



INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND MEDIATION  
**CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN AND SECURITY AFFAIRS**

---

- [Rruga Shinas Dishnica Nr 37, \(Pazari i Ri, prane Sh. Avni Rustemi\)](#)
- [P.O. Box 8177, Tirana, Albania,](#)
- [Tel: +355 4 240 0241, Tel/Fax: +355 4 240 0640](#)
- [E-mail: info@idmalbania.org](mailto:info@idmalbania.org)
- [Website: www.idmalbania.org](http://www.idmalbania.org)

**Policy Paper**  
**"Security Management Network"**

**A Road Map for a New National Security Strategy**

Evaluation of risks threats and challenges  
How to build a more participatory and accountable process

*Prepared by:*

**MA. Geron Kamberi**

**MA. Elira Hroni**

**MA. Besnik Baka**

**June 2011**

## - **Introduction**

Improving the process of CRT (challenge, risk and threats) assessment remains one of the most important challenges in terms of defining a comprehensive national security document. This policy paper aims not only to give a general view on the current implications of the process but also to ensure a useful platform for discussion on the eve of review and drafting of the new national security strategy document. More specifically, the purpose is to provide a summary analysis on Albanian CRT assessment so far, by approaching three important levels for a final integrated process. The first one comprises a theoretical approach of the main concepts of challenges, risks and threats, and the way they are reflected in view of national security perspectives. The second part provides an outline of the Albanian national security framework to define CRT, followed by an analysis of the importance for an inclusive policy and decision-making process, with the participation of different actors and groups of interest. The later assesses the contributive role that other actors mainly from civil society sector might play in this specific policy area.

### **I. A practical and theoretical approach to defining challenges, risks and threats in the national security doctrinaire framework.**

The development of a comprehensive National Security Policy (NSP), aiming to give a detailed and all inclusive approach to the national security concept, should evolve coherently with the complex security environment while at the same time transform itself according to the emerging broad concept of security. Developing an integrated, comprehensive, and cohesive National Security doctrinaire framework comprises a continuous assessment of Challenges, Risks and Threats (the so called CRT process). The analytical research is considered essential to support the practice in national security development, in order to build a consistent link between long- term objectives and respective short-term decision-making. Therefore, there is a need for differentiation and prioritization of these three concepts not only according to the human dimension of security but also to specific timeframes, including short, medium and long term ones. In addition, it is important to differentiate between the magnitude of importance concerning the impact these concepts may have on the future probability of occurrence and also on the allocation of resources which deal with them.

The current considerations of these concepts vary according to specific national security needs, priorities and challenges. For example, the Netherlands National Risk Assessment defines risk as “*a combination of impact (the total of the consequences of the scenario-incident) and likelihood (an expectation concerning the occurrence of the scenario-incident) with its consequences*”.<sup>1</sup> According to the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) most current classification risk is regarded as “*the product of three principal variables: (1) threat, or the likelihood of a type of attack occurring, (2) vulnerability, or the relative exposure of an attack and (3) consequence, or expected impact of an attack*”.<sup>2</sup>

Conversely, the UK National Risk Register (NRR) does not provide a clear definition of risk but identifies the *type* of risks that the UK is concerned with.<sup>3</sup> According to this model, the basic formula for risk assessment is simple --*probability times consequences, equals*

---

<sup>1</sup>Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), Focal report, Risk analysis, , ETH Zurich, November 2008

<sup>2</sup>Masse, Todd; O’Neil, Siobhan; and Rollins, John (2007), The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress. United States CRS Report for Congress, February

<sup>3</sup>United Kingdom (2008), *National Risk Register*. UK Cabinet Office, 8 August

*risks*<sup>4</sup>. Different sources focus on the “trio of threat, vulnerability and consequence as a general model for assessing risk” which must be at the heart of the national security approach. Therefore, risk is defined as the product of probability that a certain event might occur and the consequences that could result from such an event. The probability side of the equation is a combination of threats and vulnerabilities. In the same vein, the final piece of basic risk assessment involves exploring the consequences that might result from different threats.<sup>5</sup>

Methodologically, each risk needs to be assessed in terms of impact and probability representing the results in a risk matrix which allows the categorization of risks according to the above mentioned criteria for an improved decision-making. So, in their national security formulations countries tend to include a very broad spectrum of risks to national security and there is no major distinction and categorization of risks, threats and challenges. Moreover, the generally adopted approach comprises all range of issues (threats): from natural disasters to terrorist attacks, without providing a clear conceptual clarification. The basic reflection, therefore, is that both threats and risks should be considered and reflected by policy-makers in the formulation of strategy.

To conclude, it is absolutely worth the time and effort to develop robust national security risk assessments that can guide planning and policy development. Nevertheless, identifying threats, risks or challenges over the unknown future may fall under the subjectivity of the experts groups, defence experts or academics involved in making any kind of decision-making policy based on unpredictable potential future and the constant changing security environment. Consequently, the continuous revision of the strategic security documents may reduce the lack of inconsistency and coherence that characterize policy developments which address the future.

## **II. Overview of the Albanian national security framework to define CRT**

*It is widely accepted that all countries face a certain level of risk associated with various threats towards national security. These threats may be the result of political and economic events, accidents, and/or intentional acts threatening national security. Within this framework, it should be accounted that the first step in defining and managing risks in National Security Strategy (NSS) is the way these threats are assessed.*<sup>6</sup>

With reference to Albanian national security documents, despite the efforts for any kind of categorization, they are lacking a clear prioritization and differentiation of challenges, risks and threats. Since the adoption of the first document on National Security Strategy in 2000, it is noted that the process of basic CRT assessment does not seem to follow any top – down approach, being mainly a security elite driven process rather than a comprehensive one. Both documents of National Security Strategy adopted so far (2000, 2004), have traditionally classified risks and threats by using the dichotomy: internal (local) and external (regional, global).<sup>7</sup> The classification of risks at regional and local level, as it has been done so far,

---

<sup>4</sup>Worthmuth, E Christine, Homeland Security Risk Assessment: Key Issues and Challenges, Center for International and Strategic Studies, November 2005.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid*

<sup>6</sup> For an analytical review of the document of national security strategy and perceived threats see also: Sotiraq Hroni, Gjen.Let (in release) Pellumb Qazimi: View from Albania – “Study on Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans” in “Study on the Assessment Threats of Regional Security and Challenges in the Western Balkans”, Darko Istvam Gyarmati & Stancic (eds.), DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), 2007, p. 57

<sup>7</sup> Law No. 8572 dated 27/01/2000, “On the approval of Security Strategy Document of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 3, Year 2000, page 43). Part II, Threats and security risks. sub clause 8, 8.1, 8.2 deal with external threats and risks, while from 9 up to 9.9 defines internal threats and risks., p. 45-46 ; Law No. 9322 dated 25/11/2004 “On approval of

leaves room for shortcomings in terms of what these CRTs mean for policy-making elites and the general public.

As a result, although the Albanian NSS identifies four categories of threats and risks at local level, namely, organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters and problems of transition, there can be found vague and not enough elaborated perceived risks in the document such as for example "*public opinion misinformation*".<sup>8</sup> Moreover, threats and challenges at regional level are in line with the security cliché determined by the historical heritage and geo-strategic importance of the Balkans or the international security agenda (like terrorism or proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction).<sup>9</sup> Following this for example, in a survey recently conducted by Center for European and Security Affairs (CESA) of IDM (Institute for Democracy & Mediation) "*An assessment of Albania elites perception on national security threats, risks and strategy*" (2011) when asked about security priorities reflected in the existing security documents, the security elites<sup>10</sup> (54.3%) assessed that the priorities reflected are either mainly formal ones, not properly evaluated by the institutions or a reflection of the international agenda of global threats (30% of the respondents). Notwithstanding that, only 7.1% of security elites' representatives from this survey think that the existing security priorities are a response of realistic threats that exist in the Albanian context.

The three level model of how security elites perceive risks, namely: local, regional and global, is somewhat justified by the assumption of considering the CRT assessment a routine process, where there are no basic indicators how to prioritize and rank them, lacking also the prioritization according to short, medium and long term.<sup>11</sup> The generalization of risks reflects the fact that the responsible security institutions have not preferred to adapt a more comprehensive approach of CRT, neglecting the basic consideration that the internal and external security environment means an explicit division and link between national, societal and human security.

Therefore, this way of tackling the CRT assessment implies that this process is mainly related to security providers (being completely them who define what constitutes a risk or threat to national security) and it does not meet substantially the security consumer's needs; thus, failing somehow to link with the security consumer's priorities. (i.e to measure in advance the public perception on threats and risks). Such trend is also noted in 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph of the National Security Strategy (2004) where it is stated that "*The strategy supports the creation of a security planning system by giving priority of achieving a concrete outcome under the concept: Who does what, when, and in cooperation with whom.*"<sup>12</sup> This definition is another evidence to indicate that National Security Strategy is mostly attached to the concept

---

the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania", Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, p. 6696). (Part II. Threats and risks to security, sub clause 28 to 28.8 defines and identifies the internal risks internal and from 29.5 sub clause up to 29 are addressed the transnational and regional threats. For the first time is added the so-called global threats and risks which are treated by sub clauses 30 till to 30.3 ), p. 6705 - 6707)

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Islami Kastriot (former Albanian Foreign Minister 2003-2005), "National Security at the context of regional risks and threats" (Proceedings of the International Conference: "On the development of the national security strategy", Tirana 21 September 2007, organized by IDM & DCAF), Publishing House, Toena, Tirana, 2007, page 26

<sup>10</sup> The security elite in this survey includes officials from the following categories: senior political position in the central government, senior civil servants in the central government, members of the parliament, senior political and non-political positions at independent institution, representatives from academic cycles, civil society actors and media who deal with security issues.

<sup>11</sup> Geron Kamberi, Enri Hide "Strategic and doctrinaire framework of security policies in Albania" (edited in Security Policies in the Western Balkans , Belgrade 2010, pg 9-35, funded by BTM - Balkan Trust for Democracy, CCMR- Centre for Military Relations

<sup>12</sup> Geron Kamberi, Enri Hide Developing a national security in SECURITY REFORM ISSUES IN ALBANIA, Vol. I, 2009, pg 48-77, a collection of Policy Papers prepared by Security Monitoring Experts of Centre for European and Security Affairs ( IDM-Institute for Democracy and Mediation) with support of DCAF –Geneva and NATO Public Diplomacy Division

which is focused on the producers rather than consumers of security, missing this way a CRT assessment from human security perspective. In this framework, since the process in itself is directly related to financial and human resource allocation for security institutions any failure to prioritize it, clearly impacts the human security itself. In this context, it is worth indicating as an example, the series of civil emergencies that Albania faced in the recent years, where a lack of human and financial resources was observed, implying an undervaluation of such repeated risk.

### **An Overview of National and Legal Security Framework Gaps regarding National Security Policies.**

Despite the aforementioned gaps in the assessment of national CRT, the legal and institutional security framework is also important in providing a better participatory and comprehensive approach towards CRT assessment and evaluation. The shortcomings identified along may also be referred to as an outcome of the current operating institutional structures in the security sector area. Accordingly, the process of CRT assessment is interdependently related to the legal clarification and division of roles and competencies between the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body headed by the President of the Republic and the Committee of National Security Policies (CNSP) chaired by the Prime Minister.<sup>13</sup>

For a better understanding of the functional dualism of these bodies, it is necessary to give a general overview on the issue and how it has been assessed so far. The main consideration is that both the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents so far (2000; 2004) reflect to a certain level an ambiguous and overlapping role of both these structures. Specifically in this regard, the NSS (2000) have determined as the main task of National Security Council "*the formulation and adoption of National Security Strategy which is submitted for approval to the Parliament*". Nevertheless, the revision of the NSS in 2004 brought changes to the roles of decision-making authorities by transferring it to the Prime Minister. According to this law, the Prime Minister has the power to review NSS within 3 years which also implies even the process of CRT assessment. Such a change was preceded in January 2003, when parliament adopted the law on organization and operation of PM through which were established ministerial committees as "*consultative bodies of Council of Ministers where the policies are firstly discussed*".<sup>14</sup> Among these was established also the Committee of National Security Policies. Despite the fact that these committees are chaired by the Prime Minister and are given an important role in policy formulation, there are no other functions which are typical for the authorities of coordinating national security.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, the National Security Council under the 2000 Law "*For the powers and authority of command of the strategic management of Armed Forces (AF)*" seems to run the same tasks in the security policy area

---

<sup>13</sup> The issue of lacking the coordination between decision-making structures of security is addressed at another policy paper: Arjan Dyrnishi "Evaluation of national security decision-making structures" pg 225-47, pg 43 in SECURITY REFORM ISSUES IN ALBANIA, Vol. I, 2009, pg 48-77, a collection of Policy Papers prepared by Security Monitoring Experts of Centre for European and Security Affairs (IDM-Institute for Democracy and Mediation) with support of DCAF –Geneva and NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The author suggest the idea of establishing a permanent structure at Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister which would consist of a variety of civilian and military experts. In addition to coordination it would take the process of drafting the NSS (National Security Strategy) and conduct an updated assessment of risks and threats.

<sup>14</sup> Law Nr 9000 dated 30.01.2003 " For the Organization and Functioning of Council of Minister", Article Nr 2 (Official Journal Nr 10, Year 2003, Pg 281)

<sup>15</sup> Decision of Council of Minister Nr 584 dated 28.8.2003 "On the approval of regulation for function of Council of Minister" (Official Journal Nr 76, Year 2003, Pg 3459)

since it acts as an “*advisory body to the president on security and defense issues of the country that discusses and take decisions*”.<sup>16</sup>

This dualism between the functions of the National Security Council and Committee of the National Security Policies is noted especially in the fourth part of the National Security Strategy (2004) referring to the leadership authorities of Security Strategy in the Republic of Albania.<sup>17</sup> According to this Strategy, the President as the Head of State and General Commander of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the National Security Council is defined as “*the highest official responsible for implementing the principles and objectives of national security by protecting national interests*” (Article 78). In this way, this definition gives an executive power to the President when the National Security Council is identified only as an “*advisory body*” to the President of the Republic “*on issues of national security and defense as well as the management and mobilization of human and material resources for the benefit of security*” (article 79).<sup>18</sup> The Council of Ministers, from the other hand, is defined as “*the implementer of the National Security Strategy (NSS) as well as responsible for the state development of security instruments and national resources*” (article 82). Apart from these executive duties, the article 83 highlights also the aspects of policy formulation in the security area. According to it, “*the Council of Ministers defines the principal directions of the security policy, submits them to the National Security Council and directs the operations of bodies in accordance with the law and the constitution*”.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, throughout the clause 84 the Prime Minister and the Committee of the National Security Policies is given the right to review National Security Strategy, by playing both roles of strategy and policy makers since the National Security Council attached to the President remains a body which mainly ratifies and approves such strategies and policies.

From all the above mentioned, we may conclude that there is an ambiguity of roles and relations between the President and the Prime Minister (in particular referring to article 78 and 83) where it seems that both have the right of strategic planning in the field of national security. However, the current legislation does not provide any clear definition how the President through the National Security Council could participate and influence the process of national security strategy and CRT assessment. According to the definition provided by current law, the role of the President and the National Security Council is just as policy takers, since the only policy drivers remain the Prime Minister and Committee of the National Security Policies.

Following this, in the recent survey for “*An assessment of Albania elites perception on national security threats, risks and strategy*” the vast majority of the security elites (61.4%) support the idea that the process of drafting NSS should be coordinated by the President through the National Security Council what implies even the CRT assessment attached to this strategy. Nevertheless, the major part of the elites is sceptical (43%) towards the functionality and efficiency of the two bodies that operate in the security sector- National Security Council and the Committee on Security Policies. Among the issues that they point out as shortcomings are: lack of serious and institutionalized involvement of both these bodies in the security sector, non coordination and “*institutional rivalry*” between the President’s Office and Prime Minister’s Office in this area; and the lack of a clear strategy and segregation of functions and competences between these two structures.

---

<sup>16</sup> Law Nr 8671, dated 26.10.2000 “For the Powers and Authorities in Command and Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania” Article Nr 13 (Official Journal Nr 37, Year 2000, Pg1786)

<sup>17</sup> Law No. 9322 dated 25/11/2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania”, Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, p. 6696), (Part IV: Leadership of NSS in the Republic of Albania .From clauses 77 to 84) pg 6710-6711

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Ibid

## **For a Sustainable and Improved CRT Assessment...**

It is widely accepted that the process of drafting the National Security Strategy should be preceded by the National Security Policy as a logical step to guarantee its effectiveness. But so far all the so-called "building blocks" of a National Security Policy document are merged in the National Security Strategy and yet there is not any clear understanding among security elites about the need to have two documents separately (NSP, NSS).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, a Threat and Risk Assessment Document (TRAD) that would assess and rank the full spectrum of plausible national security risks and explore potential critical situations or threats in the country should be separately attached to National Security Strategy. In this case, the TRAD can be part of NSP which is necessary preliminary step for a sustainable NSS. This type of assessment developed on a regular basis may serve as the authoritative assessment of national security risks, identifying trends of significance for national security and if necessary, also the different views about risks among the principal senior leaders in the national government security arena. Additionally, as regards the changing security environment at national, local or regional level, the continuous review process of the CRT should update the priorities according to the developments on the ground.

There are at least three important ways to help the national security policy development and resource allocation process needs for a comprehensive and participatory process of CRT assessment:

First, *through guiding national security planning*. Security institutions can develop robust concepts of operations for national security, through conducting a strategic risk assessment. A national CRT Assessment would not only serve as the basis for developing common inter-governmental strategies for addressing specific national security challenges, but it would also serve as the basis for developing national security planning scenarios. In addition, this can be an important step towards harmonizing ongoing planning activities. Hence, these scenarios can play a larger role in driving policy, planning, and programming if they were based on the results of an intergovernmental-agreed CRT assessment.

Second, *driving the resource allocation process*. Various researchers have noted the importance of using risk assessments to set broad priorities on how security agencies allocate the resources. Beyond the formal aspects, a national CRT assessment can serve as the basis for harmonizing not only security resources or policy decisions, but also developing national security-related resources and policy decisions across the entire government and other bodies. This would follow a long way towards establishing a maximum consensus by all the engaged actors.

Finally, *evaluating potential policy and programmatic options*. Where should national security institutions and other agencies invest their money in order to prevent potential risks that the country might face? These are the kinds of real security decisions and institutions or agencies have to tackle within their budgeting processes. Risk assessment tools can help shed light on these choices in a structured way as well as a realistic allocation of funds in accordance to the threats posed to national security.

---

<sup>20</sup> For a detailed and compressive analysis of importance of "building blocks" of NSP and NSS see Bard B. Kundsén *What is a National Security Policy (NSP) and how it may be developed further into a National Security Strategy*, Geneva, 2011, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces –DCAF, 20 pg

### III. Human perspectives and local needs in the security policy

The role of civil society in the process of shaping and defining national security RCT is crucial if we take into account the strict framework and visions surrounding governmental organizations activity and scope. Historically, the governmental bodies' tend to reduce the agenda on national security policy in a narrow framework, related to territorial integrity, national interests, rule of law etc. This approach might endanger the core concept of the nation; *the people*. In this regard, traditional conceptualizations of security have a tendency to reduce humans to their role as means to secure a particular socio-economic model of statehood.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, overwhelmingly the laws and strategic documents in Albania during the last 20 years were drafted from the executive itself and represented to the parliament for approval without any prior consultations with the CS.<sup>22</sup> This has threatened to establish a dangerous gap between citizens and state institutions not only in the process of policy formulation but implementation as well, taking into consideration that the perceptions of security threats, risks and challenges in the wide public, are closely related with the human security<sup>23</sup> as it directly affects people themselves. The deficiencies in this process are confirmed by the answers of the questionnaires conducted by IDM with 70 leading security sector representatives from the state institutions as well as civil society, academia and media. The vast majority of the security elites agree that the process of identification and assessment of national security threats and risks is either "...*partially consulted with a limited number of non-state actors or a process that exclusively happens within one or two specific institutions*". In this regards, the consultations with civil society actors are limited and partially taking place in this process. Moreover, 18.6% of the respondents believe that the assessment of RTC is the product of some specific individuals who represent the main institutions in the security sector.<sup>24</sup> As a consequence the exclusion of important actors in the process of consultations and decision-making is legitimated from the structures in power.

#### CS engagement in RTC Assessment process

- *Sharing specialized information and knowledge of local needs and conditions with policy makers,*
- *Improving the legitimacy of policy processes through broader inclusion of societal groups and perspectives*
- *Encouraging security policies that are representative of and responsive to local communities and human needs*
- *Representing the interests of groups and communities in the policy environment*
- *Providing a pool of independent expertise, information and perspectives*

In this framework, the strength of the civil society organizations, compared to the state bureaucratic structures, is that they are usually more attuned to individual and community needs and perspectives. Furthermore the contribution of the civil society can be considered crucial as most governmental officials hold their positions for relatively short periods of time and aim to have "planning horizons" that generally correspond to the amount of time they expect to hold their present jobs.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Barry J. Ryan, The EU's Emergent Security-First Agenda: Securing Albania and Montenegro, *Security Dialogue* 2009; 40; 311, <http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/40/3/311>

<sup>22</sup> Arbana Lora, "Understanding Defense and Security In Correlation to Civil Society and Media", Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2003,

[http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:IrHWUcCdeiWJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev\\_belgrade\\_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en](http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:IrHWUcCdeiWJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev_belgrade_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en), Accessed July 2009

<sup>23</sup> Security Monitoring Network, Human Security in Albania, CESA IDM,

[http://www.idmalbania.org/v2/index.php?option=com\\_filecabinet&view=files&id=2&Itemid=7&lang=en](http://www.idmalbania.org/v2/index.php?option=com_filecabinet&view=files&id=2&Itemid=7&lang=en)

<sup>24</sup> IDM, An Assessment of Albanian Elites' Perception on National Security Threats, Risks and Assessment, Figure 7, March 2011

<sup>25</sup> Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, Creating a strategic vision, September 1986



The means by which civil society supports democratic decision-making in general, and in particular the process of assessing a proper framework of national security threats, challenges and risks, is to help ensure greater inclusion of groups which previously had little or no voice in the deliberative process.<sup>26</sup> The use of non-governmental data in parallel to official data can be crucial for ensuring a complementary approach along with a realistic evaluation of national security risks threats and challenges based on independent sources. It can be considered fundamental in this process the expertise on some aspect of defense and security affairs that include university departments, academic institutes, professional associations, human rights and civil liberties groups, journalists, and non-governmental organizations.

Despite the fact that these groups enable to provide a thorough unified reaction, the authorities might work to synthesize various visions in a coherent stance regarding national security.<sup>27</sup> When possible, each policy development step and decision, regarding national security implications should be validated both within government and civil society, before the process moves on. Essentially, the process of consulting other actors will be either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' driven or possibly a combination of both. The disadvantage of a top-down approach is the need to develop consensus at the highest level from the outset. Whereas a bottom-up process would enable many minor details to be resolved prior to the involvement of senior officers and ministers.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, inclusiveness is not enough to ensure consensus and support for the process of policy formulation unless the subsequent decision process is transparent. In this regard, the process of assessing national security risks, threats, and challenges not only might reflect the country's security situation but at the same time should provide an overall process, based on democratic values and standards such as transparency, inclusiveness and accountability towards the citizens.<sup>29</sup>

## Conclusion

One of the central issues surrounding the definition of a Road Map for NSS should be the development of a CRT assessment process based upon an appropriate legal framework which clearly stipulates the roles of institutions to lead it. The legal framework has to change aiming to institutionalize the participatory process of CRT assessment into security institutions and link it better with resource allocation processes. The participatory approach can elevate and integrate the useful risk assessment processes in order to help building a coherent, comprehensive risk assessment picture that would truly derive policy and programming at the strategic level.

In addition, from the viewpoint of risk classification, the national security strategy should not simply follow a ranking of geographic distribution (global, regional or local), but within each of them, this strategy should determine the degree of intensity and the ways to face them in short, medium and long terms. As such, the national security strategy should be designed taking as spotlight an interlinked concept of human security depending on the importance that it presents in certain areas (i.e. *food, environmental, social, political, road security* etc.). For this reason, the inter-action with other independent bodies such as civil society organizations and academic institutions might constitute an important aspect of this process. This would guarantee not only a greater inclusion of groups that previously had little or no voice in the

---

26 Forman Johanna, Security Sector Reform: What Role for Civil Society? in Defence and Security Affairs in Caparini et al, Civil Society and the Security Sector, DCAF, 2006,

<http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=21660&nav1=4>

<sup>27</sup> Politika e Sigurisë Kombëtare, DCAF backgrounder, 01.2006

<sup>28</sup> Defence and Security Policy Formulation, Evaluation and Implementation in Developing Countries

<sup>29</sup> ibid

deliberative process, but at the same time ensure a comprehensive approach of the CRT assessment based on local needs and situations.