

17. Rank the level of corruption in different ranks of the State Police. Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-does not exist and 5-very spread.

Leadership levels in State Police	Corruption Degree				
High rank leadership of “General Directorate of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

High rank leadership of “Directorates of State Police in Region level”	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Commissariat Leaders of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Middle rank leadership in commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Basic level of officers of State Police in commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

1. Rank the level of corruption in different structures of the State Police. Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-does not exist and 5-very spread.

State Police Structure	Corruption degree				
Traffic Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against narcotics and trafficking (Anti-drugs)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Border and Migration Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector for investigation and prevention of crimes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector for Public order and safety (Order)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against financial crime	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Sector against heavy crimes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Administration of Regional Police Directorates and commissariats	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Service	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

2. Do you agree with the following Statements? Please rank in a degree from 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree and 5-fully agree.

Statement	Evaluation				
There are enough not corrupted police officers within the State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers are corrupt before Joining the State Police force	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
The higher the number of police organizations (Police) in the country, the higher the corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Old (aged) officers of the State Police are more corrupt that young officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Male officers of the State Police are more corrupt that female officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

State police is not corrupt as an institution, but certain individuals inside it are corrupt	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers that work in the field are more corrupt than those who work in offices	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High rank officers in State Police tolerate corruption of their dependents	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Lack of action from the State Police leadership in fight against corruption discourages police officers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Majority of State Police officers are motivated in law enforcement	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Majority of State Police officers often use the law as a pressure on citizens for personal benefits	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.5.5. EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

3. In the last 12 months, has it happened to YOU in person any of the following situations?

Situation	Frequency				
	<i>Never</i>	<i>At least once</i>	<i>Several times</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very often</i>
A citizen offered a bribe	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A citizen asked for a favor	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A colleague asked for a favor	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Your supervisor asked to tolerate someone (citizen, colleague, official, etc.)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
You have denounced a police officer for corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
You have denounced your supervisor for corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
You have denounced a citizen for a tentative corruptive behavior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

4. In the last 12 months, have YOU in person ever encounter any of the following situations:

Situation	Frequency				
	<i>Never</i>	<i>At least once</i>	<i>Several times</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Very often</i>
A police officer getting a bribe	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
A police officer offering a favor to a citizen	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
A police officer offering a favor to another colleague	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
A police officer asking a bribe/ favor to any citizen in return on no punishment	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
A Police officer denouncing his colleague/supervisor about corruption	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
A police officer denouncing a citizen for a tentative corruptive behavior	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5

12.5.6. TYPES AND DEGREE OF CORRUPTION

5. In your opinion, how often do following act happen in the State Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-almost never and 5-very often.

Act	Frequency				
Bribe	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Courtesies / favors of third parties (outside police)	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Courtesies / favors for third parties (by the police)	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Courtesies / favors for their colleagues (within the police)	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Misuse of police funds	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Misuse of police means	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Evidence manipulation	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5
Use of excessive violence by the police	" 1	" 2	" 3	" 4	" 5

6. Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree and 5-fully agree.

Statement	Evaluation				
Police officers collaborate with incriminated people and/or criminal organizations	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers are involved in illegal activities (like trafficking, smuggling, etc.)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Recruitment of police officers takes place on corruptive basis	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Appointments and ranking in high rank police are corruptive	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Appointments and rankings in middle and lower ranks of police are corruptive	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police leaders use police for corruptive affairs	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political leaders and police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers collaborate between them for corruptive purposes	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Procurement in police is performed on corruptive basis	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police officers create themselves the opportunity for profit through corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.5.7. EXTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

7. In your opinion, how much spread is corruption in the following institutions? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-not at all and 5-very spread.

Institution	Degree of corruption				
President	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Council of Ministers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ministry of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courts	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High State Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High Inspectorate of Declarations and Audit of Assets	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ombudsman	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

8. How effective have been the following institutions in fight against corruption in State Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-not effective at all and 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
President	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 99
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Council of Ministers	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ministry of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Courts	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political Parties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internationals (EU, USA, OSCE)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

9. Do you believe that international and EU assistance have helped in reducing corruption in Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

10. Do you believe that NATO membership has helped in reducing corruption in Police?

Yes	” 1
No	” 2
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

12.5.8. INTERNAL FACTORS OF CORRUPTION

11. How much do following factors influence level of corruption in Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-no influence at all and 5-a lot of influence.

Institution	Evaluation				
Low salaries	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Little training	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political influence	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Working culture in police institutions	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Corruption culture in Albanian society in general	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12. How do you consider the work conditions of State Police officers?

Bad	” 1
Acceptable	” 2
Good	” 3
Very good	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

13. Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-Do not agree and 5-fully agree.

Statement	Evaluation				
Middle and low rank salaries in State Police are enough for a normal lifestyle	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High rank salaries in State Police are enough for a normal lifestyle	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Code of Ethics has not influences at all in prevention of corruption in State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal regulations of State Police allow room for corruption	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.5.9. TOLERANCE TO CORRUPTION

14. In your opinion, can following situations be considered as corruptive acts/practices?

	YES	NO	I don't know / Refuse
A police officer outside service (working hours) violates traffic police rules and is not punished	” 1	” 2	” 99

A police officer <u>helps someone else</u> to benefit a service disregarding the queue	” 1	” 2	” 99
A police officer accepts free of charge services from private subjects (coffee shops, restaurants, petrol stations, etc.)	” 1	” 2	” 99
A police officer manipulates the evidence aiming at a quicker arrest of a suspected incriminated person.	” 1	” 2	” 99

15. If a police officer is involved in illegal activities and collaborates with incriminate people and/or criminal organizations, he/she should:

Be given notice / warning for dismissal from work	” 1
Be transferred to another position	” 2
Be expelled from the police	” 3
Other: _____	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

16. Do you agree with the following statements? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-“Do not agree and 5-fully agree”.

Statement	Evaluation				
It is fair that State Police officers perform another job outside working hours	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a bribery affair	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in provision of police information to criminal people/organizations	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
A police officer should denounce his colleagues that are involved in a criminal organization	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Some rules can be violated by State Police officers for the sake of the Nob	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Performing a second job outside working hours of a State Police officer has a negative impact in fulfillment of the police duties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.5.10. TRUST IN FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

17. Do you think that corruption in Police may be reduced?

Yes, totally possible	” 1
Yes, but to a certain extent	” 2
Almost impossible	” 3
NO, impossible	” 4
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

18. DO you believe that Police is capable of fighting corruption internally?

Yes	” 1
To a certain degree	” 2
No	” 3
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

19. Do you have trust on the fight against corruption in Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-No trust at all 5-fully trust.

Institution	Evaluation				
Prime Minister	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Minister of Interior	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
General Director of State Police	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Service	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
General Prosecutor	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Ombudsman	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High Inspectorate of Declaration of Assets and Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Judicial	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Prosecution	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
High State Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Political Parties	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Civil Society	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Media	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

20. When do you expect that fight against corruption has given satisfactory results by minimizing the corruption in Police?

By the end of 2014	” 1
Within next 2 years	” 2
By the end of 2017	” 3
After being granted the EU candidate status	” 4
After we become EU members	” 5
Never	” 6
Other (Specify): _____	” 7
I don't know/refuse to answer	” 99

12.5.11. EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK

21. Do you know of the legal framework and policies in force about ant-corruption in State Police?

Have no information	” 1
Have little information	” 2
Have relatively good information	” 3
Have very good information	” 4

22. Are the legal framework and policies in force appropriate to prevent corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
Somewhat	” 3
Yes, fully appropriate	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

23. In your opinion, how much are the legal framework and policies in force being implemented in order to prevent corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
somewhat	” 3
Yes, fully appropriate	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

24. Are the legal framework and policies in force appropriate to investigate corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
somewhat	” 3
Yes, fully appropriate	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

25. In your opinion, how much are the legal framework and policies in force being implemented in investigating corruption in Police?

Not at all	” 1
Very little	” 2
somewhat	” 3
Yes, fully appropriate	” 4
I don't know / refuse to answer	” 99

26. In your opinion how effective are the following institutions in investigation of corruption in Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
Internal Audit	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Inspection	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Internal Control Service (ICS)	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

1. How effective are the following measures in fight against corruption in State Police? Please rank in a degree of 1 to 5 where 1-Not effective at all 5-very effective.

Institution	Evaluation				
Strengthening legal and institutional framework	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of anticorruption policies	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Replacement of State Police leadership	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Severe punishment	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of working conditions	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of salaries	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Improvement of education and training	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Better accountability from parliament	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Better inspection of conflict of interest	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5
Other (Specify): _____	” 1	” 2	” 3	” 4	” 5

12.6. Annex 6

Interviews with State Police officers based on hypothetical scenarios

12.6.1. Table of scenarios

Scenario 1	A police officer runs his own private business, in which he sells and installs security equipment, such as alarm systems, safety and anti-ligature locks, etc. He runs this business after office hours.
Scenario 2	A police officer regularly accepts free meals, cigarettes and other goods at a rate from the dealers in THE AREA OF HIS PATROL. He does not ask for these and is careful not to abuse with the generosity of the people that make these gifts
Scenario 3	A police officer pulls over a speedy motorist. The police officer agrees to accept a bribe in exchange for skipping the ticket; the bribe is half the amount of the ticket he was supposed to write.
Scenario 4	A police officer is much esteemed in his community. Businesspeople of the area, restaurant and bar owners try to show their appreciation of his service by giving him free food and drinks WHEN HE IS OFF DUTY.
Scenario 5	A police officer finds out that a burglary has occurred at a jeweler's. The shop display window glass was broken and many items were stolen from it. When examining the location, the police officer steals a watch, which is equal to half of his monthly salary. He reports that the watch is among other items stolen during the burglary.

Scenario 6	A police officer has a private deal with a car service and spare part shop to recommend owners of cars crashed in accidents to have their car serviced in that particular shop. In exchange of recommendations, he takes a commission of 5% of the value of the car repair from the car service shop owner for every car recommended to and serviced by this business.
Scenario 7	A police officer, who is a very good car mechanic, is assigned to work during vacation period. One of his supervisors offers him the opportunity to take some days off if the police officer repairs the personal car of the supervisor. HOW WOULD YOU CONSIDER THE CONDUCT OF THIS SUPERVISOR?
Scenario 8	It is 2 o'clock in the morning. A police officer on patrol is driving the police car in a road where there are no people. He spots a car off the road, stuck in a ditch. He approaches the car and sees that the driver is not harmed but he is drunk. He finds out that the drunk driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and recording the traffic code violation, he helps the driver out and drives him home.
Scenario 9	A police officer, who is patrolling on foot in the area assigned to him, sees that a bar owner is serving drinks one hour beyond business closing hours and there is much noise coming from the loud music and its clients. Rather than reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to have two free drinks from the bar owner.
Scenario 10	Two patrolling police officers see a young man trying to break into a car. The suspect takes to his heels upon spotting the approaching police officers, who run after him for a while. They catch him, take him down, and handcuff the suspect. After that, the police officers punch him in the belly as a punishment for his runaway and resistance to handcuffs.
Scenario 11	A police officer finds a wallet in a shopping mall where he was patrolling. In the wallet, there is some money worth his five days of work. He hands in the wallet to the lost-and-found unit, but decides to keep the money for himself.

12.6.2. Table of responses

1. How serious is this conduct in YOUR opinion??				
1 Not serious at all	2	3	4	5 Very serious
2. How serious do MAJORITY OF POLICE OFFICERS IN OUR REGION/ DEPARTMENT consider such conduct?				
1 Not serious at all	2	3	4	5 Very serious
3. Is this conduct considered as a violation of the official line and Police policies?				
1 Absolutely Not	2	3	4	5 Of course Yes
4. If a police officer is involved in such a conduct and is exposed while acting in that way, what kind of disciplinary measure should be given, if any, and YOU think SHOULD be taken against HIM?				
1. None 2. Verbal admonition 3. Written admonition				
4. Suspension without pay 5. Demotion 6. Dismissal from work				
5. If a police officer in our Police region/directorate is involved in such a conduct and is exposed while acting in that way, what kind of disciplinary measure should be given, and YOU think WOULD be taken against HIM?				
1. None 2. Verbal admonition 3. Written admonition				
4. Suspension without pay 5. Demotion 6. Dismissal from work				
6. Do you believe that YOU WOULD report on a fellow police officer who is involved in such a conduct?				
1 Absolutely Not	2	3	4	5 Of course Yes
7. DO you think that MOST OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN YOOOR DEPARTMENT/REGION would report on a fellow police officer who is involved in such a conduct?				
1 Absolutely Not	2	3	4	Of course Yes

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